Reelection Motivations Research Articles

The Relationship between Credit, Elections, and Party Ideology in Australia

Economic reforms since the 1980s resulted in weaker wage growth and the retrenchment of the welfare state. Labor’s declining share of income in conjunction with consistent asset price inflation, created an environment where the electorate increased its demand for credit to which politicians, driven by opportunistic re-election motives, respond positively. The empirical findings suggest that politicians, irrespective of their ideology, introduce policies and manipulate credit growth to maximize their re-election prospects. Moreover, the results indicate that partisan politics in Australia have become less pronounced, suggesting an ideological convergence of the two major political parties with respect to credit.

A model of conflict and leadership: Is there a hawkish drift in politics?

We analyze conflict between a citizenry and an insurgent group over a fixed resource such as land. The citizenry has an elected leader who proposes a division such that, the lower the land ceded to the insurgents, the higher the cost of conflict. Leaders differ in ability and ideology such that the higher the leader’s ability, the lower the cost of conflict, and the more hawkish the leader, the higher his utility from retaining land. We show that the conflict arises from the political process with re-election motives causing leaders to choose to cede too little land to signal their ability. We also show that when the rents of office are high, the political equilibrium and the second best diverge; in particular, the policy under the political equilibrium is more hawkish compared to the second best. When both ideology and ability are unknown, we provide a plausible condition under which the probability of re-election increases in the leader’s hawkishness, thereby providing an explanation for why hawkish politicians may have a natural advantage under the electoral process.

Subnational favoritism in development grant allocations: Empirical evidence from decentralized Indonesia

Abstract Are public grant allocations biased toward the birth districts of governors, and, if so, what explains this favoritism? The allocation of budget authority to local government officials is a common trend around the developing world, but it is often criticized for transferring favoritism from the center to lower government levels. Using a unique panel data set of 410 Indonesian districts for the period 2005–2013, I exploit the discretionary nature of a government grant and data from a large amount of asynchronous local direct elections to investigate whether the birthplace of the provincial governor determines fund allocation to the district level. I show that birth districts of incumbent governors receive significantly larger shares of discretionary grants compared with the other districts within a province. I find that local favoritism is driven by governors with political history in the district office of their birth district and is limited by local electoral accountability. Classical pork-barrel politics, however, as reelection motives or formal political party ties to the district administration, do not explain local favoritism. These results illustrate the importance of non-discretionary institutional grant design and local democratization reforms in Indonesia’s political system. The country is a young democracy characterized by low ideological cleavages, little party loyalty, and the prevalence of money politics in its decentralized fiscal system. These features characterize a number of developing countries, yet contrast sharply to the established democracies for which subnational favoritism has been analyzed.

The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the US Welfare Reform

How do governors’ reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then test the predictions in data on US state-level welfare reforms from 1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning. (JEL D72, H75, I32, I38)

Access to Land and Tenancy Practices on Tanah Bengkok: Evidence from Java, Indonesia

Tanah bengkok (bengkok land) in Java, Indonesia boasts a unique institution where elected village leaders receive usufruct rights to a parcel of land owned by the village, in lieu of salary. Despite its relevance to the political economy of land distribution in Java, unavailability of systematic data has so far constrained in-depth empirical research on bengkok land. In 2018, we conducted a survey covering 130 villages and more than 1,800 households in Java. We found substantial heterogeneity in the incidence and use patterns of bengkok land across villages. Fixed rental tenancy appeared more prevalent than sharecropping on bengkok land and bengkok landlords seldom got involved in tenants' farming decisions, which made bengkok land management look more 'business-like'. Finally, evidence is consistent with political cycles as the village heads with reelection motives offered sharecropping contracts to non-relatives to garner a larger pool of supporters.

The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism.

Without election or re-election motivations, what factors have impacted public goods preferences in an authoritarian country such as China? More specifically, what makes political elites be devoted to or not be devoted to local public goods provision? This study, using basic education provision as an example, intends to gauge the impact of leadership selection on public goods provision in China. It is found that career trajectories of politicians have a bearing on basic education provision. The findings suggest that even under a top-down appointment system, homegrown politicians are more willing to cater to local preferences, especially on basic education provision, which suggests an extension of Riker’s theory, applied in a non-democratic regime. Numerous studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on a variety of aspects of public governance in different contexts. Nevertheless, the unique contribution of this study is its policy implication that political centralization may not be an effective solution for local public governance even in an authoritarian context.

Dual candidacy as a source of legislator behaviour. The re-election and the mandate incentive under mixed-member electoral rules

Legislators are often viewed as ‘single-minded seekers of re-election’, and hence their actions are attributed to their ultimate goal of staying in office. However, an alternative approach ‘liberates’ legislators from the ever continuing struggle for re-election and argues that MPs carry out certain tasks simply because it is part of their jobs. This study is an attempt to empirically separate re-election and mandate incentives in the MPs’ behaviour. Hungary’s mixed-member electoral system with dual candidacy creates a situation in which the two types of incentives can be separately observed. If mandate incentives prevail there should be a difference between SMD and list MPs, while re-election motivations offer the dominant explanation to MP behaviour if the difference is between MPs nominated in SMDs and those who are not. Analysing legislators’ attitudes and behaviour between 2010 and 2014 it is found that although re-election incentives indeed prevail in the MPs’ behaviour, the effect of the mandate strongly characterizes attitudes creating a tension between what MPs do and what they think they should be doing.

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

We analyze the allocation of discretionary grants from the central government to local governments in Indonesia. Using OLS and Fixed Effects models on an unbalanced panel data set for more than 400 Indonesian districts covering the period 2005–2013, we investigate whether the allocation of the grants are determined by the need of a district, by political alignment of the central government with the local district heads, or by reelection motives of the incumbent president. We find that grants are not determined by need characteristics and that political considerations matter significantly. Districts with low support for the president received significantly more than the core supporting districts, especially in the year of national elections. This effect is limited to the first term of the president. In the second term, after which reelection is impossible, political considerations were largely absent. This pattern is consistent with the view that the incumbent president considers discretionary grants as an instrument to increase reelection probabilities. Unlike the evidence for most countries, we find no effect for political party alignment with local district heads. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of other variables capturing competing motives.

Commissioner Selection and Deregulation of US Gas Utilities

Le présent article se propose d’évaluer le rôle des motifs de réélection des commissaires de la fonction publique d’État dans la déréglementation du marché américain de la distribution de gaz au cours des vingt dernières années. Ces motifs de réélection peuvent affecter le choix des commissaires quant à la date et au type de régime règlementaire – restructuration de la vente au détail, plafonnement des prix ou réglementation progressive – à adopter pour déréglementer certains services publics. Le système de sélection des commissaires, le calendrier des élections et la composition des commissions sont évalués comme des facteurs politiques. Il ressort que la fréquence des élections est positivement liée au risque de déréglementation, bien qu’avec des délais différents. Dans les périodes d’élections, le risque de plafonnement des prix augmente immédiatement, tandis que celui des restructurations augmente dans les années qui suivent. Les élections favorisent un plafonnement des prix, tandis que les nominations par l’État favorisent la restructuration. Les commissions à tendance démocrates favorisent le plafonnement des prix au détriment de la restructuration.

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Signaling through Obstruction

Obstruction is a time‐honored tradition in legislative politics. In many cases, obstruction can be foreseen to be ultimately unsuccessful, and in some of these cases, purely costly even to the obstructor. In this article, I construct a model of obstruction in which the individual obstruction of a fait accompli policy proposal is potentially informative precisely and ironically because it is inefficient. The theory, based on the legislators' reelection motivations, offers comparative static predictions about the frequency and length of obstruction as a function of the individual characteristics of the legislator and his or her electoral setting, including the legislator's value for reelection, the appeal of the legislator's challenger, the legislator's individual‐specific seniority, competence, and/or valence, and the visibility of the legislator's obstruction efforts to the voter. Finally, the theory illustrates the potential for transparency of legislators' individual actions to be strictly welfare reducing, even in the absence of pandering.

Can bribes buy protection against international competition?

This paper explores the association between corruption and trade policy. A non-technical theoretical framework first outlines the effects of corruption on non-tariff barriers at the political and bureaucratic level. Both parts have incentives to accept bribes in exchange for increasing barriers. These considerations include politicians’ re-election motives, implying that free information may weaken the association between corruption and trade barriers. I employ panel data on corruption and non-tariff barriers in three periods 1995–2005. The results show that corruption tends to lead to higher non-tariff barriers. The effectiveness of corruption in buying barriers varies with the degree of press freedom and GDP per capita.

Commissioner Selection and Deregulation of Gas Utilities

This study evaluates the role of reelection motives of state public service commissioners in the recent trend of deregulation in the gas distribution market. Competing-risk hazard models are used to explain when and which regulatory regime – retail restructuring, price cap or sliding-scale regulation – state commissions adopt to deregulate particular utilities. The system of selection of state commissioners, frequency and timing of elections, and composition of commissions and state legislatures are evaluated as determinants of commissioners’ personal motives. Frequency of elections is associated positively with the risk of all forms of deregulation, albeit with different time delay. In election years, the risk of price cap adoption rises immediately, while that of restructuring rises in subsequent years. Public elections favor price caps, while appointments by state legislature favor restructuring. Democratic-leaning commissions and legislatures appear to avoid restructuring in favor of price caps, perhaps due to their doubt over the prospect of effective competition.

When to Befriend the Court? Examining State Amici Curiae Participation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

AbstractOver the past 30 years, the U.S. states have increased their participation as amici curiae significantly, in addition to winning more of their cases as direct parties. However, little attention has been paid to the factors that cause amici participation rates to vary among the states. The author examines the decision of state attorneys general (AGs) to initiate or join amicus curiae briefs in all 253 U.S. Supreme Court criminal procedure cases from 1990 through 2001. He hypothesizes that AGs are motivated largely by their own policy preferences and by their motivation to get reelected. Because amicus briefs are not particularly high-profile policy tools, reelection motivations ought to be demonstrated through responsiveness to elites in state government. The findings provide less support for this idea and more support for the idea that state AGs follow their own policy preferences through amicus participation.

Economies of Scale, Ideology and Trade Policy

This paper analyses trade policy within a modified version of the well-known political economy models of Hillman (1989) and Long & Vousden (1991). The modified model incorporates economies of scale in production and cast doubts on viewing trade policy as solely determined by political ideology and re-election motives. Cross-country analyses confirm our predictions and establish that strategic economic as well as political concerns are dominant in trade policy.

On the Feasibility of Unpopular Policies under Re-Election Concerns

1. Introduction A common concern about political decision making is that re-election motives lead incumbent politicians to select policies that, although popular among the electorate, are inferior to available, less popular alternatives. This concern, reflected in the notions such as demagogy and mob rule, implies that politicians may be penalized for choosing policies that they believe to be the best, but ironically are rewarded for choosing popular policies that they do not necessarily believe to be the best. In this paper, I study this common concern through series of models.1 For the main model that I will study, politicians differ only in utility from holding office. The main result is that strong re-election motives on the part of the incumbent politicians in general do not render efficient and unpopular policies infeasible. In fact I will show that, under very general conditions, voters' voting decisions do not depend on whether the incumbents have chosen popular policy options, nor are incumbents' policy decisions responsive to policy popularity. We may call this result the irrelevance or neutrality of policy popularity. Note that voters only have limited information, and there is possibility that the unpopular policy may be superior to its alternatives. Voters would take their policy opinions as tentative and be willing to revise them upon the arrival of new information. Then an incumbent's re-election chances will not deteriorate simply because of her choice of unpopular policies. Foreseeing this, incumbents with even strong re-election motives will not find it beneficial to choose popular but inefficient polices.2 To convey the above ideas, I will examine an infinite horizon political agency model, along the line pioneered by Barro (1973). There are two important ingredients in this model. First, politicians are of two types: strong and weak. Both types of politicians are concerned about both social welfare and the utility gained from holding office, whereas the strong type puts smaller weight on the latter. Each politician's type is the politician's private information. If the politicians were homogeneous, the choice between different incumbents would be inconsequential. If their heterogeneity were public information, voters would not need the politicians' past records to infer their preferred future policies. In either case, the question of policy manipulation would no longer exist. (In section 6, I will introduce third type of politicians.) The second ingredient is proper modelling of a policy that could be unpopular but potentially superior. A policy is popular when more voters think that the policy will yield welfare greater than those of its alternatives. Such policy's reflects its ex ante efficiency as perceived by the electorate. The incumbent politician, nevertheless, observes an additional imperfect-information signal about the likely efficacy of the policy.3 Therefore, popular policy might be interim inefficient, whereas an unpopular policy might be interim efficient. One crucial assumption for the policy popularity irrelevance result is that the only difference among politicians is their utility derived from holding office. This suggests that for policy popularity to be relevant, other sorts of heterogeneity among politicians are needed. Suppose, for instance, that the public believes with some probability that the incumbent is ignorant in the sense that she knows about different policy options even less than the public does. Then choice of an unpopular policy might signal the incumbent's ignorance; an incumbent who is informed but with strong re-election motive might then reject the unpopular policy even if it is interim efficient. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 prepares preliminaries for later sections. Section 4 establishes the efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium under the assumption that voters vote for the candidate who has greater probability of being strong. …

The Persian Gulf War in the context of the debate over the political economy of US militarism

Critics of the U.S. role in the 1990-91 war in the Persian Gulf region have provided various explanations for it: global militarism, preemption of the so-called peace dividends, oil and/or petrodollars, and even presidential reelection motivations on the part of the Bush administration. This study is an attempt to go beyond the short-term, conjunctural factors that contributed to the war. It examines the role of the United States against the backdrop of the long dispute among in ruling circles over the issue of how to cure the economic malaise that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That long and continuous dispute revolves around the question of a long-term economic and/or industrial policy and the role of military industry and military power within such a policy. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy

Conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political, as well as economic, forces. Using vector autoregression analysis, I test three models of monetary policy determination for the United States, 1953–1984: the electoral cycle model (that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle), the party differences model (that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations), and the referendum model (that changes in presidential approval create, in effect, a continuing referendum, allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary). Analysis shows that monetary policies, as measured by the monetary base and short-term interest rates, respond to the election cycle and presidential approval (although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous). Party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables.