Northern Mali Research Articles

Identity and conflict: Evidence from Tuareg rebellion in Mali

Does internal conflict erode national identity in Sub-Saharan Africa? We explore this question in the context of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali. The timing of the conflict was plausibly exogenous: the fall of al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 triggered the return of the Tuareg fighters from the demised leader’s Praetorian guard to their homeland in Northern Mali. Using representative survey data on the salience of national and ethnic identities, we perform a difference-in-differences estimation and find that the outbreak of the conflict prompted Malian residents living closer to the conflict zone to decrease their national identity more than the residents further away. We argue that this effect is likely to have been driven by proximity to violent events perpetrated by separatist groups and not by selective migration, exposure to internally displaced persons, communal violence, or other potential alternative explanations. Our results are consistent with the qualitative evidence on the matter. We place these findings in the context of recent theoretical advances in identity economics.

Iklan Aesthetics in Niger: Identity and Adornment from Servility to Self-agency

<i>Iklan</i> Aesthetics in Niger: Identity and Adornment from Servility to Self-agency

Scenarios Analysis on Electric Power Planning Based on Multi-Scale Forecast: A Case Study of Taoussa, Mali from 2020 to 2035

The increase in electricity demand is caused by population density, gross domestic product growth and technological conditions. A long-term forecast study on the electricity demand could be a promising alternative to the investment planning of power systems and distribution. In this study, the main aim is to forecast and understand the long-term electricity demand of the Taoussa area for the sustainable development of the regions of northern Mali, by using the Model for Analysis of Energy Demand (MAED) from the International Atomic Energy Agency. To fill such a knowledge gap, the long-term evolution of electricity demand is calculated separately for four consumption sectors: industry, transportation, service and household from 2020 to 2035. The demand for each end-use category of electricity is driven by one or several socioeconomic and technological parameters development of the country, which are given as part of the reference scenario (RS) and two alternative scenarios (Low and High). These scenarios were developed based on four groups of coherent hypotheses concerning demographic evolution, economic development, lifestyle change and technological change. The results showed that the annual growth rate of electricity demand in Taoussa area in all scenarios is expected to increase by only 8.13% (LS), 10.31% (RS) and 12.56% (HS). According to the seasonal variations of electricity demand, dry season electricity demand was higher than the demand in cool season during the study period. Such a conclusion demonstrates that the proposed long-term method and related results could provide powerful sustainable solutions to the electricity development challenges of Africa.

How Algeria-Turkey Ambitious Strategic Rapprochement Will Affect France’s Sahel Policy?

President Macron did decide to withdraw French troops from the Sahel last summer, leaving only special forces based in north Mali, he stated that Operation Barkhane will end early in 2022. Nonetheless, Algiers’ decision to not allow French military planes to use Algeria’s airspace will create a direct impact on the military mission and France’s entire ‘war on terror in the Sahel. In Algeria, however, bold decisions toward a strategic rapprochement with Turkey were in the making. Even though the new authorities in Algiers were hesitant for such a foreign policy shift, because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the internal political struggle, constitutional and institutional amendments in the aftermath of the peaceful Algerian 2019 Hirak needed to be put in place. However, the tenacious resistance of the Francophile and Arabophone-nationalists anti-Ottoman legacy, the well-off social class, and elite pro-France lobbies in Algiers and Paris held back President Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s Administration from improving the relations between Algiers and Ankara. Meanwhile, the ambassadors from both countries have been pushing tirelessly for the success of the strategic rapprochement between these two states.

Influence of Orography Upon Summertime Low‐Level Jet Dust Emission in the Central and Western Sahara

AbstractLow‐level jets (LLJs) drive frequent emission of mineral dust in the central and western Sahara in boreal summer. A major hotspot for this process is central Algeria, northern Mali and Mauritania, through which blow the dry near‐surface northeasterly Harmattan winds, with a peak in dust emission around the low‐lying Tidihelt region. North African orography is thought to contribute to the strength of the LLJ over the Bodele dust source in Chad, but its influence on erosivity over summertime source regions remains unquantified. In this paper, the contribution of central Saharan orography to the strength of Harmattan LLJs and associated dust emission frequency is tested. An idealized simulation with flattened Hoggar mountains is compared with a control using the Met Office Unified Model at 12 km horizontal resolution. In the absence of the Hoggar mountains, dust emission frequency estimated using an empirical relationship with surface wind speeds is found to decline across the entire northeasterly “LLJ alley,” including by 31% in the Tidihelt where composited jet surface winds drop from 9.0 to 7.3 m s−1 under a more easterly regime. The mountains are linked to a low‐level leeward geopotential height perturbation, with a northern limb reinforcing northeasterlies through the Tidihelt. Dome‐shaped elevated heating situated over the Hoggar mountains explains the difference between the simulated wind fields in the two experiments. These findings suggest that central Saharan orography plays an important role in sustaining erosive dusty conditions during boreal summer.

Pragmatism and Purism in Jihadist Governance: The Islamic Emirate of Azawad Revisited

The Islamic Emirate established in northern Mali in 2012 was brought down less than a year later by a French military intervention, provoked by the Emirate’s belligerent posture. This article explains why the leaders of the Emirate appeared to govern in a way that jeopardized the state’s survival, despite AQIM’s leadership calling for a cautious approach. Based on novel primary sources, this article provides a detailed view of governance practices in the Emirate, showing that they were in fact considerably more pragmatic than hitherto assumed. Furthermore, it argues that both AQIM and the leaders of the Emirate in the end were more concerned with the long-term prospects of jihadist expansion in the region than with the survival of the Emirate itself.

Implementing Reparations in the Al Mahdi Case

Abstract The city of Timbuktu evokes remoteness and, since 2012, chaos and destruction. During an armed conflict in the north of Mali, radicals took over the city and destroyed several of its mausoleums. One of the perpetrators, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, was convicted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his participation in the destruction of 10 religious and historic buildings. The unprecedented nature of the Al Mahdi case led to an equally unprecedented question at the reparations phase: who are the victims of cultural heritage destruction and how should their harm be addressed? Drawing from the author’s personal involvement in the case as an appointed expert, this article is a journey into how this question was resolved and the practical challenges it posed during the implementation phase. These challenges, while specific to the Al Mahdi case, provide a framework to demonstrate the level of complexity involved in the implementation of reparations. The article focuses on three ‘monumental’ challenges: (i) whether ‘unborn children’ should be included in the pool of victims given that cultural heritage is meant to be preserved for the benefit of future generations; (ii) what place women ought to occupy in the implementation of reparations, despite the customary practices of side-lining them; and (iii) the decision of whether to memorialize events surrounding the crime. On the latter challenge, the article introduces the concept of ‘restorative agency’, a working principle that was adopted to ensure memorialization practices reflect the experience of victims. Incidentally, this article reveals some of the work of the Trust Fund for Victims, one of the ICC’s least comprehended creations, and briefly discusses the role of experts during implementation moving forward.

Conflicted colonialisms: multi-dimensional violence in the Western Sahel

ABSTRACT In October 2020, French-language media overflowed with coverage of the release of Sophie Pétronin, the last French hostage held overseas. Pétronin, a 75-year-old humanitarian worker, had been kidnapped in northern Mali nearly four years earlier and returned to France as a Muslim convert who challenged received ideas about security and terror, generating a violent backlash across French social media. She made headlines again a year later for her unlawful clandestine return to Mali. This article argues that the complex figure of Sophie Mariam Pétronin brings into focus the masculinised necropolitics of the Sahelian conflict, including the assumed privilege of white actors, hostility towards female involvement, and the ‘relations of enmity’ that Europe maintains with the racialised others of its former colonies.

External interventions in Mali and its borderlands: a case for stabilisation

The article’s main objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the concept of stabilisation, in both academic and policy terms, by analysing theoutcomes of counterinsurgency and support to peace operations in the Sahel by regional, continental, and extra-continentalactors. It addresses the problematic associated with the so-called ‘intervention traffic jam’ resulting from numerous external initiativesin the political process and conflict dynamics of Sahelian countries, with focus on central and northern Mali and its borderlands. The external interventions entered a new phase of the so-called liberal peace project when, in the 2000s, peacekeeping modalities evolved into integrated or multidimensional missions, as well as into a normative framework for statebuilding. Furthermore, interventions in the Sahel reflect a return to stabilisation in the early 2010s – a concept that emerges as an alternative to the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus which dominated the previous decade. Despite the numerous stabilisation efforts, there are recurrent episodes of extreme violence in the ethnically diverse central Mali, along with increased insecurity in neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. The insurgency phenomena in the border areas between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso (Liptako-Gourma) is often not only directly linked to the association between the expansion of Salafi-Jihadist movements and the Malian political crisis of 2012, but also to the weak state presence in large regions in the SaharaSahel and the challenges posed by ethnic pluralism.The article concludes by emphasising the lack of integration of stabilisation responses into a political approach considering different governance strategies. It also stresses the need to prioritise the restoration of the state’s legitimate authority despite the achievement of a modus vivendi in the country’s northern region.

MALI: ECOWAS RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT IN MALI (2012-2021)

"This paper highlights the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] mode of response to the Malian conflict between 2012 and 2021 and identifies various gaps therein. It seeks to explain why ECOWAS has found it difficult to resolve the Malian conflict in spite of its commitment and experience in conflict resolution in the subregion. Secondary data are used for the study and presented qualitatively. The study reveals that the towering interest of Algeria and other neighbors in the chaotic northern Mali, as well as French interest in its former colony hindered ECOWAS initiative and its effectiveness in resolving the conflict. The paper recommends ECOWAS’ involvement in negotiations at the next peace agreement, and the drawing up of a roadmap for implementing such agreement. Besides, ECOWAS needs to address governance deficits in Mali and elsewhere in the subregion through peer review mechanism and increase its capacity to respond to violent conflicts beyond microstates and Anglophone enclaves in the region. Keywords: ECOWAS, Malian conflict, military coup, Tuareg, Jihad."

Rasmussen, Susan. Persons of courage and renown: Tuareg actors, acting, plays, and cultural memory in northern Mali. viii, 224 pp., illus., bibliogr. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2019. £73.00 (cloth)

Rasmussen, Susan. Persons of courage and renown: Tuareg actors, acting, plays, and cultural memory in northern Mali. viii, 224 pp., illus., bibliogr. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2019. £73.00 (cloth)

Tribal engagement strategies in the Islamic Emirate of Azawad

ABSTRACT The Tuareg uprising in northern Mali in 2012 culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Azawad, a proto-state run jointly by Tuareg Islamists in Ansar Dine and foreign jihadists with connections to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Ruling over a vast territory where jihadist ideology had little traction, the jihadists had to navigate a complex field of tribal politics to stay in power. This article explores jihadist tribal engagement strategies in Azawad during the occupation of northern Mali (2012–2013) and discusses how the relationships with tribal chiefs and traditional authorities impinged on the state-building efforts. Based on novel primary sources and local media reports, this article shows that the jihadists sought above all to avoid a tribal uprising and, therefore, pursued a relatively lenient policy towards the tribal chiefs. The comparatively weak position of the jihadists gave the chiefs some bargaining power in the new political settlement. However, collaboration with the jihadist rebels increased over time as their territorial control became more consolidated.

Norms, non-combatants’ agency and restraint in jihadi violence in northern Mali

ABSTRACT In 2012, several Jihadi armed groups stormed the northern part of Mali and became the unchallenged rulers of two-thirds of the country. Each group governed based on Islamic Law, codifying violence against their enemies in combat and the populations they controlled. Despite drawing on similar jihadist ideology, these governing systems differed significantly in their uses of violence and jurisprudence. What explains the emergence and legitimization of such contrasting norms? We compare patterns of violence and restraint in the regions of Kidal and Gao based on interviews with diverse protagonists of the occupation, including former members of Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Unity of Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). In Kidal, the Ansar Dine commander’s decision to follow local Islamic jurisprudence limited violence. In contrast, MUJAO rule over Gao used forms of punishment encompassing physical violence to assert political hegemony despite opposition from influential local imams and youth movements. Figures among the noncombatant population also influenced the formation and interpretation of norms among these groups, though less so under strong military imperatives. The findings highlight the importance of searching for a common language over norms of government between insurgents and populations as a key source of restraint.

Transition From Wild to Domesticated Pearl Millet (Pennisetum glaucum) Revealed in Ceramic Temper at Three Middle Holocene Sites in Northern Mali

Imprints of domesticated pearl millet (Pennisetum glaucum (L.) R. Br.) spikelets, observed as temper in ceramics dating to the third millennium BC, provide the earliest evidence for the cultivation and domestication process of this crop in northern Mali. Additional sherds from the same region dating to the fifth and fourth millennium BC were examined and found to have pearl millet chaff with wild morphologies. In addition to studying sherds by stereomicroscopy and subjecting surface casts to scanning electron microscopy (SEM), we also deployed X-ray microcomputed tomography (microCT) on eleven sherds. This significantly augmented the total dataset of archaeological pearl millet chaff remains from which to document the use of the wild pearl millet as ceramic temper and the evolution of its morphology over time. Grain sizes were also estimated from spikelets preserved in the ceramics. Altogether, we are now able to chart the evolution of domesticated pearl millet in western Africa using three characteristics: the evolution of nonshattering stalked involucres; the appearance of multiple spikelet involucres, usually paired spikelets; and the increase in grain size. By the fourth millennium BC, average grain breadth had increased by 28%, although spikelet features otherwise resemble the wild type. In the third millennium BC, the average width of seeds is 38% greater than that of wild seeds, while other qualitative features of domestication are indicated by the presence of paired spikelets and the appearance of nondehiscent, stalked involucres. Nonshattering spikelets had probably become fixed by around 2000 BC, while increases in average grain size continued into the second millennium BC. These data now provide a robust sequence for the morphological evolution of domesticated pearl millet, the first indigenous crop domesticated in western Africa.

Spontaneous External Digestive Fistula of Tuberculosis Origin, Medical Treatment: About a Case at the Timbuktu Hospital

In the literature, the management of enterocutaneous fistula of tuberculosis origin is rare. The aim of this work was to report a case of external digestive fistula of tuberculosis origin in a 10-year-old girl in northern Mali in a situation of armed conflict. She was a 10-year-old patient who was admitted to our general surgery ward for external digestive fistula evolving for more than (4) four years, at admission the general. The karnofsky index was at 40%, she could not sit or hold a cup to drink water. A 3 cm enterocutaneous fistula deafened foul-smelling liquid stools, on clinical examination, the conjunctivas were pale, the lips were dry, the eyes were sunk in the eye sockets, the ribs visible from a distance. The paraclinical aspects (Itra-Dermo-Reaction (IDR) to tubercria, anatomopathology) were positive, specifying the place of medical treatment and evolution under medical treatment. Digestive fistula of tuberculosis origin is a rare condition in surgical settings.

NORTHERN MALI 2012: THE SHORT-LIVED TRIUMPH OF IRREDENTISM

Strengthened by weapons from Libya, the rebellion beginning in Mali incJanuary 2012 finally gave a Tuareg-dominated irredentist movement control of Northern Mali in the fourth rebellion since independence. The Movement for the National Liberation (MNLA) called this area Azawad, proclaiming it as independent. Although it was to be a multiethnic country, the MNLA remained dominated by the Tuareg. Discontent among Malian officers during the fight against the rebels produced a coup d'état, undermining the military command structure, which greatly contributed to the rebels' success. An unavowed alliance existed with AQIM (Al-Qaida of the Islamic Maghreb) and the Tuareg Islamist group Ansar Dine. The latter and the AQIM-offshoot, MUJAO (the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa), eventually drove the MNLA from Northern Mali. Increasingly, the Islamists imposed an extreme version of sharia, adding to the mass flight of refugees. Negotiations between the interim Malian government, the MNLA and the Ansar Dine still continued until the latter and AQIM moved towards Southern Mali. The perceived threat made the Malian government request French assistance. The intervention gradually drove the Islamists from the country, enabling the restoration of the state in Northern Mali. The conflict reveals underlying features of the political situation in Northern Mali, and highlights how the Tuareg and NorthernMalians have responded to the state's shortcomings through rebellion. Access to the state passes through privileged individuals. Rebels have been drawn closer to the state after conflicts, with only some benefitting from this arrangement. This is mirrored at a local level, with public figures and their followers enjoying the closest relation to the state. Producing widespread discontent, this situation is marked by insecurity because of a weak state presence. Misgivings have fed into new rebellions. Weak state control also allowed the AQIM to engage in hostage taking and for smuggling to expand. This volatile situation produced the latest rebellion. An improved connection to the state for Northern Mali and a strong state presence are necessary to counteract the factors responsible for repeated conflict.

POST-GADDAFI REPERCUSSIONS IN NORTHERN MALI

While utopias of (political) autonomy or an independent (Tuareg) state have for long been part and parcel of internal debates among Tuareg, it was only recently that the claim for independence was formulated to the outside world. A Tuareg state, Azawad, was even put into practice, albeit for some months only. A second characteristic is that there has never been a serious attempt at integrating all Tuareg, regardless of the country they are living in, into a unique nation-state. Is the 'national identity' of the respective post-colonial states so strong that it supplants the 'claim for independence'? Or is the pre-colonial form of political organisation among Tuareg, the regional drum-group (ettebel), still so vivid that it impedes the establishment of a state that would encompass all Tuareg? Apart from the independence movement MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad) operating in Northern Mali, there are Islamist groups which fight for the spread of an Islamic mode of life. Some of these succeeded in recruiting Tuareg, particularly among the Tuareg of the Kidal region. The appeal of the 'Islamic claim' to the Kidal Tuareg goes back to their genesis as a political entity during the period of colonial conquest when the French installed a regional 'drum-group' within the framework of administrative chieftainship. As nearly all regional Tuareg claim descent from members of the Islamic army that conquered North Africa in the 7th century, regional power differs from power structures in all other regions inhabited by Tuareg. It is based on a double legitimacy: that of Islamic nobility, and that of the Tuareg warrior class. For several months, however, there has been ideological dissent among the Tuareg followers of the Islamic movements. This debate revolves around several issues, particularly the question as to whether or not the Islamic mode of life is to be limited to the sole region of Kidal.

INTRODUCTION: POST-GADDAFI REPERCUSSIONS IN THE SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA

The areas south of Libya have experienced more than their fair share of conflict and rapid social change. In earlier times, the main routes of trade, commerce and pilgrimage between West African and the Arab Peninsula passed through this region, also once inhabited by mighty warrior empires (see for example Bawuro 1972). However, as the empires along these routes faded away, and international ocean shipping opened up this part of Africa to the forces of global trade and capitalism, the centres of authority that once controlled this region also vanished. What remained was an almost open territory: unwelcoming and hard, but also a place of possibilities and the freedom to roam for those who had mastered the art of survival under such difficult conditions. This was the land of the Tuareg and other semi-nomadic groups who controlled cities and important trading posts such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal in contemporary Mali. This is the world of the Sahel and the parts of Western Africa that straddles Libya, and a region that currently includes Southern Algeria, Northern Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania and parts of Northern Nigeria. These are therefore also the countries and areas that have come to experience the full effect of what we define as post-Gaddafi repercussions.

"A FESTIVAL OF BRIGANDS": IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN MALI

Mali's coup d'état in March 2012 and the subsequent occupation of northern Mali by Islamist and separatist rebels took many observers by surprise. How could an erstwhile model of peaceful democratic transition collapse so swiftly? Why did so few ordinary Malians stand up in defence of their 20-year-old democracy? Combining accounts from Malian and foreign journalists with observations made in Bamako leading up to and during the dramatic events of early 2012, this article assesses the failures of Mali's pre-coup political system. A combination of the tenuous rule of law, weak state institutions, and perceptions of systemic corruption deeply eroded Malians' faith in their democracy. The junta that ousted Mali's elected president in March 2012, despite its international isolation, skillfully manipulated public frustrations with the government as well as local symbols and discourses pertaining to heroic leaders to gain support and legitimacy at home. The crisis in Mali was preceded by certain warning signs, some of which might be applied to gauge the health of democratic transitions elsewhere in Africa.

Interview with Attaher Zacka Maïga

Attaher Zacka Maïga was born on 10 May 1963 in Bia, Bourem Cercle, Gao Region, Mali. He has spent his life in the service of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, joining the Mali Red Cross as a volunteer in 1987 before working for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as a nutritionist in a pilot centre for nutritional recovery and education in Bourem from January 1988 to June 1990. In 1990 and 1991 he acted as consultant to a number of organizations, including World Vision and UNICEF.In April 1992, Attaher Maïga joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a “resident” (i.e. local) employee. Since then, he has held many positions. From 1996 to 2000, he was in charge of the Gao office, which employed almost 100 staff, both resident and “mobile” (expatriate). He then took charge of the ICRC's programmes in northern Mali from 2001 to 2006, ran the organization's office in the Malian capital Bamako from 2007 to 2008 and was responsible for the Mali communication programme between 2009 and 2011. From November 2011 to November 2014, he was head of the ICRC's northern Mali sub-delegation, one of the first resident employees to lead an ICRC sub-delegation. Since 2015, Attaher Maïga has been Networking Coordinator for the ICRC's Mali delegation.In 1996, Mr Maïga initiated the ICRC's post-conflict programmes in his country, covering the fields of agriculture, veterinary services and health. In 2009, he launched a pilot migrant project in Kidal, northern Mali. These much-appreciated initiatives resulted in his being invited to participate in the 2010 Montreuil meeting, which laid the foundations for the reforms currently underway.Attaher was the first Mali focal point for the ICRC's Unit for Global Affairs. This role gave him a deeper understanding of trends in the Islamic world and enabled him to help the ICRC adjust its dialogue with Jihadist armed groups. Our interview with Mr Maïga highlights his extensive experience with one of the oldest humanitarian organizations and is an opportunity for him to share his understanding of the ICRC's interaction with the armed groups that controlled northern Mali in 2012, when he was representing the ICRC in the region.Attaher Maïga holds a degree in public administration from the Institut de Gestion et des Langues Appliquées aux Métiers, Bamako.