Abstract
The Islamic Emirate established in northern Mali in 2012 was brought down less than a year later by a French military intervention, provoked by the Emirate’s belligerent posture. This article explains why the leaders of the Emirate appeared to govern in a way that jeopardized the state’s survival, despite AQIM’s leadership calling for a cautious approach. Based on novel primary sources, this article provides a detailed view of governance practices in the Emirate, showing that they were in fact considerably more pragmatic than hitherto assumed. Furthermore, it argues that both AQIM and the leaders of the Emirate in the end were more concerned with the long-term prospects of jihadist expansion in the region than with the survival of the Emirate itself.
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