Abstract
Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: (A) the semantic contents of sentences are structured propositions whose basic components are objects and properties, (B) names are directly referential terms, and (C) a sentence of the form ‘n believes that S’ is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Naive Russellian theory’. In this talk, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer’s puzzle. Schiffer first presented the puzzle as an argument against the Naive Russellian theory. Schiffer’s argument proceeds in two steps. In step one, Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to two principles regarding de re belief; the special-case consequence and Frege’s constraint. Then, in step two, Schiffer argues that the special-case consequence is not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Salmon and Braun reply to Schiffer’s argument that although the Naive Russellian theory is committed to Frege’s constraint, it is not committed to the special-case consequence. However, in this paper, I will argue with a new Schiffer-case that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to the special-case consequence, it is still not consistent with Frege’s constraint. Concluding, I will discuss the possibility to reject Frege’s constraint within the Naive Russellian theory.
Highlights
Following the work of Marcus (1961), Donnellan (1970), Perry (1977), Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989), so-called Neo-Russellians like Salmon (1986a, b, 1989, 2006) and Braun (1998, 2006) hold that: S
Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to the following principles regarding de re belief, where α is any singular term of English, β is any proper name or other directly referential term of English, φit is any English open sentence in which the pronoun ‘it’ occurs as a free variable – alternatively ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘him’ or ‘her’ – and φβ is the same as φit except for having occurrences of β wherever φit has free occurrences of the relevant pronoun: The Special-Case Consequence (S): Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that φβ, β is believed/disbelieved by α to be such that φit
I will argue with a new Schiffer case that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to (S), it still leads to instances of the problem of rationality regarding de re belief that violate Frege’s constraint
Summary
Following the work of Marcus (1961), Donnellan (1970), Perry (1977), Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989), so-called Neo-Russellians like Salmon (1986a, b, 1989, 2006) and Braun (1998, 2006) hold that:. Schiffer argues that the Naive Russellian theory is committed to the following principles regarding de re belief, where α is any singular term of English, β is any proper name or other directly referential term of English, φit is any English open sentence in which the pronoun ‘it’ occurs as a free variable – alternatively ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘him’ or ‘her’ – and φβ is the same as φit except for having occurrences of β wherever φit has free occurrences of the relevant pronoun: The Special-Case Consequence (S): Necessarily, if α believes/disbelieves that φβ , β is believed/disbelieved by α to be (something/someone) such that φit. I will argue with Schiffer (2006, 365– 366) that the most promising way to solve Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de dicto belief within the Naive Russellian theory is to take the propositional modes of presentation implied by Salmon’s constraint to be public language sentences or to be sentences in a language of thought. Before I come to the new Schiffer case, I will briefly present Schiffer’s original puzzle
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