Abstract

This paper analyses trade policy within a modified version of the well-known political economy models of Hillman (1989) and Long & Vousden (1991). The modified model incorporates economies of scale in production and cast doubts on viewing trade policy as solely determined by political ideology and re-election motives. Cross-country analyses confirm our predictions and establish that strategic economic as well as political concerns are dominant in trade policy.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.