The Argument of "On Denoting"

Abstract

Russell's theory of descriptions, introduced in On Denoting,' has long been taken as a paradigm of analytic philosophy. Yet the central argument of OD, the Gray's Elegy argument (henceforth the GEA), remains puzzling, despite many efforts to untangle its mysteries. Peter Hylton, in Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy,2 correctly reads the GEA as attacking the theory of denoting concepts of Russell's own Principles of Mathematics.3 But Hylton still fails to do the GEA justice; in particular he goes wrong by seeing its main point as metaphysical rather than epistemological. Simon Blackburn and Alan Code4 come closer to appreciating the point of the GEA; but they mistakenly view it as an attack on Frege, and are unable to reveal its true force. This paper provides a new interpretation of the GEA, clarifying both what is being attacked and how.5 In developing my interpretation, I assume familiarity with the less controverted parts of OD. I begin by laying out the historical background. Next, I discuss the structure of OD, and