Abstract
Martin Gardner's two-children paradox posits two scenarios, in one we know that of two children one is a girl, and in the other we know that of two children the older one is a girl. The chances of the other child being a girl is not the same in these two scenarios, in the first being 1 in 3 while in the second they are 1 in 2. Gardner himself believed that the problem of this paradox lies in the ambiguous way the scenarios are articulated. However, it is possible to show that the original version of the paradox provides sufficient content for a meaningful explanation of these unexpected results. Inspired by comments by Leonard Mlodinow, we attempt to provide a comprehensible explanation for this counterintuitive change with help of Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions. The difference between the two scenarios then boils down to the difference between indefinite and definite descriptions.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
