The Changing Role of Congress in Defense Policy-Making

Abstract

The role of Congress in defense policy-making has clearly been changing since 1968. The objective of this study is to describe and explain this change through the use of systemic indicators. A set of behavioral rules for the 1947–1967 period is developed by examining previous studies. Then empirical indicators are developed for the inputs, conversion processes, and outputs of the Congressional defense policy system. These indicators point to an increased role for Congress in the 1968–1974 period. Major factors explaining this change include the Vietnam War, decreased public perception of external threat, a rise in non-DOD defense policy alternatives, increased control of military procurement, a balanced Senate Armed Services Committee, continuing debate on national priorities, and the rise of a legitimate Congressional bloc critical of defense policy. Key variables in assessing the permanence of the change appear to be public perception of threat stemming from U.S.-Soviet relations and the conflict between foreign and domestic spending.