Russell's Theory Research Articles

An Indian Quasi-Fregean Theory of Number

A very interesting account of the reference of number words in classical Indian philosophy was given by Maheśa Chandra (1836–1906) in his Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and its Technical Terms (BN), a primer on Navya-Nyāya terminology and doctrines. Despite its English title, BN is a Sanskrit work. The section on “number” (saṃkhyā) provides an exposition of a theory of number which can account for both the adjectival and the substantival use of number words in Sanskrit. According to D. H. H. Ingalls (1916–1999), some ideas about the reference of number words in BN are close to the Frege–Russell theory of natural number. Ingalls’s comparison refers to a concept of number in Navya-Nyāya which is related to the things numbered via the so-called “circumtaining relation” (paryāpti). Although there is no theory of sets in Navya-Nyāya, Navya-Naiyāyikas do have a realist theory of properties (dharma) and their theory of number is a theory of properties as constituents of empirical reality, anchored to their system of ontological categories. As shown by George Bealer, properties can serve the same purpose as sets in the Frege–Russell theory of natural number. In the present paper, we attempt a formal reconstruction of Maheśa Chandra’s exposition of the Navya-Nyāya theory of number, which accounts for its affinity to George Bealer’s neo-Fregean analysis. As part of our appraisal of the momentousness and robustness of the “circumtaining” concept of number, we show that it can be cast into a precise recursive definition of natural number and we prove property versions of Peano’s axioms from this definition.

An affective space view on depression and anxiety.

This study aims to investigate the reconcilability between a continuous model based on Russell's core affect system and a discrete entity view on depression and anxiety. The data were drawn from the anxiety and depression short forms in the Patient-Reported Outcomes Measurement Information System (N=763). It consists of 15 items with a 5-point Likert scale. Ratings of the items in terms of distress and arousal were obtained from experts in emotion research. An approach based on Russell's core affect theory was compared with the common type of factor models in which the items are lined up on clearly separated depression and anxiety dimensions with an empty space in between, as if they are separate and discrete entities. Our alternative model works with a continuous space instead. The core affect theory-based method exhibits a goodness of fit that is comparable with the conventional models. Depression and anxiety can be understood in terms of Russell's bipolar core affect model; the core affect-based model leaves room for symptoms in the space between dimensions.

Online advertorial attributions on consumer responses: materialism as a moderator

PurposeBased on the Mehrabian–Russell theory, the purpose of this paper is to view the attributes of advertorial information as a stimulus in an online environment to examine the emotional states of consumers and their sequential behavioral responses. Moreover, materialism is proposed as a moderator in the relationship between advertorial attributions and emotion.Design/methodology/approachBy adopting a quantitative approach, 421 consumers with browsing forums or blog experience participated in the study. SEM techniques were adopted for the formal data analysis.FindingsThere was a causation found among control, arousal and pleasure. Advertorial attributes influenced the consumers’ emotional states via control, and emotional states directly affected the information acceptance and purchase intention. Materialism partially moderated the relationship between the advertorial information attributions and emotional states.Practical implicationsAdvertorial editors should provide detailed product information with credible sources in a positive manner and should attach videos or interesting pictures to avoid boredom and attract reader attention, especially in the case of materialists. In addition, editors should also provide some related hyperlinks for consumers to stimulate their further reading and then should observe the number of clicks and shares to estimate the popularity of the advertorial, so adjustments can be made if necessary.Originality/valueThis paper confirmed the causation of pleasure, arousal and the validity of the dominance (PAD) emotional model and found a partially moderating effect of materialism on the relationship between the attributes of advertorials and the emotional states of consumers.

The Real Problem with Uniqueness

AbstractArguments against the Russellian theory of definite descriptions based on cases that involve failures of uniqueness are a recurrent theme in the relevant literature. In this paper, I discuss a number of such arguments, from Strawson (1950), Ramachandran (1993) and Szabo (2005). I argue that the Russellian has resources to account for these data by deploying a variety of mechanisms of quantifier domain restrictions. Finally, I present a case that is more problematic for the Russellian. While the previous cases all involve referential uses of descriptions (or some variations of such uses), the most effective objection to the uniqueness condition draws on genuine attributive uses.

Integration of Two Skeptical Emotion Theories: Dimensional Appraisal Theory and Russell's Psychological Construction Theory

ABSTRACTThis inquiry attempts to integrate two skeptical emotion theories: dimensional appraisal theory and Russell's (2003) psychological construction theory. To bring out the skeptical elements of these theories, I compare them first with two classic theories: affect program theory and discrete appraisal theory. The skeptical theories are similar to each other in that they replace the concept of emotion with the concept of emotional episode, and that they organize the variety within the set of emotional episodes according to dimensions instead of vernacular emotion subsets. Their differences concern the strength of the relations among the components in emotional episodes and the scientific status of the set of emotional episodes. To make an informed decision about the elements to keep and to revise from both theories, I engage in a separate analysis of the behavior-related components and the experience component, guided by insights from general behavior theories and general theories of consciousness. The analysis of the behavior-related components suggests the relatively uncharted idea that the so-called emotional aspect of behavior can be caused by a goal-directed mechanism. The analysis of the experience component reveals that different theories have emphasized different aspects of experience and hence different paths toward experience. The inquiry ends with an integrated theory that rejects the scientific status of emotions or emotional episodes, but accepts the scientific status of the components and sees strong causal relations among them.

A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion

INTRODUCTIONIn this paper I consider Franz Brentano's theory of emotion. My interest is mainly philosophical, rather than historical, and I argue that his theory contains many correct insights about the nature of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims:i. emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena;ii. emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena;iii. emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value.I believe all three of these claims are correct, and in what follows I weave together Brentano's arguments with some of my own to support them. Despite a strong affinity between Brentano's view and the view I favor, our understanding of (i)-(iii) sometimes diverges, and where relevant, I'll point out some of these differences.Claims (i) and (ii) are the subject of much attention in contemporary theories of emotion, and while there is wide acceptance of the idea that emotions are intentional and somehow connected to value, Brentano's theory is distinctive in its nonreductive treatment of emotions.Claim (iii) is more controversial, in part because the assertion that value is objective is controversial. Brentano clearly accepts that value is objective:Is there a moral law that is natural in the sense of being universally and incontestably valid-valid for men at all places and all times, indeed valid for any being that thinks and feels-and are we capable of knowing that there is such a law?.... My own answer is emphatically affirmative. (1969 [1889], 6)I agree that value is objective, although I won't argue for it here. My present interest is in the prospect of providing an epistemology of objective value on the basis of emotional experience.It is crucial to note at the outset that although Brentano is concerned with objective value, he does not take this to mean that objects or states of affairs have objective value properties such as 'good' and 'bad'.1 According to Brentano, the terms 'good', 'bad' and 'better' are syncategorematic. That is, when they are used in sentences where they seem to be predicates, they aren't really predicating goodness and badness of anything. 'Good' is not a term that refers to a property and so in this sense is not independently meaningful; it is an expression such that when it occurs in the context of a sentence, it contributes to the meaning of that sentence. It functions in a way similar to the way in which definite descriptions function in Russell's theory of descriptions, according to which, 'The F' in the sentence 'The F is G' is not an independently meaningful expression; rather, it only contributes to the meaning of the sentence as a whole.In contrast, the arguments I offer for (i)-(iii) appeal to the idea that in having emotional experiences subjects necessarily attribute value properties to objects and states of affairs. It is then most natural to take objective value as a matter of objects and states of affairs having value properties. This difference may in turn affect some of the details of the epistemology of value under consideration.In what follows I will focus on conscious emotional episodes, noting in passing that we allow that attributions of emotional states or conditions may be true even if the person to whom they are attributed is not at that time consciously feeling any emotion at all, being, perhaps, in a dreamless sleep. I will also not discuss freefloating anxiety or depression, which are sometimes cited as examples of emotions that are not intentional. I think that there are good arguments in favor of treating these phenomena, too, as intentional, perhaps as directed at the self or at the world in general, but a fuller consideration of these issues is for another time.The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first two sections I briefly situate (i) and (ii)-that emotions are essentially intentional and essentially evaluative phenomena-in the context of Brentanos overall theory of the mind. …

Contested Waterlines: The Wave-Line Theory and Shipbuilding in the Nineteenth Century.

Ship hydrodynamics in the nineteenth century was dominated by John Scott Russell's wave-line theory. Russell, a prominent British shipbuilder and scientist, argued that wavemaking was the primary source of resistance for ships, and that by designing ships according to trigonometric curves and proportions (the wave line) this resistance could effectively be eliminated. From the 1840s to the 1880s, shipbuilders such as John Willis Griffiths, Donald McKay and George Steers designed their clipper ships (like Sea Witch and Flying Cloud) and yachts (America) with wave-line hulls, while authors like Jules Verne referenced Russell's theory. The wave line slowly faded after William Froude developed his laws of ship resistance. The article examines how Russell's theory became accepted by technical experts and the wider public to become the most widely known ship hydrodynamic theory of the 1800s-a reminder of how a persuasive idea can take hold of an entire profession, and even the public, for a long time.

Incomplete descriptions and the underdetermination problem

The purpose of this paper is to discuss two phenomena related to the semantics of definite descriptions: that of incomplete uses of descriptions, and that of the underdetermination of referential uses of descriptions. The Russellian theorist has a way of accounting for incomplete uses of descriptions by appealing to an account of quantifier domain restriction, such as the one proposed in Stanley and Szabó (2000a). But, I argue, the Russellian is not the only one in a position to appeal to such an account of incomplete uses of descriptions. Proponents of other theories, such as the Fregean, which does not treat descriptions as quantifiers, might benefit from this account of domain restriction. In the second part of the paper I discuss referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions. Relative to such uses, Wettstein (1981) and others have argued that the Russellian theory faces a problem of underdetermination of semantic content. Neale (2004) has replied to this objection showing why it does not pose a threat to the Russellian theory. Again, I argue that not only the Russellian, but also the Fregean can subscribe to Neale’s (2004) suggestion.

Comments on Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation

Henry Somers-Hall has written a book1 that is much needed, and in many ways. We need it, for one thing, to understand a striking feature of Deleuze's thought-striking at least to the novice reader (and I claim to be nothing more). While some of Deleuze's many insights are incredibly interesting and illuminating, some of them-including some of the deeper ones-betray a strange arbitrariness. Why empiricism, for example, and not idealism or realism? Why must inquiry explain how experiences are generated rather than conditioned? Wasn't the latter good enough for Kant? Why valorize difference above identity? Why does difference have to be affirmative, and what does that mean? Why calculus and not set theory (Badiou) or arithmetic and geometry (Kant) or modal logic (Kripke)? And so on. Somers-Hall's book operates on the level of such questions, and it is so clear and carefully argued that I learned an incredible amount from it.And not just about Deleuze, for this book's importance stretches across the philosophical spectrum-or would, if the different approaches that make up philosophy today were not in too much disarray to constitute a spectrum. It is not that philosophy fails to be a single unified discipline, with everyone working cooperatively in the same paradigm; worse than failure, that would be philosophy's death. It is, rather, that no one has any sense for what anyone else is doing. One index of this is the infamous analytic/continental split. After 60 years, philosophers still don't know what it is about.2 Another is the increasing fragmentation on both sides of the split. Analytical philosophy has divided by topic into so many subspecialties that each has room only for a few dozen people. Except for the work of race and gender theorists, much of the continental side has become a pantheon of incommensurable geniuses: Habermasians, Derrideans, Sartreans, Butlerians and so on follow their leaders without concern for anyone else's leaders.It will take great efforts to overcome this situation, and Somers-Hall shows why. Just to bring Hegel and Deleuze-only two of the many continental deities- into productive dialogue requires him to awaken, and then exorcise, a panoply of intimidating ghosts. The specters of Leibniz and Newton haunt Deleuze's and Hegel's views of the calculus respectively; Scholastic doctrines of analogy haunt Russell's theory of types; Plato's Third Man argument haunts Aristotle's ontology; Husserlian intentionality haunts Sartre and turns Merleau-Ponty to Klee and Cezanne; Cuvier's disputes with Geoffroy over teleology haunt the Hegel-Deleuze confrontation.On all this extraordinary variety of matters, and much more, Somers-Hall provides interesting and often novel insights, and by doing so shows that the various components of the philosophical panoply are far too deeply interconnected to be mutually indifferent and, so, however happily, incommensurate. While the book is dense (how could it not be?), it is always clear. The arguments are meticulously stated and, always, driven home. The diverse thinkers Somers-Hall discusses are not aufgehoben or verschmelzt into some single meta-paradigm, but are placed into fruitful dialogue-exactly what, to me, is missing in so much contemporary philosophy.Transcendentality and RepresentationSomers-Hall stages the Deleuze-Hegel confrontation in two rounds. The first concerns the fate of the realm at the hands of affirmative difference; the other, that of teleology at the hands of evolution. The book begins, however, with the problem of representation: what sort of isomorphism must hold between mind and reality if representations in the former are to give us knowledge of objects in the latter? Kant claims that this question can find its answer only on a transcendental level, one that first sets forth the kind of mind that is necessarily presupposed by knowledge and then shows that the conditions of our knowledge of objects are the conditions of the objects themselves (S-H 12). …

What’s Happening to the Weather? Australian Climate, H. C. Russell, and the Theory of a Nineteen-Year Cycle

The theory of a nineteen-year climate cycle put forward by acclaimed New SouthWales Government Astronomer Henry Chamberlain Russell is arguably one of his least successful contributions to science. Yet his ability to draw global connections made Russell a pioneer in the field of climate science— one whose innovative thinking helped prepare the way for much later achievements in the field of seasonal prediction. While controversial, Russell's theory sparked intense interest in meteorology and climate cycles and, at a time when extreme weather events were putting pressure on agriculture and pastoralism in New South Wales, it addressed the question of whether the Australian climate was undergoing permanent change. An historical understanding of ideas about climate cycles illuminates current debates on how to address the problems associated with anthropogenic climate change.

The Role of Attention in Russell's Theory of Knowledge

In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance.

A Deconstructionist Critique of 'On Denoting' -- Introducing aNAND-deconstruction

On denoting is a paradigmatic essay by Bertrand Russell and has been termed by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as -the- paradigm of philosophy. This paper is intended to be a critique of Russell's theory in On denoting. This critique, in essence, is this: because language is deployed in social contexts, dynamics of power, group dynamics and psychology are inherently tied into the use of language. Thus, what a phrase 'means' (the meaning M of phrase P) and 'denotes' (the denotation D of phrase P) are not just the literal sense of the phrase. It is also about who said what to whom and in what context, what was the power relation between the speaker(s) or communicator(s) and the person(s) being spoken to or communicated to. The intent of the communicator I, the context of the communication C, the technology of delivery of the communication T, the nonverbal communication accompanying the communication NV and the method of delivery MT are all variables that also determine the meaning M, not just the specific words used in the phrase P. Thus, M is a function not just of the set of words S in P. M is a function of I, C, T, NV and MT as well.

Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement: What did Wittgenstein Try that Wouldn't Work?

AbstractIn this article, I pay special expository attention to two pieces of philosophically relevant Wittgenstein–Russell correspondence from the period leading up to the ultimate demise of Russell's Theory of Knowledge manuscript (in June 1913). This is done in the hopes of shedding light on Wittgenstein's notoriously obscure criticisms of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgement. I argue that these two pieces of correspondence (the first, a letter from Wittgenstein to Russell dated January 1913, and the second, a letter from Russell to Ottoline Morrell, reporting a tense confrontation with Wittgenstein on 26 May 1913) each refer to what is more or less the same approach to problems concerning the unity and well‐formedness of propositions or judgements. However, the view advanced in Wittgenstein's January letter to Russell nevertheless differs in a key respect from the view of Russell's referred to in the May letter to Morrell. The difference involves Wittgenstein's incorporating qualities and relations as unsaturated parts of the copulae of atomic complexes, where these copulae are in turn conceived as logical forms. Because such an approach to logical form (and more specifically, to relations) was philosophically unpalatable to Russell, he undertook an alternative theoretical correction in the context of his 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript. This theoretical correction was discussed with Wittgenstein during the tense confrontation on 26 May, and involved deploying a supplemental significance constraint on judgements. It was this significance constraint on judgements, moreover, which was the ‘premiss’ alluded to by Wittgenstein in the context of a June 1913 letter to Russell, wherein he claims to express his objection to Russell's theory ‘exactly.’

Embedded Definite Descriptions: A Novel Solution to a Familiar Problem

Paul Elbourne claims that Russellians cannot accommodate the behavior of certain embedded definite descriptions. Since Fregeans can handle such descriptions, Elbourne urges theorists to reject Russell's theory in favor of Frege's. Here, I show that such descriptions pose no threat to Russellianism. These descriptions, I argue, are neutral between the two camps.

Structured Variables

Drawing on Russell's substitutional theory, this paper examines the notion of ‘structured variable’, in order to compare Russell's and Tarski's conceptions of variables. The framework of syntactic fibrations, coming from categorical logic, is used as a common setting. The main objective of this paper is to make sense of the notion of structured variable beyond the context of Russell's theory, to question the Tarskian way of understanding what it is to be a possible value for a variable, and to bring out semantically structured variables as a renewed and fruitful way of conceiving of logical structure.

Structured Variables

Drawing on Russell's substitutional theory, this paper examines the notion of ‘structured variable’, in order to compare Russell's and Tarski's conceptions of variables. The framework of syntactic fibrations, coming from categorical logic, is used as a common setting. The main objective of this paper is to make sense of the notion of structured variable beyond the context of Russell's theory, to question the Tarskian way of understanding what it is to be a possible value for a variable, and to bring out semantically structured variables as a renewed and fruitful way of conceiving of logical structure.

『数学の原理』におけるラッセルのパラドクスとクラスの理論

We can regard Russell's theory of classes in The Principles of Mathematics as a dual theory of classes based upon the distinction between a class as one and a class as many. In this paper, I shall show the following (A)-(D) from the viewpoint of how Russell dealt in the Principles with the paradox that bears his own name. (A) The dual theory of classes is one that deserves serious considerations. (B) Russell offered measures against the paradox other than the simple theory of types developed in an appendix to the Principles. (C) Russell avoided the paradox without forbidding self-memberships of classes in general. (D) Though introducing a hierarchy of types into pseudo-entities is a very important step to Russell's later theories (e.g., the substitutional theory and the ramified theory of types), we can find this strategy already in the Principles.

Wittgenstein's New Method and Russell's The Analysis of Mind

I argue that Wittgenstein's engagement with Russell's The Analysis of Mind was crucial for the development of his new method. First, I show that Wittgenstein's criticism of the causal theory of meaning (namely: that it generates an infinite regress and that it does not determine the depiction of a fact) is motivated by its incompatibility with the pictorial conception of language. Second, I show that in reacting against that theory he comes to invent the calculus conception of language. Third, I argue that the calculus conception is vulnerable to critiques that parallel those presented against Russell's theory (a rule-following regression and the inde- terminacy of depicted facts). Fourth, the striking similarity between the problems present in Russell's theory and in Wittgenstein's own views makes him realize that both were working under misleading trains of thought and false analogies. It is this realization that brings Wittgenstein to the view that his task is to investigate the genesis of philosophical puzzlement in order to stop philosophical theorizing right from the beginning. Thus, in explaining the invention of Witt- genstein's new method I show its relation to Russell's philosophy and indicate the origins of the rule-following problem.

Do You Deserve To Be Talented?

Are inborn characteristics deserved or undeserved? Using Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions and Peter Strawson's objection to this theory, I argue that this question does not make sense. In order to know whether a person deserves something she has, it is necessary to evaluate what she did before having it. But people did not exist before their birth, so they did not exist before having their inborn characteristics. Therefore, talking about people deserving their inborn characteristics does not make sense: these characteristics are neither deserved nor undeserved.

Memory as acquaintance with the past: some Lessons from Russell, 1912-1914

Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.