Philosophy Compass Research Articles

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Cosmic Fine‐tuning, the Multiverse Hypothesis, and the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy

Philosophy CompassVolume 18, Issue 3 e12906 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching & Learning Guide for: Cosmic Fine-tuning, the Multiverse Hypothesis, and the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy Neil A. Manson, Corresponding Author Neil A. Manson [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-5669-4780 The University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, USA Correspondence Neil A. Manson Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Neil A. Manson, Corresponding Author Neil A. Manson [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0002-5669-4780 The University of Mississippi, University, Mississippi, USA Correspondence Neil A. Manson Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 March 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12906 This guide accompanies the following article(s): Neil A. Manson, ‘Cosmic Fine-tuning, the Multiverse Hypothesis, and the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy.’ Philosophy Compass, 17(9), (2022) e12873. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12873. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume18, Issue3March 2023e12906 RelatedInformation

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Philosophy of Street Art

Philosophy CompassVolume 18, Issue 3 e12907 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching & Learning Guide for: Philosophy of Street Art Andrea L. Baldini, Corresponding Author Andrea L. Baldini [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7709-2570 School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bangalore, Karnataka, India Correspondence Andrea L. Baldini Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Andrea L. Baldini, Corresponding Author Andrea L. Baldini [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-7709-2570 School of Liberal Arts, Alliance University, Bangalore, Karnataka, India Correspondence Andrea L. Baldini Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 March 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12907 This guide accompanies the following article: Baldini, A. L. (2022). Philosophy of Street Art: Identity, Value, and the Law. Philosophy Compass, 17(9) e12862. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12862 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume18, Issue3March 2023e12907 RelatedInformation

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Mind‐Body Commerce: Occasional Causation and Mental Representation in Anton Wilhelm Amo

Philosophy CompassVolume 18, Issue 3 e12905 TEACHING AND LEARNING GUIDE Teaching and Learning Guide for: Mind-Body Commerce: Occasional Causation and Mental Representation in Anton Wilhelm Amo Peter West, Corresponding Author Peter West [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0003-3862-142X Durham University, Durham, UK Correspondence Peter West, Durham University, Durham, UK. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Peter West, Corresponding Author Peter West [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0003-3862-142X Durham University, Durham, UK Correspondence Peter West, Durham University, Durham, UK. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 March 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12905 This guide accompanies the following article: Peter West, ‘Mind-Body Commerce: Occasional Causation and Mental Representation in Anton Wilhelm Amo.’ Philosophy Compass 17(9) (2022) pp. e12872, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12872 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume18, Issue3March 2023e12905 RelatedInformation

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Counterspeech

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Counterspeech

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Jürgen Habermas and the Public Intellectual in Modern Democratic Life

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Jürgen Habermas and the Public Intellectual in Modern Democratic Life

Scientific Evidence and the Internalism–Externalism Distinction

Considerations of scientific evidence are often thought to provide externalism with the dialectical upper hand in the internalism–externalism debate. How so? A couple of reasons are forthcoming in the literature. (1) Williamson (2000) argues that the E = K thesis (in contrast to internalism) provides the best explanation for the fact that scientists appear to argue from premises about true propositions (or facts) that are common knowledge among the members of the scientific community. (2) Kelly (Philosophy Compass, 3 (5), 933–955, 2008; 2016) argues that only externalism is suited to account for the public character of scientific evidence. In this article, I respond to Williamson and Kelly’s arguments. First, I show that the E = K thesis isn’t supported by the way in which we talk about scientific evidence, and that it is unable to account for facts about what has been regarded as scientific evidence and as justified scientific belief in the history of science. Second, I argue that there are internalist views that can account for the publicity of scientific evidence, and that those views indeed do better in that regard than the (externalist) view proposed by Kelly. The upshot is that considerations of scientific evidence do not favor externalism over internalism.

Anticipatory Care

Anticipatory Care

Problems with Rowland’s Practical Conciliationism

Richard Rowland (2017, Philosophy Compass, 12(2), 1–16) defends the following principle: if we must suspend judgement about whether it is permissible for us to φ, then it is not permissible for us to φ. He calls this the Epistemic → Metaphysical (EM) principle. This paper considers two challenges to this principle. First, assuming that both conciliationism and EM are true, then in cases where you and your epistemic peers disagree on both the permissibility of φ-ing and the permissibility of refraining from φ-ing, neither φ-ing nor refraining from φ-ing would be permissible. Thus, the view entails that moral dilemmas, which many regard as impossible, are possible. Second, EM is in conflict with the Principle of Decisive Reasons (Kiesewetter 2016, The Philosophical Quarterly, 66(265), 760–782). While EM implies that you may be obligated to φ when it is not permissible for you to believe that you ought to φ, the Principle of Decisive Reasons implies that you ought to φ only if it is permissible for you to believe that you ought to φ. Given those two challenges, I conclude that EM should be rejected.

Moral Ambivalence: Relativism or Pluralism?

When we disagree with each other at the beginning of a debate, we are confident that we are right and the other side is just wrong (More discussions on moral disagreement can be seen at Rowland in Philosophy Compass 12(2), 2017). But at the end of the debate, we could be persuaded that we are wrong and the other side is right. This happens a lot when we disagree on empirical or factual claims. However, when we disagree with each other on moral issues, it is quite rare that either side is persuaded. We could be frustrated by the other’s stubbornness. But sometimes we come to see that the other side has a point. Their view seems reasonable. We might even feel that we could have taken their moral perspective and values. This phenomenon of moral ambivalence is discussed extensively by David Wong as part of his argument for moral relativism that there is no single true morality (Wong 2006). Recently, Agustin Vicente and Agustin Arrieta write to refute Wong’s argument (Vicente and Arrieta in Acta Analytica: International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition 31:207–223, 2016). They argue that moral ambivalence is a phenomenon of moral pluralism, the position that there are different acceptable courses of actions, rather than moral relativism (For many readers, moral pluralism is similar to moral relativism. I will specify the difference later). In this paper, I argue that moral ambivalence does not support the kind of moral pluralism that Vicente and Arrieta argue for. Furthermore, I point out that moral ambivalence does not support Wong’s naturalism, the position that morality has human nature constraints, but it does support the kind of relativism that he endorses.

Failing to Think: The Promise of Performance Philosophy

Performance Philosophy, at its most hopefully imagined, seems to promise to succeed where other philosophical discourses and performative practises have come up short—perhaps even failed. That is to say, far from simply announcing a relatively modest interdisciplinary venture between philosophy and performance, Performance Philosophy seems invested with a radical potential that would, if realised, reveal a paradigm of creation and/or interpretation that is quite new and distinct. Its achievements, if successful, would be beyond the compass of performance and philosophy conceived independently of each other. Even the term itself, ‘Performance Philosophy’, conveys a certain paratactical momentum that seems directed towards a profound artistic, intellectual, and disciplinary miscegenation where neither performance nor philosophy would remain separate and intact and neither would be subordinated to or conditioned by the unchanged disciplinary genealogy and underpinnings of the other. Though exciting in prospect, this is far from unproblematic. Is performance, as an act of deliberate creative expression, not to some degree pulling in the opposite direction to truth-revealing, knowledge-bearing philosophy? Or does Performance Philosophy relate only to more elastic understandings and redefinitions of philosophy? More specifically, this article asks what ‘thinking’ ‘itself’ might be in the context of Performance Philosophy and what sort of ‘knowledge’ it might give rise to. It will be argued that against the usual measures of epistemological success Performance Philosophy must be judged to fail. However it will then explores whether, in a move reminiscent of the aesthetics of failure of early German Romanticism, it is precisely failure that seems to hold the promise of opening up new epistemological ground.

Knowledge-how, Understanding-why and Epistemic Luck: an Experimental Study

Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g., Stanley & Williamson Journal of Philosophy 98, 411–44, 2001; Stanley Noûs 45, 207–38, 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard Philosophy Compass 3, 93–118, 2008a, Grazer Philosophische Studien 77, 147–90 2008b, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, 439–67 2009, 2011) hold, contra Ryle (1946, 1949), that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why (e.g., Salmon 1984; Lipton 2004; Woodward 2003; Grimm The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 515–35, 2006; Greco 2009; Kelp 2014) insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are right, then knowledge-how and understanding-why should be susceptible to the same extent as knowledge-that is to being undermined by epistemic luck. This paper reports experimental results that test these luck-based predictions. Interestingly, these results suggest a striking (albeit, imperfect) positive correlation between self-reported philosophical expertise and attributions of knowledge-how, understanding-why and knowledge-that which run contrary to reductive proposals. We contextualize these results by showing how they align very well with a particular kind of overarching non-reductive proposal, one that two of the authors have defended elsewhere (e.g., Carter and Pritchard Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 181–99, 2015a, Noûs 49, 440–53, 2015b, Australasian Philosophical Quarterly 93, 799–816, 2015c) according to which knowledge-how and understanding-why, but not knowledge-that, essentially involve cognitive achievement (i.e., cognitive success that is primarily creditable to cognitive ability). We conclude by situating the interpretive narrative advanced within contemporary discussions about the role of expertise in philosophical judgment.

Does Naturalism Make Room for Teleology? The Case of Donald Crosby and Thomas Nagel

Research Article| January 01 2019 Does Naturalism Make Room for Teleology? The Case of Donald Crosby and Thomas Nagel Mikael Leidenhag Mikael Leidenhag University of Edinburgh Mikael Leidenhag is a Research Fellow in Theology and Science at the University of Edinburgh. He obtained his PhD at the University of Uppsala. His current research area is on the relationship between natural teleology and Christian eschatology. Some of his more recent publications are “From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism: A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphy’s Non-Reductive Physicalism” (Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions [2016], “The Mysterianism of Owen Flanagan’s Normative Mind Science” (Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science [2018]), “Religious Naturalism: The Current Debate” (Philosophy Compass [2018]), and Naturalizing God? A Critical Evaluation of Religious Naturalism (forthcoming with State University of New York Press). Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google American Journal of Theology & Philosophy (2019) 40 (1): 5–19. https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjtheophil.40.1.0005 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Mikael Leidenhag; Does Naturalism Make Room for Teleology? The Case of Donald Crosby and Thomas Nagel. American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 1 January 2019; 40 (1): 5–19. doi: https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjtheophil.40.1.0005 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveUniversity of Illinois PressAmerican Journal of Theology & Philosophy Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois2019 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Art and painful emotion

AbstractThis essay updates Aaron Smuts', 2009 Philosophy Compass piece, “Art and Negative Affect” in light of recent work on the topic. The “paradox of painful art” is the general problem of how it is possible to enjoy or value experiences of art that involve painful emotions. It encompasses both the paradox of tragedy and the paradox of horror. Section lays out a taxonomy of solutions to the paradox of painful art and argues that we should opt for a pluralistic approach rather than seeking a unified solution. Section surveys recent work on the topic, with an emphasis on views holding that it is possible for an experience of art to be pleasant partly in virtue of involving painful emotion. Section suggests a range of phenomena that are not usually considered under the umbrella of the paradox of painful art but that offer promising directions for further research.

Repeatable Artworks and the Relevant Similarity Relation

Research Article| July 01 2018 Repeatable Artworks and the Relevant Similarity Relation Sherri Irvin Sherri Irvin Sherri Irvin is Presidential Research Professor of philosophy and women’s and gender studies at the University of Oklahoma. She recently edited Body Aesthetics (2016) and is currently completing Immaterial: A Philosophy of Contemporary Art, under contract with Oxford. She serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Philosophy Compass, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Journal of Aesthetic Education (2018) 52 (2): 30–39. https://doi.org/10.5406/jaesteduc.52.2.0030 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Sherri Irvin; Repeatable Artworks and the Relevant Similarity Relation. Journal of Aesthetic Education 1 January 2018; 52 (2): 30–39. doi: https://doi.org/10.5406/jaesteduc.52.2.0030 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All Scholarly Publishing CollectiveUniversity of Illinois PressJournal of Aesthetic Education Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright 2018 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois2018 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

Model of formation of abilities of the foreign language professional communication at cadets of military and sports higher education institution with use of training games

1. Polat, E.S. (2000), “Method of projects at lessons of a foreign language”, Foreign languages at school, No. 2, pp. 4-10. 2. Goldin, V.E. (1996), Etiquette and speech, publishing house SSU, Saratov, Russian Federation. 3. Tenilov, E.A. (2010), Formation of competitiveness of future specialist teacher in higher education institution, Modern problems of science and education, No. 1, pp. 63-66 4. Goodpaster, K.E. (2001), Business ethics and stakeholder analysis, in T.L.Bowie, N.E., Ethical Theory and business, 6th ed., Prentice-hall, Upper Saddle River, N.J. ,pp. 66-85. 5. Jeffrey Moriarty, Business, Ethics: An Overview, Bowling Green State University, Appears in Philosophy Compass 3:5 (2008). 6. Mizyurova E.Y. (2010), “Project methodology in formation of students’ foreign language competence in non – language institutions”, Uchenye zapiski universiteta imeni P.F. Lesgafta, Vol. 65, No. 7, pp. 51-56. 7. The foreign languages standard program for not linguistics specialized profession (2004), available at: http://narfu.ru/pomorsu.ru/www.pomorsu.ru/_doc/sin/prog.pdf. Контактная информация: e.v.androsova@mail.ru

Transitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics

Previous articleNext article No AccessReview EssayTransitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics*Michael HuemerMichael Huemer Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 123, Number 2January 2013Symposium on Rights and the Direction of Duties Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/668905 Views: 146Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref © 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl The case for comparability, Noûs 18 (Feb 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12407Peter Baumann Rational intransitive preferences, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 21, no.11 (Jan 2022): 3–28.https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211072271Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl Consequences of comparability, Philosophical Perspectives 35, no.11 (Oct 2021): 70–98.https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12157Caner Turan Does autonomous moral reasoning favor consequentialism?, Estudios de Filosofía (Jan 2022).https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.345775Joe Horton Partial aggregation in ethics, Philosophy Compass 16, no.33 (Feb 2021).https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719Tung-Ying Wu Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox, Philosophia 48, no.11 (May 2019): 391–404.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00084-6Michael Da Silva Developing a Capped Model for Combining Ideals, Philosophia 47, no.11 (Feb 2018): 59–73.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9956-yEdmund Tweedy Flanigan, John Halstead THE SMALL IMPROVEMENT ARGUMENT, EPISTEMICISM AND INCOMPARABILITY, Economics and Philosophy 34, no.22 (Feb 2018): 199–219.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267118000019John Cusbert Acting on Essentially Comparative Goodness, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6, no.22 (Apr 2017): 73–83.https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.240John R. Welch Comparative Decision Theory, (Sep 2014): 47–94.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08013-0_3Nick Byrd Intuitive and Reflective Responses in Philosophy, SSRN Electronic Journal 53 (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787284

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: <i>Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity</i>

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: Democracy in Confucianism

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: Democracy in Confucianism

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Philosophy of Comics

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Philosophy of Comics