Moscow Patriarchate Research Articles

Orthodox kaleidoscope: focus on Japan

ABSTRACT This contribution addresses the theoretical and methodological issues proposed in the ‘Orthodox Kaleidoscope’ network. Based on five months of field research in Japan, the contribution argues that the experience of the Japanese Orthodox Church refracts some of the theological and organisational concerns of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) – of which it is a constituent part – and that it does so in ways that may help us move beyond our traditional approaches to the whole field of Orthodox studies, both Russian and otherwise.

THE METROPOLITAN THEOPHILUS (BULDOVSKY) CHURCH ACTIVITY (ON THE MATERIALS OF THE SECTORAL STATE ARCHIVE OF THE SECURITY SERVICE OF UKRAINE)

Статтю присвячено аналізу життя та діяльності організатора й лідера «Лубенського розколу» митрополита Феофіла (Булдовського), котрий розпочав своє священицьке служіння у 1886 р. Автором показано, що ще в 1917 р. Булдовський став одним із провідників українського національного руху серед православного духовенства Полтавської єпархії. Ставши в 1923 р. архієреєм, Феофіл не змінив своїх переконань, прагнучи автокефалії Православної Церкви в Україні. В дослідженні розкриваються причини відмови Булдовського від підтримки Української Автокефальної Православної Церкви й утворення ним власної церковної організації, яку назвав «Братським об'єднанням парафій Української Православної Автокефальної Церкви». На основі збережених у кримінальній справі свідчень самого церковного діяча з’ясовано розвиток Лубенського розколу в східних регіонах України, а також показано реакцію Московської патріархії на діяльність цього угрупування. Акцентовано увагу на причинах припинення архієреєм церковної роботи наприкінці 1930-х рр. й описано намагання відновити ним церковне життя під час німецької окупації України. На підставі показів митрополита Феофіла доведено, що протягом 1942 – 1943 рр. він прагнув очолити Українську Автокефальну Православну Церкву, вважаючи себе найбільш гідною для цього особистістю, й мав натягнуті взаємини з її адміністратором митрополитом Полікарпом (Сікорським), котрий наділив Феофіла титулом митрополита Лівобережної України. Значну увагу приділено контактам архієрея з німецькою окупаційною владою. На закінчення розкрито намагання Булдовського після повернення у Східну Україну радянської влади в надії на затвердження на Харківській кафедрі налагодити контакти з Московською патріархією й з’ясовано обставини його арешту НКДБ та смерті в тюрмі під час слідства.

The variability of approaches in the church’s identification in the Russian theology of the 20-th century

At all times one of the key problems of Orthodox ecclesiology has been the definition of the concept “Church”. Certainly, it reflects a certain theological-ideological paradigm that might change depending on socio-historical circumstances. Such legitimacy is well illustrated by the ecclesiological experience of the Moscow Patriarchate of the 20th century, especially in the 1990s, when Russian Orthodox Church actively acceded to the introduction and spreading of the political and church mythologem as “Russian World” or “Ruskiy Mir” by the leadership of Russian Federation. However, the line allocated to the Church in this project is abhorrent to the concept of the Church of Christ, and therefore, the article is devoted to first and foremost a comparative analysis of various approaches for understanding the Church of Christ and the impact of these approaches on the formation of ecclesiological doctrine and practice of Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the 20th century. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the various approaches to understanding the Church of Christ and the impact of these approaches on the formation of ecclesiological doctrine and practices of Russian Orthodox Church in the 20th century. The choice of time and place of the object under study is due to the need to analyze the external and internal influences on the understanding of the phenomenon of the Church of Christ. It was specified that within a short period of time (during the 20-th century), the demolition of several centenaries paternalistic system of mutual influences between the Church and the Russian state took place, and a new system of relations was formed in a wide range – from the persecution and attempts of unequal symbiosis and even to mutual emancipation. Approaches of Russian theologians of the 20’th century as to the concept of the Church should be divided into three groups: conservative (based on the achievements of scholastic theology of the 18’th–19’th centuries), innovative (creative understanding of the patristic heritage, denial of the absolutization of social moment in the Church) and modernistic (adaptation of theology to modern society needs) philosophical understanding of the latter needs, and sometimes it’s considered as a tool for the use of the Church, or for its destruction). The criteria for their intrinsic definition were the method of definition (e.g, the concept of love) and the connotation associated with their perception (positive or negative). It should also be noted that the "The Foundations of Social Concept of Russian Orthodox Church" adopted by the Moscow Patriarchate in 2000 are in full compliance with the provisions established in the works of the pioneers of the 20’th century. The ideas of the documents remain relevant in the 21’st century, but they appear to undergo new transformations in the future. First of all, we have to take into consideration the current trends in the development of Russian society.

Churches, Politics, and Ideological Struggles in Ukraine: The Case of the Euromaidan Protests (2013–2014)

ABSTRACTThis article offers an analysis of the key differences in the representations of the Euromaidan protests of 2013–2014 in the discourses of two significant religious organizations of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). Using as primary source material media interviews and public statements of religious figures, the present study traces the basic argumentative strategies employed by these churches either for legitimating direct involvement in the protest or, vice versa, for justifying complete abstention from participating in it. It demonstrates that while the UGCC’s involvement helped enhance the legitimacy of the Euromaidan by constructing its quasi-religious image, the UOC-MP’s alleged neutrality played into the hand of the state authorities by lessening the impression of the unity of the Ukrainian population in opposition to the political regime and by undermining the high moral ground claims of the protestors.

A.V.Kartashev on the Relationship between Russian Orthodox Parishes in Western Europe and the Moscow Patriarchate in the 1920s — 1930s

The author carries out a discourse analysis of journalistic articles by well-known Russian emigrant historian, theologian, and public figure Anton Kartashev in order to understand his attitude to the schisms of the Russian Orthodox Church caused by the Russian Revolution, and to clarify his methods for shaping his readers’ perceptions of these events. This analysis reveals a complex correlation of political, religious, and historical argumentation. From the very beginning, political arguments were pushed into the background by a statement of apolitism, which initially extended to Russian emigrants. Subsequently, he abandoned apolitism as a principle of activity in exile in order to consistently pursue a policy of intransigence with the Bolsheviks. Political argumentation remained in the background compared to historical and religious facets, since the church should not interfere in politics. He consistently historicized contemporary experiences, based on a historical perspective, to give an assessment of the political orientation and concrete actions of the hierarchs. This created an illusory opportunity to maintain the legal subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate, which increasingly depended on the Bolshevik regime. He saw the post-revolutionary history of the Russian Orthodox Church as a series of schisms that weakened it. This gradually brought a precise religious argument to the forefront in substantiating specific measures to preserve the canonical structure of Western European parishes headed by the Metropolitan Eulogius, at the break with the Synod of Bishops in Sremski Karlovtsi and with the Moscow Patriarchate.

The relationship of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Jerusalem Patriarchate in 1948-1953 in the context of Soviet-Israeli relations.

The subject of this article is the problem of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Jerusalem Patriarchate in 1948-1953 in the context of Soviet-Israeli relations. The specified chronological framework was not chosen by chance, since it was during these years that significant events took place in the development of bilateral relations: the formation of the State of Israel, the establishment of diplomatic relations, the drafting of the statute on Jerusalem, and the severance of diplomatic relations. The ROC was involved in the Soviet Middle East policy, the purpose of which was to strengthen ties between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Eastern Patriarchates. The methodological basis of the research is the principle of historicism, which assumes taking into account the specific historical conditions and events in which the development of the process of interest to us took place. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that the previously unexplored process of the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Jerusalem Orthodox Church during this period has been studied. The source base of the research is unpublished documents of the Foundation of the Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR of the State Archive of the Russian Federation. Based on the analysis of archival materials introduced into scientific circulation for the first time, it is concluded that, on the one hand, contacts between the ROC and the Jerusalem Patriarchate were maintained through the Soviet diplomatic mission in the State of Israel. Therefore, the state of bilateral relations influenced the relationship between the Churches. On the other hand, after the rupture of diplomatic relations in February 1953, the situation of the RDM in Jerusalem worsened, but contacts between the Moscow and Jerusalem Patriarchies were not interrupted. Representatives of the Jerusalem Church had the right to freely cross the border, as a result, they could visit the Mission despite the state of Soviet-Israeli relations.

Between two stools

In the summer of 2020, the Belarusian Orthodox Church failed to adopt a clear position with regard to the conflict that had broken out in the country. Some priests and believers took part in the protests against electoral fraud and the violence employed by the state forces. Others supported the longstanding president, Lukashenka. The church leaders tolerated both positions - and did not change its stance even when the Russian Orthodox Church, to which the Belarusian Orthodox Church is affiliated as a semi-autonomous member church, replaced the head of the church at the end of August. The new exarch, who for the first time is a Belarusian, was not as supportive of the state as Lukashenka had hoped. The Moscow Patriarchate is also not willing to squander its authority in Belarus in order to win the approval of an unpopular dictator.

МІЖКОНФЕСІЙНЕ ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ В СУЧАСНІЙ УКРАЇНІ: ФОРМИ ВИЯВУ ТА ШЛЯХИ ПРОТИДІЇ

The aim of the article is to clarify the essence of the main forms of inter-confessional confrontation in Ukraine among Christian churches and to find ways to counteract them in order to religiously and nationally consolidate Ukrainian society. Conflictogenic factors influencing the interfaith confrontation in modern Ukraine have been identified. There are two main groups of interfaith conflicts, each of which has special forms of interfaith confrontation and different phases of their severity: conflicts between Orthodoxy and other denominations; conflicts in the Orthodox environment. It is substantiated that with the restoration of the Ukrainian Churches during the rise of Ukrainian independence in the 90s of the twentieth century. interfaith relations have become more acute, which is associated with both the split of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the actualization of the long-standing conflict between Orthodoxy and the revived Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The reasons for the confrontation in the Orthodox environment were conflicts of corporate interests between individual Orthodox church institutions, different views of each of them on the principles of the unification process and a radically opposite understanding of canonicity. The formation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, although integrating the interests of the two Orthodox denominations (UOC KP and UAOC), at the same time did not eliminate inter-confessional contradictions with the UOC within the Moscow Patriarchate. It is concluded that the realities of Ukrainian church life encourage an active search for ways to counteract interfaith confrontation, a key aspect of which should be the establishment of a new format of socio-religious communication in the coordinates "Church-Church", "Church-State", "Church-Society". In a practical sense, effective means of its implementation can be: interfaith dialogue, building the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, countering Russian ideological aggression, strengthening the role of the media in overcoming religious threats.

“Atheists of the Kyiv Patriarchate”

At the start of 2019, an orthodox national church was founded in Ukraine. However, this is no more than a state church organisation. The attempt to unify Ukraine by founding a new church has failed. The religious-nationalist policies pursued by President Poroshenko from the autumn of 2018 onwards have in fact led to new conflicts and a division of the country. Although the state discredited the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) as being loyal to Moscow and exerted pressure on it, only a small number of parishes joined the new church. Reports on alleged conversions, and opinion polls in particular, were instrumentalised for political purposes. It was only after Volodymyr Zelensky was elected that tensions were reduced to a certain degree. However, numerous conflicts remain unresolved, including disputes over church buildings that were forcibly seized or confiscated by local authorities without any legal grounds.

Tomos in the context of the Russia and Ukraine information war

After the Revolution of Dignity on Maydan Square in Kyiv in 2013-2014, Russian military aggression began, which was marked by the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of a full-fledged war in the eastern territories of Ukraine. On January 6, 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew signed the Tomos for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which testified to the independent vector of development undertaked by Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which has long been under pressure from the Moscow Patriarchate. This event caused a resonance in both Ukrainian and Russian media. The purpose of the study is to find out how the process of granting the Tomos turned into one of the aspects of the information war between Ukraine and Russia. The publication presents the content of Ukrainian and Russian web resources dedicated to this event and analyzes how the media event of receiving the Tomos by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine influenced the internal social dialogue in Ukraine, communication between Ukrainian and Russian Orthodoxy, and information confrontation between Russia and Ukraine.

Expansion after the discord

2019 marked a significant change of tack for the Russian Orthodox Church with regard to its global policy. After the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephalous status to the newly founded Orthodox Church of Ukraine, against the will of the Moscow Patriarchate, Moscow adopted a confrontational stance. By far the largest of the 14 independent orthodox churches now regards itself as a global church in competition with the Greek-dominated Constantinople Patriarchate. In this competition, the Russian Orthodox Church is not only abandoning its “Russian world” ideology, but is also in effect breaking away from its Greek roots.

The restauration of the Reval suffragan diocese in 1917 and the election of the bishop as an expression of ‘church revolution’ in the Riga diocese

Abstract: The restauration of the Reval suffragan diocese in 1917 and the election of the bishop as an expression of ‘church revolution’ in the Riga diocese
 This article focuses on the creation of the Reval suffragan diocese in 1917 and the election of Pavel Kulbusch as the first bishop of Estonian descent. The article reconstructs the course of historical events on the basis of documents from the Russian State Historical Archive and provides a framework for understanding the events via the concept of ‘church revolution’ proposed by the historian Pavel Rogoznyi. The case of the Reval suffragan diocese complements the argument of Rogoznyi and suggests that processes in the Russian borderlands also contributed to the ‘church revolution’. While demands for Estonian and Latvian suffragan bishops had already been put forward by Governor Shakhovskoi in the 1890s and by the Riga diocesan council in 1905, it was only in 1917 that some of these projects were given institutional form. The Orthodox assembly of the Riga diocese in August of 1917 in Tartu elected the parish priest Pavel Kulbusch from St Petersburg as bishop of Reval. The process of consecrating the new bishop took several months due to the church hierarchy’s resistance to his candidature, primarily due to his ethnic origin. The documents published in this issue suggest that the institutions formed during 1917, including the diocese council (soviet) and the representative assemblies of the diocese, and the activity of nationalist Orthodox priests (such as Antoni Laar, who mobilised the Orthodox parishes in support of the bishop) rendered the formation of Reval diocese successful compared to several similar initiatives in other dioceses. The article argues that the institutions and practices formed during 1917 and the martyrdom of Bishop Platon in 1919 paved the way for the separation of the Estonian Church from the Moscow patriarchate in 1923.
 The translated and published documents accompanying the article are kept in the Russian State Historical Archive (in St Petersburg) and include the decrees of the Most Holy Synod; decisions made by the delegates of the congress of the ecclesiastical and secular representatives of the Riga diocese and the Temporary Council of the Riga Diocese; and individual and collective petitions in regards to restoring the suffragan diocese in Tallinn.

Changes in the Religious Situation in Ukraine (1985—2019): Ethnocultural Implications

In the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union and development of the independent Ukrainian State (1985–2019), the Ukrainian Orthodoxy underwent radical changes, which influenced the ethnocultural development of the Ukrainian society. Accession of Kyiv Metropolia by Moscow was abolished and its previous status restored. The Unification Council established the Local Orthodox Church, which was later granted tomos of Autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The topical tasks of the Church consist in its recognition by other Orthodox churches and its engagement in the unification process of Orthodox parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate. The intensity of further differentiation depends largely on the new government of Ukraine. For modern Ukrainian society, the main ethnocultural consequences of changes in the religious situation are as follows: 1) the appearance of Ukrainian national religious organizations; 2) the full-fledged functioning of the Ukrainian language in the religious life; 3) the revival of rituals and traditions associated with the religious life that were banned in the USSR or forgotten; 4) formation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church on the basis of Kyiv Metropolia and its acquisition of the highest canonical status in Ukraine. Changes that took place in the religious sphere contributed to the reverse Ukrainization of the Ukrainian ethnos after the long process of Russification, as well as to the political and ethnocultural consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. The impact of these changes on the modern ethnocultural development of the Ukrainian society, which took place from the mid-1980s till today, should be considered positive and corresponding to the national interests of Ukraine. These shifts in the religious situation contribute to the process of overcoming consequences of the religious, political, economic, and ethnocultural domination of Moscow in Ukraine.

Między Kijowem a Konstantynopolem Relacje Kościoła ukraińskiego z Patriarchatem Ekumenicznym (X–XXI w.)

Relations between the Ukrainian Church and Constantinople were difficult. This goes back as far as 988, when the Christianisation of the Rus created a strong alliance between Kiev and the Byzantine Empire. There were times when Constantinople had no influence over the Kiev Metropolis. During the Mongolian invasion in 1240, the Ukranian region was broken up and Kiev lost its power. The headquarters of the Kiev Metropolis were first moved to Wlodzimierz nad Klazma in 1299 and then to Moscow in1325. In 1458 the Metropolis of Kiev was divided into two; Kiev and Moscow, but Kiev still remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since that time, the orthodox hierarchs of Moscow no longer adhered to the title Bishop of Kiev and the whole of Rus and in 1588 the Patriarchate of Moscow was founded. In 1596 when the Union of Brest was formed, the orthodox church of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was not liquidated. Instead it was formally revived in 1620 and in 1632 it was officially recognized by king Wladyslaw Waza. In 1686 the Metropolis of Kiev which until that time was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was handed over to the jurisdiction of Moscow. It was tsarist diplomats that bribed the Ottoman Sultan of the time to force the Patriarchate to issue a decree giving Moscow jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kiev lost its Metropolitan status and became a regular diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in the beginning of the 20thcentury, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution were efforts made to create an independent Church of Ukraine. In 1919 the autocephaly was announced, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize it. . The structure of this Church was soon to be liquidated and it was restored again after the second world war at the time when Hitler occupied the Ukraine. In 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine gained its independence, the Metropolitan of Kiev requested that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine becomes autocephalous but his request was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. Until 2018 the Patriarchate of Kiev and the autocephalous Church remained unrecognized and thus considered schismatic. In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople looked into the matter and on 5thJanuary 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received it’s tomos of autocephaly from Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow opposed the decision of Constantinople and as a result refused to perform a common Eucharist with the new Church of Ukraine and with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Religious-pilgrim tourism in the west of Ukraine: main centres and shrines

This study analyzes the formation factors and major centres and shrines of pilgrimage and religious tourism in the Western region of Ukraine. The article presents structure of the religious space of 8 regions of Western Ukraine in the context of major Christian denominations. According to the latest statistics in the West of Ukraine, among the Christian denominations we can see dominance of believers and communities of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Roman Catholic Church. The main pilgrimage centres that represent the Christian denominations of the region are characterized by attracting their faithful and at the same time serving as religious tourism centres for a wider range of people. These include, among others: Univ Lavra, Krekhiv and Hoshiv Monasteries, the Marian Spiritual Centre in Zarvanytsia (Greek-Catholic Church); Maniava Skete, St. George Monastery on the Cossack Graves (Orthodox Church of Ukraine); Pochayiv Lavra, Zymne and Mezhyrich Monasteries, Monasteries in Bukovyna and Transcarpathia (Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate). At the same time, the Roman Catholic Church is represented by sanctuaries: Basilica of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Lviv, churches in Stryi, Bilshivtsi, Chortkiv, Letychiv and other settlements. The annual number of visitors to these major centres is between 30 and 100 thousand people a year. Regarding non-Christian religions, there are important shrines in the region for Hasidic pilgrims in Belz, Medzhybizh and other towns. At the same time, a number of regional centres are important destinations. There are many temples in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lutsk, Ternopil, which, given the presence of objects of religious worship and significant architectural appeal, perform both a pilgrimage and a religious-tourist function. Religious shrines, which are primarily of natural origin, are often an important component of the pilgrimage-tourist movement in the West of Ukraine. These include the appearance of the Virgin Mary, including individual hills or springs, as well as ancient cave monasteries. Numerous pilgrimage and travel agencies actively promote visits of believers and tourists to them. Development of religious and pilgrimage centres is related to the development of service infrastructure, service complexes and a network of different types of accommodation. It may be recommended to organize more educational and scholarly events of ecumenical nature and meetings of faithful of different denominations in the well-known religious centres of the region. Key words: pilgrimage, religious tourism, denominations, temple, shrine, pilgrimage centre, infrastructure.

Language and religion in Central Ukraine

AbstractThis article investigates the relationship between linguistic preferences, religiousness and religious denomination in Central Ukraine. On the one hand, the Ukrainian linguistic situation is characterized by the co-existence of Ukrainian, Russian and substandard forms of Ukrainian Russian mixed speech, on the other hand, the Orthodoxy in Ukraine is split into different denominations. In Central Ukraine, most notably the conflict between the Kyїv and the Moscow Patriarchate is relevant. For both linguistic and religious affiliation, a correlation with political preferences has been postulated, and, in a similar vein, a connection between religious denomination and the degree of religiousness on the one hand, and different aspects of linguistic affiliation, i. e. language usage and native language, as well as attitudes toward substandard speech on the other hand. Based on field work from 2014, we show that there is no preference for the Russian language among members of the Moscow Patriarchate in comparison to those of the Kyїv Patriarchate, and only a slightly more pronounced preference towards substandard forms of mixed speech among respondents with lower degrees of religiousness. Overall, the results argue against the existence of a “language conflict” in the Ukrainian population, outside the elites.

The Kremlin’s strategy vis-à-vis the Baltic States: a role for Orthodoxy

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on two assumptions oft discussed in the academic literature: that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), the Moscow Patriarchate, and Patriarch Kirill are part and parcel of the Kremlin’s regional strategy, and that the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe (particularly those in former Soviet states), are appendages to the Russian Orthodox Church and also part of the Kremlin’s regional strategy, effectively creating fifth columns for the Kremlin. There is extensive academic literature debating both assumptions, particularly as regards Georgia’s and Ukraine’s relations with Russia. However, these two are not the only states on the frontlines of Russian-Western geostrategic tensions. The Baltic States, as members of both the EU and NATO, are equally vital and possibly even more so. As the English-language academic literature concerning the relationship between the Kremlin, the ROC, and the Baltic States is limited, this paper attempts to further that conversation and asks whether, by more openly embracing Baltic Orthodox churches, the Baltic governments could limit Kremlin strategic influence in the region.

Activities of the Socially Oriented Organizations of the Russian Orthodox Church: The Regional Aspects

Introduction. The article analyzes the results of the sociological research undertaken by the authors in 2018 within the framework of the research project “Social Projects of the Russian Orthodox Church” in terms of comparing motivation, social technologies and social consequences of implementing Orthodox social projects in the capital and other regions of Russia in order to identify factors contributing to and hindering their successful implementation at the regional level. The purpose of the empirical research was to identify the social functions fulfilled in the process of developing and implementing social projects by organizations within the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), as well as by lay organizations created and headed by parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church. Materials and Methods. The study used qualitative methods of collecting and analyzing sociological data such as observation, in-depth interviews with people participating in social activities of the Orthodox projects and with the members of their target groups. The qualitative study used theoretical sampling and the method of selecting typical cases, which made it possible to describe and analyze social technologies and the consequences of the Orthodox social activities in different areas of impact on the society, including helping the poor and the socially deprived strata of the population, rehabilitation of the disabled, ‘pro-life’ movements, as well as educational activities. Results. In the process of research, based on the analysis of the survey data, the goals of the Orthodox social projects and their hierarchy have been identified, as well as the peculiarities of motivation of the activities of the participants of the Orthodox social projects studied and the specifics of the forms of organizing social assistance in Moscow, the Republic of Mordovia, and the Ivanovo Region. The social technologies of direct and indirect influence of the Orthodox social projects in terms of educational activities have been studied. The authors sought to assess the transformational consequences of implementation of the Orthodox social projects studied at the levels of the individual, social institutions, and groups. Discussion and Conclusion. The study has revealed that the Orthodox social initiatives help their participants master such skills as fundraising, interaction with the society, government bodies and commercial entities, thus becoming an important segment of civil society. The main difficulties the Orthodox social projects encounter have been revealed: poor systemic work and dependence on the personality of the leader, dependence on grants. The scientific results of the study can be used when developing strategies and implementing social policies with the participation of Orthodox non-profit organizations through a comprehensive analysis of methods and social technologies.

Constituting of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a factor in changing the cultural-civilizational paradigm of independent Ukraine.

Summary. The article deals with the close link between the diminishing influence of the Moscow Patriarchate on social and political processes in Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian cultural and civilizational space. Namely, the gradual deprivation of Orthodox believers of the post-imperial syndrome, including attitudes, perceptions, behavioral models, etc., associated with the stay of Ukrainians in the foreign-language and other people's (Asian) mentality and culture of the empire. It is noted that the receipt of the Tomos on recognition of autocephaly and the constitution of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) by Orthodox believers of Ukraine has a positive impact not only on the development of the OCU itself (increase in the level of theology, international and intra-Ukrainian inter-church communications, nationalization of both the cult and some Orthodox ceremonial forms, etc.), but also the level of patriotism, restoration and development of the Ukrainian-speaking environment, archetypal traditions, rituals, behavior models, etc. The conclusion is about the religious aspect of promoting Ukrainian development from the Asian to the European cultural and civilizational model.

ON THE DATE OF BIRTH OF PATRIARCH HADRIAN OF MOSCOW AND ALL RUSSIA

The Russian historiographic sources recognize three probable birth dates of Hadrian, the last Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia in 17th century, i.e.1627, 1637 and 1639. The fourth date, 1636, is not widely recognized. Two epitaphs to the Patriarch Hadrian, both written by Karion Istomin, a major court poet of that time, serve as the main source of information about the life of the head of the Russian Church. The first epitaph is prosaic, mounted on his tomb in the shrine of the heads of the Russian Church in the Assumption Cathedral in the Moscow Kremlin, and the second is poetic, preserved in the papers of the poet. . This paper establishes that the cause of chronological differences were errors in reading and interpreting the date of the Patriarch's death in the prosaic epitaph, which were made in historical studies of the 19th - early 20th century and without cross-checking with the gravestone inscription were reproduced in various publications. A visual study of the prosaic epitaph, conducted by the author in March 2014, indicates that Patriarch Hadrian died on October 2, 1700 at the age of 62 . The same date is written in the poetic epitaph. The “birthday” of Patriarch Hadrian (October 2), also raises doubts; most likely this date originated in the 19th century on the basis of the day of his baptism. The conducted research on the base of combination of archival sources and critical analysis of the writings of historians of the 19th - early 20th centuries established that Patriarch Hadrian was born in 1638.