Abstract

Russian officials and the Moscow Patriarchate have worked together in recent years to promote a socially conservative policy agenda, both domestically and beyond the Russian Federation’s borders. Examining official documents and the statements of key leaders, this article evaluates the development and nature of contemporary church–state relations as they pertain to international relations. The picture that emerges is one of pragmatic partnering, with the state increasingly inclining towards normative positions long espoused by the Church in an effort to shift its foreign policy in a direction that stresses civilizational differentiation and positions Russia as the protector of Christians and “traditional values” around the globe. Underlying this shift in orientation on the part of the Kremlin is a neorealist perspective (though one increasingly expressed through ideational rhetoric) that envisions Russia as not just having a privileged regional sphere of influence but becoming a major player in a polycentric world. As a means of legitimating these objectives, the Church has proven an ideal partner; however, it would be a mistake to simply regard the latter institution as an arm of the state, given that it has its own objectives and motivations relative to the wider world, and these at times conflict with those of the Kremlin.

Highlights

  • The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has often been depicted by Western commentators as little more than a handmaiden of the state

  • For Kirill the concept of “Holy Russia” and its secular analogue of the “Russian world” (Russkii mir) have long been virtual synonyms, his use of them dependent on the audience he was addressing (Suslov 2018, p. 345).40 According to Kirill, the “Russian world is based on the Orthodox faith, which we found in the common Kievan baptismal font,” but it encompasses a common experiential background, along with similar views on societal development (Vystuplenie Sviateishego Patriarkha 2009)

  • There is no doubt that the ROC and Russian state have worked closely together in recent years when it comes to the pursuit of foreign policy objectives

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Summary

Introduction

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has often been depicted by Western commentators as little more than a handmaiden of the state. The synergistic effects of such partnering are today widely apparent in Russia, but they are especially evident in the conservative and moralizing rhetoric that has come to characterize how the Kremlin discusses its goals and priorities in the international relations arena This is not to imply that the ROC has been co-opted as an arm of the post-Soviet state, nor is it to naively suggest that the burgeoning of overt manifestations of Orthodoxy in political and military circles reflects a commensurate increase in sincere religious belief among Russian elites (though for some it genuinely may).. The conclusion draws out the broader implications of this study and suggests avenues for further research

Church-State Relations in Russia
The ROC’s Goals beyond Russia
The ROC’s Geographic Representation
Institutions Representing the ROC Abroad
The Russian State’s Priorities Abroad
Representing the Kremlin across the Russian World (and Beyond)
Institutional Bases of Church-State Relations in the Foreign Policy Arena
Analysis
Findings
Conclusions
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