Senate Armed Services Committee Research Articles

After the Fight: Interagency Operations

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 23 June 2005, the head of US Central Command, General John Abizaid, reported that the strength of the insurgency in Iraq had not changed since the beginning of the year. Further, he said, I believe there are more foreign fighters coming into Iraq than there were six months ago. (1) General Abizaid's testimony shortly followed statements in the press by Senator Chuck Hagel that things aren't getting better; they're getting worse .... The reality is, we're losing in (2) The post-major combat operations phase in Iraq is stunning example of how the failure to effectively plan and execute interagency operations turned what started as out as rapid victory into long, hard slog. Despite the lightning-quick defeat of Saddam's army and the destruction of his regime, US and Coalition forces in Iraq are struggling to create secure environment and bring to fruition stable, democratic Iraqi government. The situation may not be nearly as dire as some pundits and much of the media would have the American public believe, (3) but there is certainly long way to go before most Iraqi citizens will be living in safe and secure environment under democratic government. This state of affairs begs the question: How did we regress from stunningly rapid conventional military victory to slow, painful, and drawn-out counterinsurgency effort? James Fallows argues that two themes have emerged: a lack of foresight and lack of insight--that is, failure to ask 'What happens next?' and failure to wonder 'How will this look through Iraqi eyes?' (4) US and Coalition military forces did very well during the initial major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, yet subsequently failed to recognize the political, social, economic, and ideological aspects of the campaign. A substantial reason for this breakdown was the lack of effective interagency collaboration at the operational level--in other words, lack of interagency unity of command and effort. This in turn resulted in failure to apply effectively all the elements of national power: diplomatic, informational, and economic as well as military. Using the relationship between Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CJTF-7) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq as case study, this article argues that improving its ability to conduct interagency operations needs to become one of DOD's highest priorities. (5) Post-Major Combat Operations in Iraq President Bush declared the end of major combat operations on 1 May 2003. Nonetheless, during the few months of 2004 strategic planners in CJTF-7, the senior military headquarters in Iraq, commonly asked each other: Are we in Phase IV yet? This phase consisted of post-combat operations in which the role and footprint of Coalition military forces would begin to sharply decline, while civilian authorities played greater role and began the process of returning sovereignty to what was expected to be 'friendly Iraqi government. Although Coalition soldiers were experiencing increasingly frequent attacks from guerillas or insurgents, especially from roadside bombs, Saddam's armed forces clearly had been defeated. There was even period of several weeks in which US casualties from traffic accidents exceeded those from enemy action. Yet the slaughter of American contractors on 31 March 2004 and the subsequent first battle for Fallujah, combined with al-Sadr's assaults on Najafand Kut, clearly indicated that there was still plenty of combat in Iraq. Much of the press has asserted failure to plan for post-combat operations. (6) The greater problem, however, was that of execution. Before the war, US Central Command published 300-page operations order for Phase IV. (7) A key aspect of DOD planning was to appoint senior civilian administrator upon the completion of major combat operations. This was initially accomplished by the appointment of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner and the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). …

Statement by Undersecretary of the Air Force Director, National Reconnaissance Office Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space The Honorable Peter B. Teets Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee On Space Policy March 16, 2005

ABSTRACT The following is the prepared testimony of the Honorable Peter B. Teets, then Undersecretary of the Air Force, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space, presented to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, on 16 March 2005. Mr. Teets has subsequently retired from the Department of Defense. This prepared statement can be found at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/March/Teets%2003-16-05.pdf

Statement of General James E. Cartwright, USMC Commander United States Strategic Command Before The Strategic Forces Subcommittee On Space Policy March 16, 2005

ABSTRACT The following is the prepared testimony of General James E. Cartwright, U.S. Marine Corps, Command of United States Strategic Command, presented to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on 16 March 2005. The prepared testimony can also be found at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statement/2005/March/Cartwright%2003-16-05.pdf

Congressional Testimony of General Lance W. Lord, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee United States Senate Washington D.C 16 March 2005

ABSTRACT The following is the prepared testimony of General Lance W. Lord, USAF, Commander of U.S. Air Force Space Command before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate's Armed Services Committee on 16 March 2005. The prepared testimony can also be found at: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2005/March/Lord%2003-16-05.pdf

Editor's Column: Collateral Damage

In an interview following his 7 may 2004 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld, the United States secretary of defense, admitted knowing about abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison since they were first exposed in January. He also knew of the existence of photographs documenting the abuses, but he had not studied the images until shortly before they were shown to the public during the first week of May. In asserting that “[i]t is the photographs that give one the vivid realization of what actually took place” and that “[w]ords don't do it,” Rumsfeld expressed, and even surpassed, one of the prime clichés of our time, that a picture is worth a thousand words. Before the power of visual images, the subject has an uncontrollable emotional response: “you cannot help but be outraged.”

Editor's Column: Collateral Damage

In an interview following his 7 may 2004 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld, the United States secretary of defense, admitted knowing about abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison since they were first exposed in January. He also knew of the existence of photographs documenting the abuses, but he had not studied the images until shortly before they were shown to the public during the first week of May. In asserting that “[i]t is the photographs that give one the vivid realization of what actually took place” and that “[w]ords don't do it,” Rumsfeld expressed, and even surpassed, one of the prime clichés of our time, that a picture is worth a thousand words. Before the power of visual images, the subject has an uncontrollable emotional response: “you cannot help but be outraged.”

Network centric interoperability - Using a variable message format (VMF) based data-link to improve situational awareness and close air support (CAS)

Clearly demonstrated in the recent military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, one of the most significant challenges now facing the warfighter is how to seamlessly interface the myriad of disparate stand-alone situational awareness (SA) and close air support (CAS) systems into the DoD's Network Centric Warfare (NCW) infrastructure. This point was recently highlighted in the Secretary of Defense's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Referring to mission critical shortfalls that occurred during the IRAQ deployment, the Secretary discussed the state of the current warfighting environment (Rumsfeld and Franks, 2003). Although tremendous progress has been made in the integration of new and emerging technologies and their applications on the battlefield, there is still a significant lack of interoperability between various communication systems. To address these battlespace management environment issues, Raytheon Technical Services Company's Engineering and Production Support facility underwent a product development effort to provide a network centric interoperability demonstration for CAS. This demonstration utilized various Raytheon-fielded SA and CAS products in a representative CAS scenario interfacing to variable message format (VMF) based data links. This paper addresses the systems and software issues encountered during this successful demonstration of CAS battlespace connectivity. This presentation will also discuss lessons learned during our product development from both a systems and a software engineering perspective.

Documentation

Document Number 1, Remarks by President George W. Bush on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004 Document Number 2, Prepared Testimony of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Director, Missile Defense Agency, on the Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2005 Budget before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 11, 2004 Document Number 3, Prepared Statement of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks, Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 24 March 2004

Caught in the Web of McCarthy ism: Anna M. Rosenberg and the Senate Armed Services Committee

Anna Rosenberg, an ardent New Dealer and friend of President Roosevelt, was appointed to the position of assistant secretary of defense for personnel and manpower in 1950. She was nominated at the height of the Korean War and the opening of the era of McCarthyism. Unlike others, who were unable to withstand the accusations of disloyalty during the confirmation process, she survived and had a distinguished career in the Defense Department. This article is about her battle for confirmation before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decisionmaking

To date, most warfare has taken place within what Robert J. Bunker terms space, meaning the traditional four-dimensional battlespace that is discernible to the human senses. (1) In essence, war has always consisted of human beings running, dodging, and hurling things at each other, lately with the help of machinery. Even such revolutionary developments as gunpowder only enhanced our ability to throw things at enemies we could see and hear. The first crude examples of autonomous weapons were probably the early experiments by the US Navy and Sperry Gyroscope Company on unpiloted aircraft during the last years of the First World War. Then came the advent of electronics, especially radar, and warfare began to leave the realm of human senses. Ships and planes could fire on enemies that were no more than ghostly green images on cathode ray tube. Later came military robots such as cruise missiles that were able to autonomously execute missions formerly requiring manned systems. Advanced radar engagement systems enabled pilots to locate, identify, and destroy enemy aircraft without ever seeing them. Some robotic systems became even more independent, such as the Navy's Phalanx close-in air defense weapon, which is of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions. (2) Thanks to advanced sensors and information processing, target recognition and identification methods are being develo ped to permit truly autonomous guided munitions. This includes munitions capable of autonomously engaging fixed and mobile ground targets, as well as targets in air and (3) Warfare has begun to leave space. A long step in this direction was taken in mid-2000 when the US Senate Armed Services Committee added $246.3 million to its version of the 2001 defense authorization bill to speed development of unmanned combat systems. The committee set two ambitious goals--within ten years, one third of all deepstrike aircraft would be unmanned; and within 15 years, one third of ground combat vehicles would operate without human beings on board. (4) At about the same time, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the US Army selected initial contractors for the Army's planned Objective Force. The concept calls for a network-centric, distributed force that will include manned command and control element/personnel carrier, robotic direct-fire system, robotic non-line of sight system, an all-weather robotic sensor system, coupled with other layered sensors.(5) According to Lieutenant Colonel John Blitch, program manager for DARPA's Tactical Mobile Robotics Program, We have spent lot of time and ene rgy analyzing employment concepts for portable robotic platforms over the last few years and are convinced of their revolutionary impact on dismounted warfare. (6) These initiatives and others are rapidly taking us to place where we may not want to go, but probably are unable to avoid. Once this progression of ever more capable machines began, the US armed forces, and those of other advanced countries, started down road that will probably remove warfare almost entirely from human hands. Several trends are contributing to this unsettling development, but the most important one is the rise of computer-driven information systems coupled with the proliferation of mobile autonomous and semi-autonomous systems (i.e. robots). The devices created by this coupling greatly increase the speed at which things happen, especially weapon effects and information processing. A much less noticed trend, the development of very cheap and very small military systems, will also help to move warfare even further out of space. In combination, these advances have synergistic effect. More and more aspects of warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also crossing outside the limits of human reaction times. The effect of these trends is already being enhanced by the emergence of d irected energy weapons (DEWs) with their capacity for engagement at the speed of light. …

Uncle Sam Does Not Want You to Organize: The 1977 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on Outlawing Military Unionization

Uncle Sam Does Not Want You to Organize: The 1977 Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings on Outlawing Military Unionization

SOME TECHNICAL ISSUES OF AN OPTICALLY FOCUSED SMALL SPACE DEBRIS TRACKING AND CATALOGING SYSTEM

Congressional language in the 1998 US Senate Armed Services Committee authorization bill directed ‘... the Secretary of the (United States) Air Force to undertake a design study of a system that could catalog and track debris down to one centimeter in size out to 1000 kilometer in altitude.’ The US Air Force Research Laboratory, in conjunction with other US National Laboratories and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted a study that examined what technical systems and operations would be required to perform such a mission. This paper outlines the study process, details the findings, draws conclusions, and makes recommendations as to what would be needed to develop an optically based system capable of cataloging and tracking small debris in low Earth orbit.

Modeling State Representation On Defense Committees in Congress, 1959-1989

Since World War II, why have defense committees in Congress tended to represent some states rather than others? To address this question we use a variation of two-stage least squares (2SLS) to analyze the effects of each state's share of prime military contracts, military payrolls, delegation size, and legislator ideology on representation on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Subcommittees of the Department of Defense. We find that during the period 1959-1989 defense committees have been dominated by large ideologically conservative states that received the largest shares of defense contracts and payrolls. The only exception is Democrats on these committees, who did not tend to overrepre sent states with above average levels of defense contracts. These findings correct earlier studies that have stressed the influence of only some of these factors (ideology or payrolls) in models of defense committee membership.

The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence

Although the paradigm of distributive politics dominates legislative studies (Krehbiel 1992), empirical studies have produced negative, inconsistent, or mixed findings on the relationship between the organization of legislatures and the distribution of various policy benefits, particularly military procurement expenditures. This paper reconsiders the distributive theory in the light of panel data on the distribution of military contracts among states during the cold war, focusing on the defense committees in Congress (i.e., the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the Appropriations subcommittees on the Department of Defense). Some scholars postulate that committee members can influence military procurement decisions so that their constituencies benefit (e.g., Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Others suggest that districts benefit because military bureaucrats want committee members' support for programs and budgets (e.g., Arnold 1979). Still others suggest that members of defense committees can protect military contracts and bases in their constituencies from cutbacks and closures (e.g., Arnold 1979, 95-125; Ray 1980). A subset of distributive theories deals with the role of committee seniority, since it is on the basis of seniority (committee tenure) that the seniority system allocates leadership positions that may then, in turn, be used for distributive purposes (Roberts 1990, 33).

For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb

Officers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career opportunity--that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product of long-festering congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the Mayaguez incident of 1975 (1) and especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October 1983--241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded--followed only two days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems of joint execution. In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report (2) which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. (3) That act represents an astounding and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense. Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress. The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and drive of its intent. The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint establishment vis-a-vis the service departments. (4) The most important aspects are these: * The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff. * A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman. * Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of the Joint Specialty Officers. (5) * The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given increased authority over the service components of those commands and direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. * The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control. With respect to the distribution of power within the national security apparatus, there is unmistakable presumption of zero-sum game in the package as a whole. That is, Congress seemed to believe that strengthening the joint establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both. Thus, Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), and those who plan to become such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And full realization will take just that--generational change. Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb: * Raising the quality of joint military advice. …

Targeting the terrorists: A legal proposal for assassinating terrorists as a preemptive strike

Recently, Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated to a gathering of weapons scientists and military planners at Los Alamos National Laboratory that, although the Cold War is over, “this is a world of regional wars, of spreading ethnic, religious and tribal warfare” in which more countries are acquiring the capability to unleash mass death. In January, 1994, then‐Defense Secretary Les Aspin wrote in his annual report to the President and Congress that “[t]he danger that [weapons of mass destruction] might be used against U.S. forces in some conflict is not, unfortunately, theoretical.” In July, 1994, during a visit to Moscow, FBI Director Louis Freeh commented that the efforts of organized crime to steal or buy weapons‐grade nuclear material is “the greatest long‐term threat to the security of the United States.” Later that month, “credible threats” were received by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence sources of an impending bombing of Israeli targets throughout the United State...

Software Reviews : Congressional Database

As its name suggests, Congressional Database provides biographical information on all members of Congress, including the five nonvoting members of the House of Representatives. With 13 categories of information (e.g., party, state, religion, home city, education, birthdate, profession, committee memberships, and the "Liberal Quotient" of the Americans for Democratic Action), it is possible to search the database using a wide variety of simultaneous selection criteria. For example, an easily understood menu allows one to search rapidly for all senators who are Catholics and who also graduated from Harvard University, for all representatives who are former educators from California, or for all Republican members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees who are liberals.

Earmarking draws fire

Earmarking will be a hotly debated issue in Congress next year. At a time when federal research dollars are scarce, key representatives and senators are turning to earmarking as a guaranteed, no‐competition source of federal funding for research activities in their states and districts. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is expected to be a leader in renewed efforts to reduce earmarking. During last November's Senate consideration of HR 2521, the Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 1992, Nunn spoke at length about earmarking of funds.“There are numerous earmarkings for defense research money for special projects at specific universities and colleges,” Nunn said. “What makes this most objectionable is the explicit direction by the conferees to waive existing federal statutes that require these types of awards to be made on the basis of a fair and open competition. In fact, the appropriation conference report specifically prohibits competition for $94.6 million in funding that is directed in 16 colleges and universities in 12 states.”

Defense bill: Earmarking as usual

Earmarked funds in the $268 billion defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1991 stirred congressional debate in late October. Senator Sam Nunn (D‐Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, charged that the defense bill contains questionable projects totaling tens of millions of dollars. AGU opposes legislative earmarking of money for particular institutions, maintaining that the practice prevents the best use of federal funding by circumventing competitive review. Nunn noted on the Senate floor that the appropriations bill provided specific funds for cited institutions—contravening a federal law promoting competition. “ If these programs have merit, they will succeed in a fair and competent review in competition,” Nunn said. “If no other institution in the country is able to compete, there should be no fear whatever of competition… But no one else in the world is allowed to compete to work on these projects.”

A Dead Senator Tells No Lies: Seniority and the Distribution of Federal Benefits

Empirical studies of distributive politics fail to offer any systematic evidence of a relationship between committee seniority in Congress and the geographic distribution of federal benefits. These findings are at odds with many descriptive accounts of the seniority norm for which such a relationship is a presupposition. Evidence and intuition appear at odds with each other. This study offers a partial reconciliation. The death of Senator Henry Scoop Jackson provides the somewhat macabre backdrop to a novel empirical examination of the seniority/benefit relationship. Evidence is provided through stock market reactions to Jackson's death across various constituent interests of Henry Jackson and Sam Nunn, Jackson's successor as ranking minority member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The results support the hypothesis that a seniority/benefit relationship exists.