Abstract The “particularity problem” challenges arguments for a duty to vote by showing that the reasons usually offered—promoting the common good, avoiding free-riding, doing one’s part—can be satisfied by many alternative actions. We argue that this response does not always dissolve duties. Some actions remain obligatory even when substitutable, because cultural practices single them out as canonical expressions of underlying reasons. Celebrating birthdays is one example. Our culture fixes birthdays as the focal way of showing love and recognition, and parents who ignore them fail in their role, even if they meet the same ends in other ways. We argue that voting functions similarly.

Abstract The paper demonstrates that you cannot land anywhere at all between the basic relevant logic B and the strongest traditional relevant logic R by restricting classical logic to the largest of its subsets that is invariant under any plausible class of nonuniform substitutions. Nor does it help to extend the upper limit to one of the quasi-relevant logics like RM3 or KR. This is a serious but not-quite-fatal blow to a tantalizing possibility raised by a body of recent work in the area.

Abstract In the recent literature, moderate naturalistic metaphysicians have been attempting to justify the existence of ‘free range’ analytic metaphysics by employing an analogy with pure mathematics: just as pure mathematics is justified by its potential applications to science, so too, they argue, is analytic metaphysics justified by its potential applications in philosophy of science. Employing standard textbook logical tools to evaluate analogies, we argue that the analogy doesn’t hold: there are relevant dissimilarities between the two disciplines. The grounds and domain of application of metaphysics and mathematics to science are ultimately different, and arguments intended to justify the epistemic value of metaphysics for science often presuppose its value rather than demonstrate it. This is why metaphysics is not like mathematics.

Abstract This paper evaluates whether eliminativism – the thesis that the posits of folk psychology do not refer to anything real – can be employed by the naturalist to deflect Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). I start by trotting out Plantinga’s argument. After that, I present the conditionalization problem and propose to treat eliminativism as a defeater-deflector against EAAN. I then argue that eliminativism does not fall prey to Plantinga’s response against other potential defeater-deflectors from philosophy of mind. The next part consists of showing why the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable on evolutionary naturalism combined with eliminativism is high. The last part of the article is aimed at arguing that despite the initial appeal, eliminativism is not a solution most naturalists would be happy to adopt – that is because eliminativism forces the naturalist to interpret naturalism as a methodological postulate.

Abstract The doctrine of divine simplicity says that God is not composed of parts (physical or metaphysical). Modal collapse arguments aim to show that the necessary co-existence of God and creation follows from the doctrine. As noted by Christopher Tomaszewski, R. T. Mullins’s version of this argument assumes that a crucial term occurring within its premises is rigid, leaving the argument invalid or question begging. I examine a recent attempt by Mullins to repair his argument and defend the rigidity of this term. Mullins assumes a test for discerning rigidity on which he and Tomaszewski agree. I argue that this test is false and then provide a new test. My test bodes ill for modal collapse arguments in general.