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Previous articleNext article No AccessReview EssayTransitivity, Comparative Value, and the Methods of Ethics*Michael HuemerMichael Huemer Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 123, Number 2January 2013Symposium on Rights and the Direction of Duties Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/668905 Views: 146Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref © 2013 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl The case for comparability, Noûs 18 (Feb 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12407Peter Baumann Rational intransitive preferences, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 21, no.11 (Jan 2022): 3–28.https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X211072271Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel, Jake Zuehl Consequences of comparability, Philosophical Perspectives 35, no.11 (Oct 2021): 70–98.https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12157Caner Turan Does autonomous moral reasoning favor consequentialism?, Estudios de Filosofía (Jan 2022).https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.345775Joe Horton Partial aggregation in ethics, Philosophy Compass 16, no.33 (Feb 2021).https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12719Tung-Ying Wu Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox, Philosophia 48, no.11 (May 2019): 391–404.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00084-6Michael Da Silva Developing a Capped Model for Combining Ideals, Philosophia 47, no.11 (Feb 2018): 59–73.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9956-yEdmund Tweedy Flanigan, John Halstead THE SMALL IMPROVEMENT ARGUMENT, EPISTEMICISM AND INCOMPARABILITY, Economics and Philosophy 34, no.22 (Feb 2018): 199–219.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267118000019John Cusbert Acting on Essentially Comparative Goodness, Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6, no.22 (Apr 2017): 73–83.https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.240John R. Welch Comparative Decision Theory, (Sep 2014): 47–94.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08013-0_3Nick Byrd Intuitive and Reflective Responses in Philosophy, SSRN Electronic Journal 53 (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2787284

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