Abstract
AbstractGroups of subjects participated in a series of 30 noncooperative independent single‐trial resource dilemmas. On each trial the subjects in each group requested privately a number of points from a common pool. Individual requests were granted if and only if the total group request was equal to or smaller than the pool size. The pool size on each trial was sampled randomly from a uniform distribution that was common knowledge. Asymmetry in payoff was induced by assigning to each group member a different points‐to‐money exchange rate. The results show that as the uncertainty about the pool size increases subjects (1) overestimate the pool size, (2) increase their requests, and (3) expect others to increase their requests. In addition (4) individual requests and expectations regarding others' requests are inversely related to the exchange rates, reflecting attempts to equate payoffs across group members.
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