Abstract
The U.S. House and Senate Armed Services Committees are traditionally assumed to be more supportive of the military industrial complex than the Congress as a whole. This analysis provides evidence that this assumption is correct and further reveals that these panels also are not responsive to changes in congressional sentiments toward the complex. Biased committee recruitment patterns may be sufficient to explain this phenomenon in the House. Armed Services fills vacancies primarily with those already more committed than their colleagues to a strong national security posture. This, however, is not the case in the Senate, where those recruited for the assignment are fairly representative of their colleagues. Here these members undergo post-assignment conversions to positions more supportive of the military industrial complex.
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