Resource Dilemmas Research Articles

Equilibrium solutions for resource dilemmas

Considered in this article is a class of resource dilemma games designed to study interactive decision behavior in the face of both strategic and environmental uncertainty. Groups of n members are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a uniform probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j(j=1,...,n) requests r j units from the random resource pool. Individual decisions are made independently and anonymously. Preplay communication is prohibited. If (r 1+r 2+...+r n )≤ x, each member j is granted his/her request; otherwise, group members get nothing. We derive the Nash equilibrium solution for this resource dilemma game, and compare it to an expected utility model originally proposed by Suleiman and Rapoport (1988). We then show that the equilibrium solution accounts for the major qualitative features of experimental results reported in two previous studies.

Simultaneous vs. sequential requests in resource dilemmas with incomplete information

We consider a class of resource dilemmas of the following form: members of groups of size n are asked to share a common resource pool whose exact size, x, is not known. Rather, x is sampled randomly from a probability distribution which is common knowledge. Each group member j ( j = 1,…, n) requests r j from the resource pool. Requests are made either simultaneously or sequentially. If ( r 1+ r 2+…+ r n )⩽ x all members are granted their requests; otherwise, group members get nothing. For each protocol of play we present two alternative models - a game theoretical equilibrium solution and a psychological model incorporating the notion of focal points. We then report the results of two experiments designed to compare the two models under the two protocols of play.

Some Detrimental Effects of Negative Mood on Individuals' Ability to Solve Resource Dilemmas

This research examined the effects of induced mood on subjects' problem-solving behavior In an initial study, an experimenter induced one of three emotions (happiness, sadness, or anger) or no emotion in subjects. Shortly thereafter a second experimenter asked each subject to solve a resource dilemma problem. Subjects in the sad and angry mood conditions were less successful (i.e., they were more likely to deplete limited resources, and they achieved less profit) than subjects in the happy or neutral mood condition. Performance of subjects in positive moods did not differ from that of subjects in neutral moods. In a second study, the effect of a sad mood leading to less success than a neutral mood was replicated. The effects observed across the two studies were attributed to a decrease in subjects' ability to delay gratification, found previously to be caused by negative, but not positive, moods.

Resource dilemmas and discount rates in decision making groups

In an exercise which simulates the organization as a resource dilemma, discount rates were manipulated to examine their impact on coalition formation and group outcomes. Subjects played a 15-round resource allocation game. They had the option of forming coalitions, which decreased the size of the resource pool, or practicing collective resource allocation, which increased it. Groups with a high discount rate used resource distribution strategies (coalition formation) that resulted in lower individual as well as group outcomes. Groups in the low discount condition adopted collective strategies that increased the size of their resource pool over time. Implications for small group decision making in organizatios are discussed.

Perceived Task Difficulty, Causal Attributions, and Preferences for Structural Change in Resource Dilemmas

This study investigated the effects of causal attributions for group performance on Preferences for structural change in resource dilemmas. Six-person groups performed a resource management task in which members harvested resource units from a common, replenishable pool. All subjects. received preprogrammed feedback that their group had failed to maintain the common resource. After 10 harvest trials, subjects voted whether to elect a group leader to manage the common pool in a second session. In a 2 × 2 factorial design, two variables were manipulated: perceived cause of group performance (task difficulty, personal greed) and attribution questionnaire (present, absent). As expected, a higher proportion of task difficulty subjects voted for a group leader than did personal greed subjects. This finding suggests that causal attributions for group performance moderate the perceived effectiveness of the structural change, thereby influencing numbers'choices in a manner consistent with structural goal/expectation theory of instrumental cooperation in social dilemmas.

Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players

AbstractGroups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff was induced by assigning to each group member a different points‐to‐money exchange rate. The results show that as the uncertainty about the pool size increases subjects (1) overestimate the pool size, (2) increase their requests, and (3) expect others to increase their requests. In addition (4) individual requests and expectations regarding others' requests are inversely related to the exchange rates, reflecting attempts to equate payoffs across group members.

RESOURCE DILEMMAS AND DISCOUNT RATES IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING GROUPS.

In an exercise which simulates the organization as a resource dilemma, discount rates were manipulated to examine their impact on coalition formation and group outcomes. Groups with a high discount...

Organizations as Resource Dilemmas: The Effect of Power Balance on Group Decision Making.

This research combines the coalition and social dilemmas literature to understand the complexity of choice in small group decision making within organizations. In an exercise which simulates the organization as a resource dilemma, power balance is manipulated in 5 person groups to examine its impact on coalition formation and group outcomes.

Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems

This article presents an alternative approach to the development of a general theory of microconstitutional choice. The goal of the alternative approach is to identify conditions that affect the likelihood that individuals who face a common-pool resource dilemma will extract themselves from the situation by changing the rules affecting the structure of the situation. These conditions are viewed as variables affected by a situation rather than as assumptions or constants. Situations vary in their capability to generate better or worse information to fallible, learning individuals in the extent to which individuals share norms, in the symmetry of their interests, and in the type of rules regulating entry and use of common-pool resources. Predictions should be based on the specific configuration of these situation-specific variables.

Environmental and social uncertainty in single-trial resource dilemmas

Considered in this paper is a class of social dilemma situations in which subjects are instructed that there is a certain amount of money, x, that can be made available to them collectively and all they have to do is to request, individually and anonymously, how much money they, as individuals, want. If the total amount requested collectively by the group members does not exceed x, each member gets what he or she requested. Otherwise, no one receives anything. The amount x is a realization of a random variable drawn from a probability distribution whose parameters are common knowledge. The number of members in the group is known. How much money should each group member request? Taking an individual decision-making approach — where beliefs about requests of the other group members are modeled by subjective probabilities — we provide a general solution to the problem, which is experimentally testable, when requests of the other group members (i) are known or (ii) are not.

Scarcity or abundance caused by people or the environment as determinants of behavior in the resource dilemma

There is evidence that people respond differently to people-induced scarcities and abundances than to nature-induced ones. In a resource dilemma game, half of 72 subjects were confronted with a scarce remaining resource and the other half with an abundant one. Half of the subjects in each of these conditions learned that scarcity and abundance could be attributed to the members of their own group, while the other half believed that these circumstances were due to the environment. We found that subjects harvested more from the resource in abundance than in scarcity conditions. Furthermore, the difference in harvest size between scarcity and abundance conditions was greater in the environment condition than in the group condition. These results are contrasted to predictions derived from a rational economic analysis and a psychological model that accounts for the results is discussed.

Alternative structural solutions to resource dilemmas

Groups of six undergraduates were given a resource management task in which they were to harvest points from a regenerating resource pool. Their objective was to maximize individual harvests while maintaining the common resource pool. Following the trials, subjects were asked to vote on how to conduct a second session. The 2 × 2 × 3 between-subjects factorial design crossed two levels of resource use (overuse, optimal use) with two levels of variance of others' purported harvests (low, high) and three levels of type of alternative to free access (leader, equal division, proportional division). As predicted, overuse subjects voted to give up free access to the resource and change the decision structure more frequently than subjects in the optimal use condition. Electing a group leader was the most popular structural solution, followed by proportional division of the resource pool, with equal division being the least acceptable change. As expected, high variance among group members' harvests was found to increase subjects' preferences for structural change in the leader and equal division conditions, while decreasing preferences for change in the proportional division conditions.

Inequities in access to and use of shared resources in social dilemmas.

In this study we investigated the effects of inequities in access to and use of shared resources on harvest decisions and preferences for structural change in resource dilemmas. Subjects, in groups of six, harvested resource units from a common, replenishable resource pool over 10 trials. Following the harvest trials, subjects were asked to vote on how to conduct the second session. The variables in this 2x2x2 factorial design were (a) access to the resource pool, (b) perceived resource use, and (c) perceived inequity (variance) in other group members' harvests. The hypothesis was that highvariance subjects, when placed in a situation where harvest inequities could be attributed to structural features of the free-access system (i.e., access differences), would demonstrate a stronger preference for equality-restoring decision structures than would low-variance subjects. The results offered little support for this prediction overall; the variance manipulation had the predicted effect only among high-access subjects in the overuse condition. As expected, the access and use variables had independent effects on preferences for structural change. Harvest decisions were mediated by the three design variables in the manner predicted by a three-factor model which assumes that harvest size will be governed by self-interest, a desire to use the common resource responsibly, and conformity to implicit group norms.

New Initiatives and the Resources Dilemma — The Treatment of Offenders

New Initiatives and the Resources Dilemma — The Treatment of Offenders

The Population of China

80% of Chinas population live in the rural areas of the country and the demographic trends in this very large social group have a considerable significance for both China and the world as a whole. In many economically developing countries the rate of population growth has fallen faster among the educated urban population than it has among the peasantry. The peasant economy encourages population growth: many children provide many hands to work the small plot of land the typical peasant family owns or rents. Children also ensure that the land will be worked when the parents are old. Although the collectivization of agriculture that followed the Communist revolution removed much of the economic incentive for large families on the farm the rate of population growth remained high because profamily cultural attitudes persisted. Not until after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 was the control of demographic growth pursued vigorously as an official policy. The political structure of Chinese society is such that policy decisions can be quickly implemented. Consequently the rate of population increase has declined faster in China that it has in any other large economically developing country. Contrary to the experience of many developing countries the reductions in the birthrate have occurred in rural areas as well as in the cities. The decrease in the rate at which the population is growing is on the whole beneficial to a developing country a rapid decline in the birthrate has significant social costs. The official position of the Chinese government is that the largest population China can support is 1.2 billion or 200 million more than the population counted in the most recent census (taken in 1982). A table shows projections of the effect of an immediate birthrate decrease to a level commensurate with an ultimate constant population of 1.2 billion. The projections show that such a rate could have at least 2 implications: in the middle of the 21st century there will be a disadvantageous distribution of the Chinese population according to age and a relatively small group of workers will be supporting a large group of retired people; and if China is to achieve a constant population of 1.2 billion Chinese married couples must average fewer than 2 children for much of the 1990s. The projections present Chinese officials with some difficult choices. The well defined limits of agriculture are the strongest motivation for family planning in China but other considerations have strengthened the collective will to limit population growth. 1 of the disadvantages resulting from a high rate of population growth is the presence of many young people who need jobs. The problem is exacerbated by the shortage of jobs suitable for educated people. Along with the dilemmas of resources and employment uncontrolled population growth could aggravate tensions between the city and the country. In addition to arguments favoring population control birth control devices and rewards and punishments are delivered through the administrative apparatus.

Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures.

Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures.

Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures.

Administered a resource management task to 86 US and 97 Dutch undergraduates. Ss were divided into groups of 6 and instructed to harvest points from a regenerating resource pool. Their objective was to maximize individual harvests while maintaining the resource pool. The factorial design crossed 3 levels of resource use (overuse, underuse, and optimal use) with 2 levels of variance of others' purported harvests (low and high). Both variables were manipulated through false feedback to Ss regarding the pool size and the other Ss' harvests. The primary dependent measures were Ss' individual harvests and whether Ss voted for or against elimination of free access to the resource in favor of electing a leader who would make harvest decisions for the group. Results indicate that harvest size increased over time only in the under- and optimal-use conditions. As predicted, overuse Ss voted to give up free access to the resource and to elect a leader more frequently than Ss in the other conditions. Differences between American and Dutch Ss were found only for the variance manipulation

A computer laboratory for studying resource dilemmas

This article deals with decision making in small human groups that share renewable resources. It describes a computer-controlled laboratory that was developed to study factors that influence group members' decisions about resource uses in situations which may lead to the so-called “tragedy of the commons,” in which common resources are depleted unless all users exercise self-restraint. Simular situations can arise in organizations, societies, and supranational systems.