Russell's Theory Research Articles

The problem of the variable in Quine's perspicuous lingua franca of the sciences

AbstractSome 55 years after the publication of Russell's seminal ‘On Denoting’, Quine adopted the theory of definite descriptions presented therein to formulate his perspicuous lingua franca for the sciences. This paper illustrates how, in so doing, Quine's lingua franca inherited an old antinomy at the core of Russell's theory of definite descriptions, specifically, the lack of congruency between notation and metaphysical commitments when the variable assumes the role of fundamental singular reference. In this context, the paper contends that the phrase ‘to be is purely and simply to be the value of the variable’ is far from the straightforward solution Quine initially envisioned for his lingua franca. Additionally, it argues that it is unlikely that an attempt to account for a determinate object theory, such as those propounded by Russell and Quine, can prove successful when grounded in a referential theory of quantificational logic where the variable, seen as a simple range of values, holds fundamental singular referent‐position. The paper concludes by suggesting that Meinong's object theory could resolve the problem of the variable, albeit at the cost of potentially undesirable ontological and logical commitments. Alternatively, Kit Fine's recent work on other antinomies in the variable may provide a promising approach to exploring how to salvage the variable as a formal foundation for ontology.

The Relational Analysis of Belief Ascriptions and Schiffer’s Puzzle

AbstractUsing a variant of Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de re belief, I recently presented a new argument against the so-called Naive Russellian theory, consisting of the following theses: ($$NR_{1}$$ N R 1 ) The propositions we say and believe are Russellian propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about; ($$NR_{2}$$ N R 2 ) Names (and other singular terms) are directly referential terms, i.e., the propositional content of a name is just its referent; ($$NR_{3}$$ N R 3 ) A sentence of the form ‘A believes/disbelieves that S’ is true in a context c if and only if the referent of A in c believes/disbelieves the proposition expressed by S in c. In this paper, I will argue that my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle is not only a problem for the Naive Russellian theory, but for every theory of belief ascriptions entailing ($$NR_{3}$$ N R 3 ). Such theories are also called relational analyses of belief ascriptions. Here the main alternative to a Neo-Russellian theory, consisting of ($$NR_{1}$$ N R 1 ) and ($$NR_{2}$$ N R 2 ), is a Fregean theory, according to which the propositions we say and believe are Fregean propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of ways the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to the speaker or agent. I will argue that such variants of the relational analysis are committed to principles very similar to the principles used by my Schiffer puzzle. Concluding, I will discuss Fregean and Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis, and I will argue that, although there are Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis which provide a solution to my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle, there seem to be no such Fregean alternatives.

Russell's Theories of Events and Instants from the Perspective of Point-Free Ontologies in the Tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School

We classify two of Bertrand Russell's theories of events within the point-free ontology. The first of such approaches was presented informally by Russell in ‘The World of Physics and the World of Sense’ (Lecture IV in Our Knowledge of the External World of 1914). Based on this theory, Russell sketched ways to construct instants as collections of events. This paper formalizes Russell's approach from 1914. We will also show that in such a reconstructed theory, we obtain all axioms of Russell's second theory from 1936 and all axioms of Thomason's theory of events from 1989. Russell's work certainly influenced the works of Stanisław Leśniewski, his student Alfred Tarski, and Czesław Lejewski – prominent members of the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS). We see our work in the tradition of the research of Leśniewski and Tarski. Building on the technical tools developed in this environment and in the spirit of the traditional research of the LWS, we engage here, in particular, with two classic works by Russell on fundamental ontology.

The Limitations of Russell's Theory of Descriptions: Analyzed from the Criticisms and Doubts Raised by Other Philosophers

The Limitations of Russell's Theory of Descriptions: Analyzed from the Criticisms and Doubts Raised by Other Philosophers

George Russell, the Lydian Chromatic Concept, and Black Student Protest at the New England Conservatory

Abstract: This paper looks at composer and theorist George Russell and the impact his Lydian Chromatic Concept had on Black student activism at the New England Conservatory (NEC) during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I expand on the work of scholars who have explored how Russell's concept reflected the spirit of the civil rights era by showing how students were thinking of it as more than simply sonic freedom and in the ways it affirmed Black life at a predominantly White music institution. Scholars have been increasingly advocating for the incorporation of "fugitive music theorists" such as Russell into undergraduate and graduate music curriculum and this article joins such calls. Relying on conservatory library archives as well as oral interviews with alumni, I argue that Russell's theories served as a musical and political muse for activists in the Creative Black Artists (CBA) student union during an era of curriculum reform and nationwide student protest. In doing so, this article hints at the impact such theories would have on students in the twenty-first century.

The Quest for a Language of Science Consisting of Non-Contradictory Propositions: Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions and Denotation after the Theory of Meaning

Bilimsel bir dilin inşası için çelişik olmayan önermelerin araştırılması elzemdir. Nitekim Leibniz’den bu yana filozoflar, bilimin kullanımına uygun olan sembolik bir dil üretimi için çaba sarf etmişlerdir. Frege, her türlü akıl yürütme için genel bir cebir dilini kavram yazısıyla (Begriffsschrift) ortaya koymuştur. Önermedeki kavramın referansının hiçbir nesneye tekabül etmemesi yöntemimizi şekillendirmiş ve bizi, kaplamı boş olan kavramlar içeren önermelerin geçerliliği üzerine araştırma yapmaya, özellikle de Russell’ın tanımlı betimlemeler teorisine yönlendirmiştir. Bu makalede “Çelişik olmayan önermelerden oluşan bir bilim dili nasıl oluşturulabilir?” problematiğine çözüm olanağı bulmak amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmamızın sonunda, Russell'ın tanımlı betimlemeler teorisinin, çelişik olmayan önermelerin gönderimi sayesinde çoğulcu bir formülasyona izin verdiğini ve söz konusu teorinin amaçlanan bilimsel bir dil için elverişli olduğunu tespit etmekteyiz.

Bayesian fluid prediction by decoupling both pore structure parameter and porosity

Carbonate reservoirs exhibit complex pore structure, which significantly affects the elastic properties and seismic response, as well as the prediction of physical parameters. As one of the main factors impacting fluid prediction, pore structure parameter directly involves in few inversion methods. In order to directly predict pore structure parameter in inversion, a novel quantitative reflection coefficient formula is proposed, that integrate Russell's poroelasticity theory with Sun's petrophysical model. This formula separates fluid bulk modulus from porosity and pore structure parameter, allowing for accurate determination of pore-fluid distribution through Bayesian framework. Both theoretical model analysis and multi-component digital core experiments of carbonates validate the importance of pore structure parameter on fluid identification. The practical application of carbonate reservoirs in Sichuan Basin demonstrates that the proposed fluid factor, eliminating the prediction illusion caused by heterogeneity in porosity and pore structure parameter within strata, provides more precise and reliable predictions compared to the Russell fluid factor. Furthermore, the similarity between the Russell fluid factor obtained directly from the Russell approximation and the Russell fluid factor calculated indirectly from the proposed method confirms the stability and accuracy of the new reflection coefficient formula.

EFFECT OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION

Language learning cannot be separated from philosophy because philosophy is the mother of science. In its development, language learning was influenced by the philosophy that developed at its time, including analytic philosophy. The influence of Analytic Philosophy is felt in language teaching, especially in semantic and pragmatic research. And Russell's theory of Logical Atomism opens new horizons for scientific research, including linguistics. On the other hand, semantics is an image which is then continued by the theory of meaning used by Wittgenstein as an early study of semantics and pragmatics. Furthermore, the analytical philosophy developed by The Oxford School develops a theory of speech acts that naturally influence language learning, learning is a speech act of language learning. Keywords: Philosophy, analytic, English, pragmatics

The Analysis of Plot in The Novel In His Father’s Footsteps by Danielle Steel

This study is an analysis of Danielle Steel work entitled In His Father's Footsteps that has a historical setting before the World War II, when the Buchenwald concentration camp operated until the three generations of family's life after being liberated from Buchenwald and starting life as an immigrant which is settling in America. This data is the main data source that discusses how Danielle Steel composes the storyline and presents conditions in it. The nature of this study is literary analysis with descriptive qualitative approach to answer the problems posed. In completing the problem formulation in this study, the type of plot using Russell's (1991) theory in the kind of episode plot types. The plot structure using DiYanni's (2006) theory which is classified into exposition, complication, climax, falling action, and resolution. The results of this study discuss how Danielle Steel arranges the plot in a progressive manner as well as the storyline that shows.
 
 
 

On Empty Names: Russell’s Theory and His Rivals

Talking about non-existent beings is a great and important constituting part in ordinary languages. However, it is not as easy to make a judgement about whether a statement involving non-existent terms is true or false. Many philosophers gave their own solutions on this issue and one of the most famous theories was brought up by Russell. This article discusses several of the most prominent theories of non-existent things, centered on Russell's theory of definite descriptions. Some of vital objections to Russell would also be demonstrated. The choice of solution is very significant since it could affect not only analysis of ordinary languages but also a variety of other issues.

A recently recurring mistake over Russell's theory of descriptions

Analytic PhilosophyEarly View ORIGINAL ARTICLE A recently recurring mistake over Russell's theory of descriptions Lloyd Humberstone, Corresponding Author Lloyd Humberstone [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0003-4932-1027 Department of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia Correspondence Lloyd Humberstone, Department of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Victoria 3180, Australia. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Lloyd Humberstone, Corresponding Author Lloyd Humberstone [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0003-4932-1027 Department of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia Correspondence Lloyd Humberstone, Department of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Victoria 3180, Australia. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 January 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12281Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation

Russell Versus Donnellan on Descriptions

The paper argues that Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, whilst a genuine feature of language, does not count against Russell's Theory of Descriptions where Russell's theory is regarded as a theory of the semantics of descriptions and not the pragmatics of individual uses on a particular occasion. The argument I shall present is simple but decisive and ought to resolve once and for all the debate about the significance of Donnellan's distinction for Russell's theory, provided of course that Russell's theory really does concern the semantics of definite descriptions rather than their use on particular occasions.

Problems for Russellian act-type theories

ABSTRACT I here discuss two problems facing act-type theories of propositions, and argue that Fregean act-type theories are better equipped to deal with them than Russellian ones. The first relates to complex singular terms like '2+2', which turn out not to pose any special problem for Fregeans at all, whereas Soames' Russellian theory currently has no satisfactory way of dealing with them (particularly, with such ‘mixed’ propositions as the proposition that 2+2 is greater than 3). Although one possibility stands out as the most promising one, it requires that the Russellian treat complex properties as constituents of propositions. This leads to the second major problem for Russellians: that of proliferating propositions. I show how the most direct solution to this problem, that of rejecting complex predicative propositional constituents is available to Fregeans but very implausible for Russellians, since this means rejecting complex properties.

RUSSELLIAN DEFINITE DESCRIPTION THEORY—A PROOF THEORETIC APPROACH

AbstractThe paper provides a proof theoretic characterization of the Russellian theory of definite descriptions (RDD) as characterized by Kalish, Montague and Mar (KMM). To this effect three sequent calculi are introduced: LKID0, LKID1 and LKID2. LKID0 is an auxiliary system which is easily shown to be equivalent to KMM. The main research is devoted to LKID1 and LKID2. The former is simpler in the sense of having smaller number of rules and, after small change, satisfies cut elimination but fails to satisfy the subformula property. In LKID2 an additional analysis of different kinds of identities leads to proliferation of rules but yields the subformula property. This refined proof theoretic analysis leading to fully analytic calculus with constructive proof of cut elimination is the main contribution of the paper.

‘The bang was not as loud as I had expected’

AbstractIn 442 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein criticises the application of Russell's theory of descriptions to the sentence in the title without mentioning Russell or his theory. Wittgenstein is making a general point of wider interest. I have two aims. The first is to situate Wittgenstein's critique within the larger theoretical setting of Russell's theory of descriptions and Frege's theory of indirect reference in light of the familiar problem of quantifying into attitude contexts. The second is to draw broader methodological implications from the foregoing for how best to think of the role of individual semantic paraphrases within the formal semantic study of natural language.

GARDNER'S PARADOX AND THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

Martin Gardner's two-children paradox posits two scenarios, in one we know that of two children one is a girl, and in the other we know that of two children the older one is a girl. The chances of the other child being a girl is not the same in these two scenarios, in the first being 1 in 3 while in the second they are 1 in 2. Gardner himself believed that the problem of this paradox lies in the ambiguous way the scenarios are articulated. However, it is possible to show that the original version of the paradox provides sufficient content for a meaningful explanation of these unexpected results. Inspired by comments by Leonard Mlodinow, we attempt to provide a comprehensible explanation for this counterintuitive change with help of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions. The difference between the two scenarios then boils down to the difference between indefinite and definite descriptions.

Understanding the Welby-Russell Correspondence

ABSTRACTA shallow reading of the 1905 correspondence between Victoria Welby and Bertrand Russell yields the impression that Welby has misunderstood Russell's “On Denoting.” I argue that a deeper reading reveals that Welby should be understood, not as misunderstanding Russell, but as bringing a pragmatic attitude to bear on Russell's theory of descriptions in order to expose the limits of his strictly logical analysis.

DETERMINANTS TO HOMEOWNERSHIP AND/OR LEASING INTENTIONS: A REVIEW AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

The contribution the housing and construction sector makes to the national economy is closely tied to new project launches in the country. At present, nations are suffering from a global economic slowdown and a slumping property market. Governments and private developers have even initiated many affordable housing projects, but interestingly these units are not as popular as expected. Many housing projects across the world are initiated without a clear understanding of the needs and behavioural tendencies of homebuyers. The ability to understand homebuyers' behaviour is limited due to the lack of sufficient research using a concise and all-encompassing framework that is supported by a strong theoretical foundation. A thorough review and comparison of three fields of psychology found environmental psychology to be suitable and Mehrabian and Russell's (1974) theory to be relevant, and ought to be complemented with the theory of planned behaviour (TPB). A framework is proposed, positing that favourable evaluations of the environment (residential environment) and social factors (attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control) will elicit favourable emotional states (pleasure, arousal, dominance/place attachment) which in turn lead to favourable behavioural response (homeownership intention). On the other hand, should the evaluations of the environment and social factors be unfavourable, this would lead to unfavourable emotions and subsequently unfavourable behavioural response (leasing intention).

Emotional and Cognitive Drivers of Customer Satisfaction in Adventure Travel

Customer satisfaction has become the critical outcome variable in tourism where traveler experiences become electronic word of mouth (eWOM) for future visitors, yet the drivers of customer satisfaction in adventure travel are not well established in academic literature. This study relies on both qualitative and quantitative measures to examine visitor perceptions at a wild animal reserve to determine drivers of customer satisfaction in adventure travel. The theoretical framework extends Oliver's expectation disconfirmation theory to this new and growing sector that differs in that consumers are seeking out unexpected experiences in their travel adventures. This research addresses the role of expectations in a context where customers are seeking the unexpected. This work also incorporates Russell's circumplex theory of affect to illustrate the importance of achieving a positive, high activation state on the path to customer satisfaction. Findings indicate that perceptions of novelty, value, conservation focus, authentic cultural experience, and freedom of exploration are drivers of customer satisfaction, but perceptions of tranquility and the presence of animals are not. Results imply that the desire to seek animals or tranquil settings motivate the desire to book an adventure travel experience, but satisfaction with the experience itself will require the delivery of experiences that are undiscovered, unexpected, and go beyond consumers' preconceived notions. These novel experiences produce the high activation and positive disconfirmation that drive customer satisfaction in this unique travel context.

Naive Russellians and Schiffer\u2019s Puzzle

Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: (A) the semantic contents of sentences are structured propositions whose basic components are objects and properties, (B) names are directly referential terms, and (C) a sentence of the form ‘n believes that S’ is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Naive Russellian theory’. In this talk, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle as an argument against the Naive Russellian theory. Schiffer’s argument proceeds in two steps. In step one, Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to two principles regarding de re belief; the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint. Then, in step two, Schiffer argues that the special-case consequence is not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Salmon and Braun reply to Schiffer’s argument that although the Naive Russellian theory is committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to the special-case consequence. However, in this paper, I will argue with a new Schiffer-case that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to the special-case consequence, it is still not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Concluding, I will discuss the possibility to reject Frege’s constraint within the Naive Russellian theory.