Abstract

ABSTRACTA shallow reading of the 1905 correspondence between Victoria Welby and Bertrand Russell yields the impression that Welby has misunderstood Russell's “On Denoting.” I argue that a deeper reading reveals that Welby should be understood, not as misunderstanding Russell, but as bringing a pragmatic attitude to bear on Russell's theory of descriptions in order to expose the limits of his strictly logical analysis.

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