Moscow Patriarchate Research Articles

RECOGNITION OF AUTOCEPHALITY FROM THE MOSCOW PATRIARCHATE OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN POLAND IN 1948.

The article analyses the situation in Polish Orthodox Church after the Second World War. Particular attention is paid by the author to the issues of the canonical and legal status of the Polish Orthodox Church, its relations with the Moscow Patriarchate and the issue of recognition of the autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church by the Moscow Patriarchate. This complicated process developed in the complex context of both the internal political situation in Poland during post-war period in 1945-1948 and its relations with the USSR. The situation was seriously complicated by the unwillingness of the Head of the Polish Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Dionisy, to leave the metropolitan see and recognize the non-canonical autocephaly of the Polish Orthodox Church in the interwar period. As a result, the “Act of Restoring the Unity of the Polish Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church and Recognizing Autocephaly”, adopted by the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on June 22, 1948, finally settled the canonical status of the Orthodox Church in Poland.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate as a Global Actor: Between the End of the Cold War and the Ukrainian Ecclesiastical Crisis

ABSTRACT Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of republican Turkey, the Ecumenical Patriarchate has struggled to maintain its existence and its ecumenical role, despite the obstacles that the Republic of Turkey has set before it. Yet, challenges have abounded within the Orthodox world as well. The Patriarchate has viewed Russian involvement in Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs with suspicion, if not outright opposition. This is like its former stance regarding Russian involvement in Orthodox religious affairs in the Balkans and the Middle East throughout the nineteenth century. This competition has been rekindled since the end of the Cold War, as the Patriarchate has grown in importance as a global actor. The Ukrainian ecclesiastical crisis, which brought the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Moscow Patriarchate to loggerheads, provides an additional opportunity to measure the extent of Russian influence on the Orthodox Church. This article explores the history of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the republican Turkish era and the challenges it has faced. It also examines the dynamics that have developed since the end of the Cold War in its relations with Russia and Turkey through its confrontation with the Moscow Patriarchate particularly in light of the Ukrainian ecclesiastical crisis. This study aspires to shed light on the extent of Russian influence on Orthodox ecclesiastical affairs and explore the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the global era.

Семиотика двойничества в современной эсхатологии

Traditionally, a double (or doppelgänger) is considered to be a personified part of one’s consciousness or subconsciousness, social experience, behavioural patterns, etc. represented as an independent actor of social relations (in a literary text, an independent character or a character claiming independence). Doubles are characters that have something in common. The study of the doubles phenomenon is often limited to artistic discourse, its religious interpretation, including in eschatological narratives, being poorly investigated. In the Christian tradition, the eschatological interpretation of doubles goes back to early Christian hermeneutics of the New Testament texts about false apostles and the Antichrist. This article analyses the mythology of doubles formed under the influence of modern eschatology. In terms of hermeneutics, modern versions of the theological mythologeme of doubles are attempts at an apocalyptic interpretation of information technology, while information models are assigned the role of demonic doppelgängers. Thus, a binary opposition is formed: the real world created by God vs the digital world of the Antichrist, functioning in a similar way to binary oppositions of mythological discourse. The content analysis of modern eschatological discourse identified the following key mythologemes of doubles in it: digital double-image, digital kingdom of the Antichrist, doubles of rulers and prominent personalities. The abovementioned mythologemes are analysed using the methods of semiotic and hermeneutic analysis. The sources of the study are original texts of the prophetic and pseudo-prophetic genres, popular among Orthodox subcultures, but found in the canon of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as well.

Автокефалия русской Церкви по отношению к Константинополю и Риму в зеркале теории «Москва третий Рим». (ХV XVI вв.) 

The Connection of the Russian autocephalous Church with Rome and Constantinople in the Mirror of the Theory of Moscow the third Rome ””. XIV XVI.) In 1448 the Russian Orthodox Church became de fac to autocephalous. The metropolia, later patriarchate of Moscow never wanted to question the universal position of Constantinople within Orthodoxy. for two Romes had fallen, but the third one is standing and there will be no fourth. The Theory of Moscow the third Rome formulated by the monk Filofei, claiming that Moscow had become the third and last centre and refuge of true Christianity.

Russian Orthodoxy during the Soviet-Axis War

Russian Orthodoxy is presented in the article as a multidimensional system of church institutions, clergy and laity. The Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate was only one of the elements of this system, which undoubtedly dominated in the confessional aspect within the USSR. The historiography of the problem of the role and place of the Church in World War II East Front is examined, and the source base of the issue is presented. The state-dependent position of the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate in the prewar years is analysed. The attitude of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad towards the start of the Axis aggression against the USSR is personalised. The patriotic vector of the ministry of Moscow Patriarchate during the war years is considered. The anti-Christian nature of the ideology of Nazism, designed to create a quasireligion of the German nation, is revealed. The reasons for the change in state-church relations in the USSR during history's most horrifying war are identified, the most important of which includes the foreign policy perspective of the use of the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate and confessional policy in general in the context of international activities of the USSR.

Religion and the Cold War Politics: The Election of Athenagoras as Patriarch

A critical development during the years of World War II was the change of the USSR’s policy towards the Church and its attempt to make use of the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on the Orthodox world. This move of the USSR mobilized the United States, which assumed that the Soviet influence in the Balkan countries and the Middle East would be prevented by strengthening the Patriarchate of İstanbul. The US proposed Athenagoras, the Archbishop of North and South America, for the leadership of Phanar; a figure who was expected to be effective in the struggle with Moscow. This proposal was accepted by Turkey and Greece. However, Athenagoras’ election as patriarch was not easily achieved both because he did not have Turkish citizenship and because of the cautious attitude demonstrated by Turkey during the selection process. At the end of the election process during which the United States has taken a cautious stance with Turkey, Athenagoras was elected as the Patriarch. As soon as he started the job, with his pro-US rhetoric and close relations with the Turkish official circles, the new Patriarch showed that he was a cleric who could meet the expectations. Being the religious pillar of the Truman doctrine, as he himself stated, Athenagoras’ efforts were also welcomed by the US and Turkish authorities. At the same time, Athenagoras's pro-Turkish and pro-American stance has caused discomfort within the Greek community over time, leading to some reactions against him.

The omitted role of the Churches in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

SUMMARY: 1. Premise - 2. The recognition of the Autocephaly of the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a factor of crisis of relations between Ukraine and Russia - 3. The stages of the crisis - 4. The Kiev Metropolia of the Moscow Patriarchate and the War - 5. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the war.
 ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes the effects of the recognition of autocephaly by the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It constitutes one of the crisis factors in relations between Ukraine and Russia in the ongoing clash in the Orthodox Churches between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. The article reconstructs the positions of the various religious denominations present in Ukraine in contending for the representation of the interests of the Ukrainian people. It explores how the war is undermining the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and its Metropolia of Kiev. It also analyzes the role played in the crisis by the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Catholic Church, a sui juris Church that aspires to play a supranational role.

Православная певческая традиция Сахалина

This article is devoted to the formation of the Orthodox singing tradition in one of the youngest diocesan formations - the South Sakhalin and Kuril dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The quantitative ratio of the existing religious views and beliefs of the ethnic groups of the island region is touched upon. The features of the historical processes of the development of Orthodoxy in the region, which have determined the range of problems that exist in the dynamics of the formation of the liturgical and singing tradition of the region and its transmission, are considered. Three typological types of worship (in relation to the singing component) in the Sakhalin region are considered: monastic, cathedral and parish. The repertoire preferences in liturgical chants of cathedrals and branches are analyzed. As a result of the research, the author reveals that for one daily liturgical circle of a separate temple or cathedral, in the singing relation, a kind of synchronous cut is characteristic, represented by chants of different eras, styles and directions in simultaneity, leading to stylistic eclecticism, however, difficult to differentiate by the ear of an unprepared parishioner. The existing organizational problems in the regency-singing business are analyzed. The concert and educational activities of choirs and vocal ensembles of the parishes of the Yuzhno-Sakhalin diocese are covered. The conclusion is made about the incompleteness of the described processes and the unstable current state of the Orthodox singing tradition of Sakhalin, which is in the initial period of its formation.

Topical Issues in the Field of Religious Tourism. Current Challenges

The number of political and cultural shifts in Ukraine during the last years have caused the rise of the interest in Ukraine as a place of attraction for religious tourists. As a result of Ukraine's rapid withdrawal from the religious and ideological milieu of the Moscow Patriarchate, getting a Tomos and the creation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (where a fairly high percentage of Muslim believers (Tatars) live and are persecuted), the gradual integration of (mostly) Orthodox Ukraine into the European Union (where most countries profess Catholicism and Protestantism) attract the attention of the European community to Ukraine more than ever in the religious sphere. Today this can become a favorable environment for the world’s getting acquainted with the Ukrainian religious culture, with the promotion of its spiritual heritage, which has been created for thousands of years, for creating a general image of the country as a tourist one. According to the World Tourism Organization, at least 200 million people go pilgrimage annually. Pilgrimage is also gaining popularity in Ukraine every year. The specificity of pilgrimage is determined by the features of the religious consciousness of believers, which in turn is associated with the nature of religious doctrine and cult practices of specific regional destinations. Thus, in the context of the development of modern state tourism policy, once lost traditions of pilgrimage are gaining significant growth in the country.

Significance of abolishing the Brest Church Union within the Russian Empire for the Russian Orthodox Church and the Byelarussian People

This article discloses those aspects of abolishing the Brest Church Union within the borders of the Russian Empire in 1780–1875, the comprehension of which remains relevant for historical and church-historical science. The author draws the following conclusions: 1) The reunification of the Uniates with the Orthodox completed a centuries-old period in the history of Russian Orthodoxy, which can be characterized as an era of separation. Formally, the canonical division of the Russian Orthodox Church, which took shape in the mid-15 th century, was overcome at the end of the 17 th century, when in 1686, the Orthodox of Rzeczpospolita became part of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, the consequence of the canonical division — the division of the Western Russian population into Orthodox and Uniates — was overcome only in 1875, when 250,000 Uniates returned to the Orthodox faith. 2) As a result of the Uniates’ reunification with the Orthodox, most of the Byelarussian–Ukrainian population returned to the Orthodox path to their salvation and spiritual origins. This freed the Western Russians from the grafting of the alien to them Western Christian form of spirituality and Polish culture and served to develop the Orthodox forms of religiosity natural to the people in the second half of the 19 th century. Therefore, the development of distinctive Byelarussian and Ukrainian cultures as branches of all-Russian culture became possible. 3) The reunification of the Byelarussian–Ukrainian Uniates with the Orthodox was one of, if not the most, significant achievements of the Russian Empire in the lands annexed from Poland. Without this event, a lasting comprehensive integration of the Western Russian territories with the Great Russian provinces would not have been possible. 4) The termination of the Brest Pact halted the process of the involvement of the Byelarussians in the Polish Church and united the Byelarussians spiritually and culturally, having destroyed the religious and cultural boundary which divided the people, and which could be traced on the geographical map. In 1839, the Byelarussians got rid of the intrusive Romanization, Polonization and Russophobia propaganda and returned to the Russian historical and cultural world, where they got the opportunity to cultivate their identity and did not feel like second-rate people, as they did in the Commonwealth of Poland.

Orthodoxy in the land of Belarus: pages of history

This article describes the historical path of Orthodoxy in the lands of contemporary Belarus, which has taken more than athousand years and which can be distinguished by a great peculiarity. The states, including the Western Russian lands, have had a decisive influence on the church life of the local population. Orthodoxy came to the lands of present-day Byelarus together with the baptism of all Rus at the late 10 th century. It was the beginning of a complex and long-term process of the Christianization of the vast Old Russian state and the political unification of the East Slavic tribes. The second period in the history of Orthodoxy in ancient Russian lands was connected with the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and lasted until the proclamation of the Brest Church Union (the second half of the 13 th — the late 16 th century). It was characterized by a gradual loss of the position of the Orthodox Church as a result of the religious indifference policy pursued by the pagan authorities of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, since 1387, open support of the Roman-Catholic Church, which ended with the adoption of the Brest Church Union. The third period, the 17 th — late 18 th centuries, was the time of struggle for survival in an environment of dominating Catholicism and anti-Orthodox legislation, which led the Orthodox Church to the brink of extinction. The late of 18 th — early 20 th century is characterized by the inclusion of White Russia territories into the Russian Empire. It was a time of Orthodoxy revival and reunification of the Belarusian people divided by the Brest Church Unity into Orthodox and Uniates. The Soviet years in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus are connected with the hard trials, which the Orthodox Church experienced during the Soviet time. The contemporary period in history of Orthodox Church in Byelarus begins with the foundation of the Belarusian Exarchate of Moscow Patriarchate in 1989 and proceeds up to now. It is characterized by not simple process of spiritual revival of the society and fast restoration of Orthodoxy’s positions in the sovereign Republic of Byelarus.

International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church

Russian officials and the Moscow Patriarchate have worked together in recent years to promote a socially conservative policy agenda, both domestically and beyond the Russian Federation’s borders. Examining official documents and the statements of key leaders, this article evaluates the development and nature of contemporary church–state relations as they pertain to international relations. The picture that emerges is one of pragmatic partnering, with the state increasingly inclining towards normative positions long espoused by the Church in an effort to shift its foreign policy in a direction that stresses civilizational differentiation and positions Russia as the protector of Christians and “traditional values” around the globe. Underlying this shift in orientation on the part of the Kremlin is a neorealist perspective (though one increasingly expressed through ideational rhetoric) that envisions Russia as not just having a privileged regional sphere of influence but becoming a major player in a polycentric world. As a means of legitimating these objectives, the Church has proven an ideal partner; however, it would be a mistake to simply regard the latter institution as an arm of the state, given that it has its own objectives and motivations relative to the wider world, and these at times conflict with those of the Kremlin.

«Остаюсь искренним другом Русской Православной Зарубежной Церкви»: письма иеромонаха Василия (Родзянко) протопресвитеру Георгию Граббе

This article makes public the letters of Revd. Vladimir Rodzianko (Hieromonk Vasily) to Protopresbyter Georgy Grabbe. Both the sender and the addressee are wellknown. The former is the future bishop and a long-term prsenter of Orthodox programmes on BBC Radio. The former also became a bishop, and for many years was the secretary of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Church Abroad having a great infl uence on its policy. The letters were written in the early 1979 in the moment of great changes in the life of their author. The fi rst letter was prepared when he was Protopriest Vladimir, the second soon after his becoming a monk as Hieromonk Vasily. The reason for the letters were the attacks of the administration of the Russian Church Abroad against Moscow Patriarchate as well as the idea, popular in the Russian Orthodox Church, that there is no holy grace at all in any communities not belonging to the Orthodox Church. This idea was put forward by Protopresbyter G. Grabbe in the article Acribeia and Oeconomy. This approach was aggravated by the fact that the administration of the Russian Church Abroad regarded as apostate the clergy of Moscow Patriarchate. The consequence was an idea about their gracelessness. Hieromonk Vasily (Rodzianko) thought that this was erroneous and dangerous. Using certain historical evidence and an opinion of St. Ioann (Maksimovich), he claimed that the Orthodox gaith and the Eucharist are supreme over the jurisdictional controversies and that the temporary discord does not aff ect grace. The letters contain interesting facts as to relations between the Russian Church Abroad and the Serbian Church in the 1920s — 1940s, describe little-known details between the Russian Church Abroad and other branches of Russian church in exile.

Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky) on the Difficulties of Restoring Communion with the Georgian Church in the Light of Overcoming the Renovationist Schism (1944)

Written in early 1944, a letter of confidence from Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky) to bishop Dimitri (Gradusov) reveals the nature of the friction between the head of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Kallistratus (Tsintsadze). The solemn announcement at the end of 1943 of the overcoming of the division between the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches, which had lasted since 1917, did not put an end to the mutual perplexities. The difficulty arose due to the fact that in 1927–1943 the Georgian Catholicosate was officially in ecclesiastical communion with the Russian schismatics, also known as Renovationists. But in the changed circumstances, the head of the Georgian Church preferred to keep in secret this historical fact, so as not to raise doubts about the Orthodoxy of the Georgians. The embarrassment of Catholicos Kallistratus led to the fact that the documents on the restoration of canonical communion between the Russian and Georgian Churches, which had already been prepared for publication in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate in December 1943, were removed from the almost finished issue and replaced with other materials. However, for Patriarch Sergius, the canonical aspect of the problem was crucial. The break of the Georgian Catholicosate with the Russian schismatic Renovationists was required to be documented and made public. Otherwise, according to Patriarch Sergius, the Russian Church itself could be schismatic. As a result, the head of the Moscow Patriarchate was able to convincingly argue his position and achieve the official publication of the necessary documents in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate in March 1944. Such persistence of Patriarch Sergius did not harm the further positive development of relations between the Russian and Georgian Churches.

Kościół Prawosławny na Ukrainie wobec języka ukraińskiego

Language plays a very important role in the religious life of an individual, community and state. A common language gives a feeling of unity, helps to create community bonds and facilitates integration and consolidation. Under the influence of the Revolution of Dignity and the hybrid war with Russia, the sense of national identity began to grow in Ukrainian society, and the attitude towards the Ukrainian language as an important component of national identity and security changed. Many Orthodox believers in Ukraine attach more importance to the language of worship and the attitude of the Church towards the hybrid war with Russia. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine established in 2018 represent different attitudes towards the annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine and the language of religious practice. The UOC MP, staying in the protectorate of the Russian Orthodox Church, has never condemned the annexation of Crimea and the armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine. In the UOC MP, there is an informal ban on the use of the Ukrainian language, as they perceive liturgical activities in Ukrainian as a betrayal of the "Russian world". Such an attitude causes misunderstandings and even indignation on the part of the faithful, who more and more often go to the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine presenting a pro-Ukrainian attitude.

Relations between Orthodox Christians in Ukraine in the Context of the War

Relations between Orthodox Christians in Ukraine in the Context of the War Andriy Dudchenko (bio) This article is about the Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine in the context of the war begun by the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Orthodoxy in Ukraine is represented now by two main jurisdictions: the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). First some statistics OCU is an autocephalous Church, created at the Unification Council in St. Sophia Cathedral of Kyiv on December 15, 2018. On January 6, 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew granted this Church the Tomos of autocephaly. In OCU there are now 60 bishops, about 7,700 parishes and 4,900 priests, and about 80 monasteries. Before the war, 24.1% of Ukrainians considered themselves members of the OCU, which amounts to 39.8% of Orthodox Ukrainians.1 UOC is a self-governing Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. UOC has 104 bishops, about 12,000 parishes and about the same number of priests, and over 250 monasteries (these figures include the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia before the current war). Before the war, 13.3% of Ukrainians identified themselves as members of the UOC, or 21.9% of Orthodox Ukrainians. To complete the picture, it should be added that 21.9% of respondents, or 36.2% of Orthodox, called themselves "just Orthodox" not identifying with either jurisdiction. As you can see, the number of parishes [End Page 189] and monasteries was much larger in the UOC, but OCU had far more worshippers. On the other hand, according to the data from the same research, UOC had twice as many permanent parishioners as OCU, that is, those who participate in liturgy at least once a week. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has made a huge difference. According to an Omnibus Info Sapiens poll,2 73% of believers in the UOC, Moscow Patriarchate, have ceased to identify themselves with this church. As early as March, the number of supporters of the UOC-MP for the first time fell to a record low of 4%. At the same time, the percentage of OCU supporters increased to 52%. The survey was conducted even before the data on the atrocities of the Russian invaders near Kyiv were published. On May 27, 2022, at a council in Feofaniya, the UOC announced that it is breaking all ties with Moscow Patriarchate, but did not proclaim autocephaly. The canonical status of this Church today needs to be clarified, as I will discuss later on. In addition to the two main jurisdictions, the Kyiv Patriarchate again exists in Ukraine. This jurisdiction was self-dissolved on the day of the Unification Council in 2018 and fully joined the OCU. However, in the summer of 2019, Bishop Filaret Denisenko convened a Local Council, at which he announced the revival of the Kyiv Patriarchate with himself as patriarch, and he began to consecrate new bishops. The OCU, which considers Filaret a bishop with the title of "Honorary Patriarch," called the new consecrations of bishops in the Kyiv Patriarchate non-canonical and stated that they would not be recognized by the OCU. Today there are 14 bishops in the Kyiv Patriarchate, but only a few parishes within the borders of Ukraine.3 A little background Many believers in Ukraine remember the times when there was only one Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union—the Russian Church, also known as the Moscow Patriarchate. In 1989, the revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church or UAOC was proclaimed in Lviv. By the beginning of 1990, about 200 parishes had moved to the UAOC, mainly in western Ukraine. The head of the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church at the time was then-Metropolitan Filaret. He sharply criticized the new autocephalous church, which he [End Page 190] interpreted as a schism. In October of the same year the Ukrainian Exarchate of Moscow Patriarchate was transformed into the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.4 Metropolitan Filaret received the title of His Beatitude. In the Blessed Charter issued by Patriarch Alexiy of Moscow, the UOC was called "independent and self-governed in its administration," united with the universal Church through the...

Reasons for the Rupture of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the Moscow Patriarchate against the Backdrop of the War in Ukraine 2022

The object of the study is provided by the conflict of interests of the Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-(MP) against the backdrop of the 2022 full-scale Russian war against Ukraine. The article considers the impact of new legislative initiatives aimed at minimizing the destructive Russian influence, including on the religious area. The main content and contradictions of certain points of the Decree of the Council of the UOC (MP) dated May 27, 2022, as a result of which the religious denomination declared independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, are analyzed. The main reasons for the rejection of the Moscow Patriarchate by the UOC and their influence on the decisions of church leaders are identified. Also included are the independent decisions of more than 400 UOC parishes to transfer to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. In the context of illustrating the reasons for the refusal and contradictions, certain facts of the destruction by the Russian army of churches in Ukraine subordinate to the UOC-MP (friendly fire) are pointed out. This study is aimed at establishing the motives, results, and consequences of rethinking the subordination of one's own religious activity to a denomination that, despite its dependence on the Moscow Patriarchate, is actively functioning in Ukraine during the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war

The History of the Russian Church Diaspora in the Third Quarter of the 20th Century in a New Monograph by the Moscow Researcher A. A. Kostryukov

The article analyzes the new book “The Russian Church Abroad under Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky), 1964–1985” by the Moscow historian A. A. Kostryukov. Despite the presence of a number of works on the history of the Russian Church Abroad in the 1960s–1980s, major studies that comprehensively characterize the period of the reign of Metropolitan Filaret, before the appearance of the book by A. A. Kostryukov, was not in historiography. The absolute merit of the monograph under review is an objective and unbiased study of the relationship of the Russian Church Abroad with the Moscow Patriarchate and other Local Churches, as well as the exposure of myths, misconceptions and the identification of “blank spots” in relation to a number of topics important for the history of the Church Abroad: the condemnation of ecumenism, unfulfilled hopes in relation to the “catacomb church” in the USSR, on the canonization of the royal family, the new martyrs and confessors of Russia. The monograph also outlines the key problems and important events in the history of other branches of the Russian Church Abroad in the last quarter of the 20th century — the Western European Exarchate of Russian Parishes, which was administratively subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the North American Metropolis, which in 1970 received from the Moscow Patriarchate the status of autocephalous (independent) under the name of the Orthodox Church in America. Thus, A. A. Kostryukov studied the complex processes concerning the entire Russian church diaspora, including its connections and relations, both with the Moscow Patriarchate and with other Local Churches and, above all, with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. On the whole, the work under review is the first fundamental work on the history of the Russian Church Abroad in the third quarter of the 20th century.

СУСПІЛЬНО-РЕЛІГІЙНА РЕАКЦІЯ НА ОБРАННЯ У 1943 р. МИТРОПОЛИТА СЕРГІЯ (СТРАГОРОДСЬКОГО) ПАТРІАРХОМ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ПРАВОСЛАВНОЇ ЦЕРКВИ

The article analyses the reaction of Orthodox churches and churches of the Anglican Commonwealth, as well as secular society to the election of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) as Patriarch of Moscow. This event was the first vivid fact of changing the course of the religious policy of Soviet power and caused a certain resonance in the world community, both religious and secular. The study of the spectrum of points of view about the mentioned local fact in their systematic presentation will allow to establish general trends of contemporaries in their attitude to the election of a new Moscow Patriarch in 1943. The dramatic circumstances preceding the patriarchal election of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) did not prevent the world community, primarily religious, from receiving him as the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church. This event was the initial step in the general process of renewal of state and religious relations in the USSR and the use of church resources in the international interests of Soviet power. The foreign policy effect of the election of Patriarch Sergius was significant and perceived as a certain indicator of religious freedom in the USSR, and therefore influenced the position of the Allies preparing to meet in Tehran to discuss the opening of the Second Front.

Territorial structure of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia in the post-Soviet period

The history of changes in the church-territorial structure of the Russian Orthodox Church has a very long history. This issue has become especially acute in recent years. The active revival of religious life in the country, which began in the late 1980s, is accompanied by territorial transformations in the diocesan structure of the Russian Orthodox Church. The purpose of the study is to identify changes in the administrative-territorial structure of the Russian Orthodox Church within the borders of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet period. The prerequisites preceding the administrative reform of the Russian Orthodox Church are highlighted. In 2011, the reform of the diocesan structure of the Russian Orthodox Church began, as a result of which a three-stage system of organizing dioceses was built in the Moscow Patriarchate: patriarchy — metropolitanate — diocese. The main territorial unit of the Russian Orthodox Church is a diocese headed by a diocesan bishop (bishop, archbishop or metropolitan) and uniting parishes united in deaneries and monasteries in a given territory. The number of dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church since 2011 has increased from 159 to 323, i.e., more than doubled. Diocesan borders are determined by the Holy Synod, taking into account the administrative-territorial division of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Maps have been constructed that reflect the modern borders of the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church on the territory of the Russian Federation.