The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence

Abstract

Although the paradigm of distributive politics dominates legislative studies (Krehbiel 1992), empirical studies have produced negative, inconsistent, or mixed findings on the relationship between the organization of legislatures and the distribution of various policy benefits, particularly military procurement expenditures. This paper reconsiders the distributive theory in the light of panel data on the distribution of military contracts among states during the cold war, focusing on the defense committees in Congress (i.e., the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the Appropriations subcommittees on the Department of Defense). Some scholars postulate that committee members can influence military procurement decisions so that their constituencies benefit (e.g., Rundquist and Ferejohn 1975). Others suggest that districts benefit because military bureaucrats want committee members' support for programs and budgets (e.g., Arnold 1979). Still others suggest that members of defense committees can protect military contracts and bases in their constituencies from cutbacks and closures (e.g., Arnold 1979, 95-125; Ray 1980). A subset of distributive theories deals with the role of committee seniority, since it is on the basis of seniority (committee tenure) that the seniority system allocates leadership positions that may then, in turn, be used for distributive purposes (Roberts 1990, 33).