The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism.

Alfred M Wu,Yanyan Gao

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0225299

Abstract

Without election or re-election motivations, what factors have impacted public goods preferences in an authoritarian country such as China? More specifically, what makes political elites be devoted to or not be devoted to local public goods provision? This study, using basic education provision as an example, intends to gauge the impact of leadership selection on public goods provision in China. It is found that career trajectories of politicians have a bearing on basic education provision. The findings suggest that even under a top-down appointment system, homegrown politicians are more willing to cater to local preferences, especially on basic education provision, which suggests an extension of Riker’s theory, applied in a non-democratic regime. Numerous studies have examined the impacts of decentralization on a variety of aspects of public governance in different contexts. Nevertheless, the unique contribution of this study is its policy implication that political centralization may not be an effective solution for local public governance even in an authoritarian context.

Highlights

There is a small but growing debate about the relationship between leadership selection and public goods provision [1,2,3]
This study adds to the literature on the political logic of local public goods in an authoritarian context
The evidence suggests that bureaucratic integration is significantly and negatively associated with local public goods provision in China

Summary

Introduction

There is a small but growing debate about the relationship between leadership selection and public goods provision [1,2,3]. Elected political elites are instead helpful in improving local public goods [4]. Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, drawing from a dataset of 75 developing countries for 25 years, find that top-down appointment or bottom-up election does not affect public goods provision [7]. Some even suggest a positive relationship between political centralization and public goods provision. Gennaioli and Rainer document a significant and positive relationship between the centralization of local chiefs and public goods provision such as education, health, and infrastructure in Africa [8] (see the reference [3]).

Objectives

Findings

Discussion

Conclusion