Donnellan's distinction/Kripke's test

Abstract

1. Preliminaries In 'Reference and definite descriptions' (1966), Keith Donnellan argued that there were two different uses of definite descriptions: referential and attributive. He went on to suggest that Russell's (1905) Theory of Descriptions was incomplete at best, as it failed to accommodate the referential use. In 'Speaker's reference and semantic reference' (1977), Saul Kripke countered that Donnellan was mistaken in supposing that Russell's Theory was threatened by the referential use. Although definite descriptions could indeed be used referentially, this was (Kripke claimed) a pragmatic, not a semantic fact, and was therefore irrelevant to Russell's (semantic) Theory. In arguing on behalf of this view, Kripke proposed a particular test, the application of which was supposed to show that the referential use of definite descriptions did not disprove, or in any way threaten, Russell's Theory. Kripke thereby attempted to substantiate his claim that Donnellan's Distinction was not a semantically significant one. Kripke's argument against the alleged semantic significance of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction has considerable intuitive appeal and has, consequently, been endorsed by a number of Russellians.1 Indeed, I agree with Kripke that the mere fact that definite descriptions are used referentially does not undermine Russell's Theory. However, I also believe that the fact that the referential use of definite descriptions is a standard (i.e., statistically common) use of such expressions, does pose a problem for Russell's Theory. When Kripke's Test is applied to the relevant phenomenon - the frequency of the referential use - the results lend credence to Donnellan's claims concerning the inadequacy of Russell's Theory. Although the mere frequency of the referential use does not, by itself, establish that such use is semantically significant, when coupled with various other considerations (to be discussed below), such frequency does indeed support Donnellan's claims about the semantic significance of his distinction. Or so I intend to argue. First, however, I will argue briefly for an alternative (non-Russellian, non-Donnellian) account of the semantics of referentially used definite descriptions. Once I have done this, it will not be difficult to motivate Donnellan's claim that the referential use (given its frequency) does indeed pose a problem for Russell's Theory.