For the Joint Specialist: Five Steep Hills to Climb

Abstract

Officers of the armed forces have been tendered a new and exciting career opportunity--that of becoming qualified and recognized as a Joint Specialty Officer. Those who choose to follow this route will be on the leading edge of a new wave. The opportunity has been fashioned by Congress. It is the product of long-festering congressional unhappiness about the state of joint affairs within the Department of Defense. Still beset by concerns over the outcome in Vietnam, Congress was irritated further by the Mayaguez incident of 1975 (1) and especially by the failure at Desert One during the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. The momentum for reform within Congress was given a mighty twin boost by the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport on 23 October 1983--241 Marines were killed and scores more wounded--followed only two days later by Urgent Fury, the Grenadan campaign marked by serious problems of joint execution. In October 1985, the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report (2) which became the inspiration for subsequent hearings resulting ultimately in the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. (3) That act represents an astounding and historic intervention by Congress in the organization and internal operation of the Department of Defense. Officers who contemplate following the new joint specialist path as a major career option should read the Senate staff report from cover to cover in order to understand the perspectives, motives, and objectives of Congress. The most zealous of such officers may also wish to study the transcripts of the hearings. The stilted language of the law itself does not convey the spirit and drive of its intent. The basic theme of the new legislation is to strengthen the joint establishment vis-a-vis the service departments. (4) The most important aspects are these: * The responsibilities and authorities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are greatly increased. He is now the chief joint military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the entire national security apparatus. He has clear control over the Joint Staff. * A four-star Vice Chairman has been provided to assist the Chairman. * Minutely detailed instructions are contained in the law regulating the selection, education, assignment, and promotion of the Joint Specialty Officers. (5) * The commanders of the unified commands (the CINCs) have been given increased authority over the service components of those commands and direct access to the programming and budgeting processes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. * The service departments have been reorganized to increase civilian control. With respect to the distribution of power within the national security apparatus, there is unmistakable presumption of zero-sum game in the package as a whole. That is, Congress seemed to believe that strengthening the joint establishment required the weakening of the services. This is both unfortunate and unnecessary as we shall see. What is required is the strengthening of both. Thus, Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), and those who plan to become such, stand under the influence of this historic legislation, learning the ropes in respect to the organization, functions, and procedures of the reinforced and elevated joint establishment. In proceeding, it is wise to remember that it is the product, not the process, which counts and for which JSOs will be judged in the long run. The realization of the goals established in the new law and its implementing directives now passes to the hands and talents of a new generation. And full realization will take just that--generational change. Let us now turn to five selected opportunities for improvement and innovation in the joint arena, five steep hills to climb: * Raising the quality of joint military advice. …