North Korean Nuclear Issue Research Articles

대북원조 역사에서 남북협력기금의 개발재원 역할 재조명: OECD CRS 기준 적용을 중심으로

Purpose: This study aims to elucidate the role of South Korea's aid to North Korea as a development resource and to identify its characteristics in comparison to major donor countries. Originality: For North Korea, where exports and foreign investments are limited, foreign aid represents a critical resource for development. Should progress be made on the North Korean nuclear issue, the demand for development in North Korea is expected to surge, and the role of the IKCF is anticipated to expand. This study is significant as a foundational research effort to enhance the utilization of the IKCF as a development resource. Methodology: It categorizes IKCF programs from 1995 to 2022 into development aid projects and projects based on the unique inter-Korean relationship. It reclassifies the programs using the OECD CRS and compares the aid patterns of major donors to highlight the distinctive features of South Korea's aid to North Korea. Result: Initially, the IKCF had a strong character as a development resource, but since the early 2000s, the proportion of projects based on the special inter-Korean relationship has increased, giving the fund a dual character. Since 2008, the significant reduction in aid to North Korea has diminished its development resource role. Comparing sectoral allocation patterns of South Korea and major donors shows these patterns vary depending on key donor countries, reflecting international circumstances and donor characteristics rather than North Korea’s needs. In the mid-2000s, aid through NGOs increased, focusing on ‘productive sectors’ despite criticism for small, fragmented projects. Conclusion and Implication: Given fluctuating international circumstances, diversifying aid to North Korea cooperation with other donors is necessary. To enhance future aid effectiveness, integrating small-scale development projects by private organizations through consortia and addressing sectoral imbalances from a long-term perspective is crucial.

Analysis of the Impact of U.S.-South Korean Military Activities on the DPRK's Nuclear Test Process

After the end of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two, and then the Korean War broke out, and the two Koreas were still in a state of "armistice." The North Korean nuclear issue and the large-scale U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises that have lasted for decades have made the situation in Northeast Asia, which is already in a security dilemma, even more complicated and volatile. By analyzing the timing of North Korea's nuclear tests and their backgrounds, it is easy to find that North Korea has never stopped researching nuclear weapons. However, every nuclear test has been conducted against the background of large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. On the issue of resolving the DPRK's nuclear crisis, it is worth rethinking the way of resolving the DPRK's nuclear issue through sanctions and pressure. A study of the relationship between the DPRK's nuclear test and the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises will help to ease the security dilemma between the two sides as well as the security situation in Northeast Asia. It will also serve as a reference for other nuclear proliferation issues in the international arena.

북·중·러 연합의 형성과 전망

This study analyzes the North Korea, China, and Russia coalition amidst complex global crises like the US-China strategic competition, the US-Russia crisis, and the North Korean nuclear issue, using coordination games and problems as analytical tools. In the ‘New Cold War’ context, they identify a focal point, form coalitions, and coordinate strategies based on reactive anti-US policies and confrontations with coalitions involving ROK, the US, and Japan. However, differing perspectives on the ‘New Cold War’ and external factors leading to divergent focal points resulted in strategic uncertainty. Forming a stable grand coalition as an institution is challenging, and there is a risk of abandonment when forming a specific coalition based on interests. Moreover, the emergence of spoilers within the coalition breeds apprehension among other nations, rendering the coalition unsustainable. Consequently, the sustainability of the North Korea-China-Russia coalition diminishes, fostering ongoing non-cooperative behavior amidst a temporary phase of adhesion.

북한주민 식량권(Right to Food)에 대한 북한과 국제사회의 책임

This study examines the fulfillment of obligations related to the right to food for the people of North Korea, considering the concept of the right to food and responsibility under international norms. The research aims to determine whether North Korea and the international community are adequately meeting their obligations in guaranteeing the right to food. International norms, such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, delineate the individual’s right to food and the corresponding responsibilities of states and the international community.
 North Korea has implemented various policies to enhance food production, including guidelines from the Supreme Leader, initiatives such as the field-respinsibility-system (po-jeon damdangje) that incentivizes farmers, and the upgrading of agricultural institutions. However, these efforts have yielded unsatisfactory results. The North Korean authorities’ emphasis on self-reliance, labor mobilization, and resistance to accepting food aid from the international community have hindered progress. While the presence of markets in North Korea has increased access to food, government control over food purchase and distribution persists, posing challenges in guaranteeing the right to food for those unable to access the market.
 The international community has provided support to address North Korea’s food crisis since the mid-1990s. However, the imposition of UN and US sanctions due to the North Korean nuclear issue, coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, has hindered the provision of food aid. The combination of sanctions and North Korea’s political blockade further impedes the realization of the people’s right to food. Despite outward appearances, both North Korea and the international community have failed to fulfill their responsibilities in guaranteeing the right to food for North Koreans.
 Consequently, this study offers several policy implications for ensuring the right to food for the North Korean people. Firstly, it proposes resuming humanitarian support from UN organizations and international NGOs, utilizing the UN sanctions waiver with the understanding of the US, and ensuring transparency in aid distribution. Secondly, it recommends urging North Korea to accept external support, such as from the FAO, to strengthen their agricultural base and increase food production, aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Lastly, it suggests the establishment of a collaborative entity, tentatively named the “Korean Peninsula Agricultural Development Organization” or the “East Asia Humanitarian Cooperation Council,” which would enable accurate assessment of North Korea's food situation and work towards improving long-term food productivity.
 Given that the right to food is a fundamental human right crucial for individual survival and well-being, it is imperative that the responsible parties collaborate to ensure the guarantee of this right for the people of North Korea.

Taming the Nuclear Elephant: The US Indo-Pacific Strategy on North Korea

Assessing its coercive diplomacy in retrospect, the United States should deal with the North Korean nuclear issue with a more sophisticated combination of coercive measures and positive inducements to overcome past failures. Simultaneously, based on an analysis of current challenges and opportunities, the United States should consider this nuclear agenda within its Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) with a long-term regional vision. The active engagement of the United States in the North Korean nuclear issue can create opportunities for cooperation with China or provide the United States with the strategic means to influence China. In addition, the US–ROK alliance and US–ROK–Japan trilateral cooperation could be a driving force in resolving the nuclear agenda of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and support the IPS of the United States. Ultimately, the linkage between the US' coercive approach to the DPRK and its IPS could help prevent regional tension and the possible demise of the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, which is threatened by North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

1991년 북한의 대미, 대일 관계개선 시도와 한국의 대응

During the post-Cold War period, North Korea(NK) found an exit from severe diplomatic isolation by improving its relationship with the U.S. and Japan. NK and the U.S. started dialogues as the level of councilor in Beijing in 1988, and they had five meetings in 1991. Both countries maintained continuity of talks at that time. Meanwhile, South Korea(SK) endeavored to ensure that NK-U.S. relationship should not overshadow the SK-NK relationship. In that same year, NK also initiated formal discussions with Japan for the normalization of relations. SK outwardly supported the normalization of NK-Japan. However, SK actually wanted to manage the improvement of the NKJapan relationship through prior consultations with Japan. Normalization of talks between NK-Japan started in January 1991. However, it was recognized that it would be difficult to succeed without the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, issue, such as NK's abduction of the Japanese, emerged as important dialogue topics. Hence, both states had to be satisfied with the initiation of talks for normalizing the relationship. Eventually, despite its efforts to improve its relationship with U.S. and Japan, NK did not achieve its goals in 1991. In contrast, SK obtained results on the SK-NK relationship and diplomatic competitions of UN during the same period. This study shows two facts of the diplomatic history: first, SK and U.S. fiercely argued about the direction of the North Korea policy under the table in 1991. Second, with regard to the Normalization Talks of NK-Japan in 1991, SK used to SK-USSR economic cooperation as diplomatic means so that Japanese Reparation Policy did not disturb the SK-NK economic cooperation.

From Rhetoric to Posture: a Comparative Study of George W. Bush, Barack H. Obama and Donald J. Trump’s Stances Towards DPRK Nuclear Issue

This article explores the postures of the last three former US presidents towards North Korean nuclear issue. The study applies Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) model as a new approach to examine this topic. By analyzing 17 speech corpuses, this study sheds light on the foreign policy adapted G. W. Bush, Obama, and Trump to address North Korea Nuclear issue. Theoretically, the study uses both Waltz’s foreign policy analysis model and Aristotle modes of persuasion to analyze the findings. It also clarifies the original foundations of each presidents’ foreign policy based on the four American IR school of thoughts. Results indicate that the legacy of the Cold War continues to shape and influence the stances of US presidents toward DPRK, despite the differences in their rhetorical and political strategies. While this study focuses individually on presidents as the main unit of analysis, future studies can further expand the use of CDA analysis to examine the stances of other key decision makers in the presidents’ administration to fully understand the relation between discourses and power structure.

The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the DPRK Nuclear Issue

This study reflects the impact on the North Korean nuclear issue by analysing the Russo-Ukrainian war. At the international level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has changed the geopolitical landscape of the world, leading to increased strategic autonomy for some developing countries. At the regional level, the conflict has led the Six-Party Talks countries to revise their foreign and defence policies, complicating the regional situation, while at the DPRK level, the conflict has strengthened the DPRK’s determination to develop nuclear weapons and strengthen its relations with Russia. In terms of the future direction of the nuclear issue, the DPRK’s strategic goal of survival among the major powers makes the outbreak of nuclear war in the peninsula less likely.

북중관계 전망 : “조중 우호협력 및 상호원조조약” 분석을 중심으로

이 연구는 "조중 우호협력 및 상호원조조약"을 중심으로 북중관계를 전망한다. 북한과 중국은 1961년 체결한 "조중 우호협력 및 상호원조조약"을 통해 공식적인 동맹 관계를 맺고 있다. 이 조약 제2는 ‘체약 일방이 무력 침공을 당함으로써 전쟁 상태에 처하게 되는 경우에 체약 상대방은 모든 힘을 다하여 지체없이 군사적 및 기타 원조를 제공한다’ 라고 명시하고 있다. 이 연구는 조약 2조의 자동 개입 조항이 여전히 실효성이 있다고 분석한다. 또한 북중관계가 미국과 중국의 패권 경쟁과 북한의 핵무기 보유로 인해 군사 동맹을 넘어서 서로를 전략적 자산으로 인식하는 수준으로 발전되어온 과정을 분석한다. Since 1961, China and North Korea have been officially allied through the China-Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The main goal of this treaty is to ensure mutual military assistance and protection between the two states. Today, sixty-one years later, this treaty still stands. However, the relationship between China and North Korea has been shifting over the past six decades. In 1961, China and North Korea were primarily aiming to be military partners. However, today they are shifting away from focusing on the military aspect of their relationship and moving towards putting a heavier focus on being strategic political assets to one another. This shift is being driven by changing situations in the international community, such as North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and the escalating rivalry between the United States and China. Given the sometimes inconsistent and seemingly irrational actions of these two countries in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue and the United Nations, people may wonder, what does the future of this relationship between China and North Korea look like? The ability of this relationship to evolve and mold itself to fit changing international situations is going to allow it to survive and strengthen for many years to come. This conclusion has been proven through qualitative research and analysis of each article contained in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, as well as analysis of the impacts of the North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States-China rivalry, and China’s growing power.

The U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan and China's Cooperation in the North Korea Nuclear Crisis

Scholars in the U.S. and China have mentioned a likelihood that both states use the Taiwan issue and the North Korean nuclear crisis as a means to force each other. However, previous literatures never test this hypothesis through empirical analyses. This study attempts to explore whether the U.S. arms sales toward Taiwan let China to make a concession in the North Korean issue. It is a novel attempt to prove that they are related to each other as a part of the competition for a hegemony position between the US and China in Northeast Asia, away from the existing research that has been analyzed as a separate issue. The empirical analyses demonstrate that the U.S. arms sales toward Taiwan make China to cooperate in the North Korean nuclear issue.

Donald Trump’s Securitizing Speech Acts and the United States Maximum-Pressure Strategy towards North Korea in 2017

Intersubjective process of international communication may shape security issue which requires extraordinary policy. This article aims to analyze how speech acts of a country leader securitize an issue and result in an extraordinary or distinct foreign policy. Donald Trump, the 45 th President of the United States of America, demonstrates his blunt talkativeness through social media and formal speech acts, including on the North Korean nuclear issue during his presidency term. Despite the regular focus placement of North Korea’s nuclear in the United States’ foreign policy since the 1990s, Trump leaves the issue during his campaign. Nevertheless, in 2017, the first year of his term, he shifted to expressing his enmity in line with the enaction of the maximum pressure strategy, the heaviest sanctions ever enacted on North Korea. This study utilizes securitization theory by analyzing three assumptions that support Trump’s political communication style: the centrality of the audience, the co-dependency of agency and context, the dispositif and the structuring forces of practices. Using the qualitative-deductive-method, this article finds that Trump’s speech acts in 2017 securitized the North Korean nuclear threat as an unprecedented threat requiring an extraordinary policy of maximum pressure strategy.

공약신뢰문제와 이란 핵협상

This study addresses the Iranian nuclear issue from a commitment problem perspective. With the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA accord by the Trump administration in 2018, the commitment problem, which refers to a dilemma that the state is unable to make credible commitments due to international anarchy construed as the lack of superior authority to enforce commitments, has come to the fore in the new nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran held since April 2021. Using a simple game theoretical model, this study shows that without ameliorating the commitment problem, no agreement would be reached, thus focusing on what initiatives can be and have been offered in the negotiations to address this problem. In particular, although a form of treaty that requires the two-thirds approval from the U.S. Senate must be the most legally-binding and, consequently, most costly form of agreement in that another U.S. withdrawal would inflict serious damage on its reputation, this kind of agreement is unlikely at present because of the Republican opposition in Congress. In response, the Iranians have offered several initiatives, including a ‘creative’ one called an “inherent guarantee,” which allows Iran to fully reverse its course so that it can acquire highly enriched uranium (HEU) again when the U.S. reneges on a new agreement. Whether this kind of initiative can be realized remains to be seen, proposed initiatives in the U.S.-Iran negotiations to address the commitment problem deserve attention because they might affect the North Korean nuclear issue, once a deal is struck between Washington and Tehran.

The Solidification of US Government's Hostile Policy Towards North Korea from the Perspective of North Korean Nuclear Issue

The key to solve the North Korean nuclear issue is the United States, but the United States never gives North Korea enough credit. The United States policy framework on the North Korean nuclear issue formulated by the last three governments has shown a clear hostility. In the military field, the United States and South Korea have held regular military exercises for several years on the grounds of self-defence; in the economic field, they have imposed sanctions against the North Korean in various fields and imposed strong unilateral sanctions, maliciously attacking the North Korean economy; in the diplomatic field, on the one hand, they have emphasized international cooperation, on the other hand, it transferred the responsibility of the North Korean nuclear issue to China. The lack of attention to North Korean nuclear issue has made it difficult for the United States to build a new peace and dialogue program; the United States has not played a leading role in guiding North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. The solidification of the hostile policy made the normalization of the U.S.-North Korea relations a long way off as well as slowed down the negotiations of the North Korean Nuclear Issue directly.

The Impact of the North Korean Nuclear Issue on Northeast Asian Countries and China's Responsibility

The essence of the North Korea nuclear dilemma is the continuation of the Cold War confrontation in the last century, and the "zero-sum game" thinking restricts the dialogue and consultation between the United States and North Korea, the key parties of the North Korean nuclear issue. With the solidification of the North Korean nuclear dilemma, both the United States and North Korea bear huge economic costs but maintain the trend of "Mutually Assured Destruction"; at the same time, The conflict of interests between the United States and North Korea poses a severe threat and challenge to the security environment in the border area of northeast China. In the role of mediator, China should appeal both sides to jointly make concessions; persist in realizing nuclear security through peaceful means such as dialogue and negotiation; safeguard China's state interests resolutely; and balance US-North Korea relations. Rational handling of China-North Korea relations and China-US relations is an issue that China should cope.

North Korean nuclear program and Six Party Talks: A critical analysis

North Korea is an important figure in Northeast Asian politics due to its growing nuclear program which she claims to have initiated for defence. However, it has disturbed the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula at large. The tense relations over the years between U.S., its regional allies particularly South Korea and North Korea have affected world politics. Breakdown of the Agreed Framework Agreement of 1994, signed between U.S. and North Korea in 2002, caused a damage to their relationship. Six Party Talks were started to bring stability to region and political certainty among the relations of the stakeholders. However, SPT failed to achieve the desired objectives due to the ambitious interests of the member states. This research paper focuses those obstacles that led to breakdown of the six-party talks. Furthermore, the study addresses the question that how U.S., China and other regional states are handling and exploiting the North Korean nuclear issue for the vested interests. This qualitative study has used secondary sources for data collection and for the analysis it used descriptive-analytical and narrative analysis technique. The study shows that failure and suspension of the SPT have some serious implications on the security of Northeast Asia.

A SMART POWER Strategies to the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula

Purpose: The Purpose of this article is to analyze the smart power strategy to the peace process on the Ko-rean Peninsula and to suggest alternatives to build permanent peacebuilding efforts. This paper seeks to an-swer a key question regarding building a peace regime. What is South Korea’s smart power strategy for the peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula? Simultaneously;this paper also analyzes various South Korea’s domestic opinions over the North Korean nuclear issues. Method: This study analyzed ROK s Smart power strategies toward peace regime building on the Korean Pe-ninsula. Smart Power means developing an integrated strategy;resource base;and tool kit to achieve objec-tives;drawing on both hard(military muscle;economic might) and soft power(economic aid;sharing culture). It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military but also invests heavily in alliances;partner-ships;and institutions at all levels to expand the state s influence and establish the legitimacy of the action. Results: The ROK’s smart power strategies to the peace process are as follows. First;in terms of using al-liance;South Korea has to call for the U.S to foster a peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula while coo-perating with the Biden administration s democratic principle and ideology. Second;in terms of using partner-ship;South Korea has to induce China to put pressure on the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. Third;in terms of using institutions;ROK and DPRK have to transform the current 9/19 inter-Korean military agreement of the initial operational arms control into systemic arms control through early notification of mutual military training. Conclusion: The essential components of smart power are using alliances;partnerships;and institutions;etc. In this context;South Korea has all the necessary elements of the ROK-US alliance and ROK-China economic partnership;and 9.19 inter-Korean military agreement. In the long and bumpy road of the peace regime build-ing process;it needs strategic optimism in pushing ahead smart power strategies but in building defense post-ure;they need to be a strategic pessimist.

Two-Level Silence and Nuclearization of Small Powers: The Logic of Rendering North Korea Nuclear-Armed

The North Korean nuclear issue serves as a failure of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that Pyongyang has, at present, nearly achieved its program. Why do some states like North Korea succeed in nuclear armament, while others fail? Two-level silence at both intranational and international levels served as a sufficient condition for North Korea to become nuclear-armed. Under a brutal dictatorial regime, the domestic audience complied with their leader s provocative policy while simultaneously serving as an environment of silence at the intranational level. More importantly, the international community and external states, including China, South Korea, and the U.S., remained relatively less assertive to North Korea s nuclear program as opposed to the cases of Iraq and Syria, which led to the creation of a silent structure at the international level. A structure of silence at both levels provided North Korea with a window of opportunity for accelerating and completing its nuclear program. This analysis generates policy and academic implications. Various options, including daring measures, at great risk, should be on the table in order to resolve a nuclear issue. Most importantly, the finding shows that robust military measures and their willingness to implement these measures serve as the most effective and innovative tool to stop a recurring pattern of past mistakes.

Rethinking Avenues to Resolve North Korean Nuclear Issues: Bilateral Relations or Multilateral Coordination?

Since the easing trend of the situation of the Korean peninsula in 2018, active and positive changes have occurred in the bilateral relationship between North Korea and South Korean/the US/China as well as between China and South Korea. In this scenario, the bilateral relationship between North Korea and South Korea or the US has been considered to be the main avenue to resolve the North Korean nuclear issues. However, in essence, the formation and development of the North Korean nuclear issues are the consequences of the multilateral factors, which also embody the limitations of the bilateral relations of North Korea and the US/South Korea. The future complete resolution of the North Korea nuclear issues should be dependent on the framework of multilateralism driven by the bilateral relations.

中国学界关于 “北韩核问题”的研究特点分析 －基于CiteSpace软件的计量统计－)

中国学界关于 “北韩核问题”的研究特点分析 －基于CiteSpace软件的计量统计－)

How to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue: From a Commitment Problem Perspective

From a rationalist perspective, this paper analyzes the current nuclear stalemate between the United States and North Korea. Using a simple game theoretical model, this paper shows that the current deadlock emanates from a commitment problem, Pyongyang’s concern that the United States will be unable to commit itself to following through on an agreement once Pyongyang has dismantled its nuclear programs, because Pyongyang’s accommodation of the demand for denuclearization would imply not only the increased vulnerability of the North to U.S. military presence but also the undermining of its future bargaining power relative to that of the United States. Currently, the lack of a reliable enforcing mechanism to guarantee the implementation of a nuclear deal generates this commitment problem, making it more difficult for both sides to strike a deal. Thus, this paper offers three policy alternatives to minimize the commitment problem as a prerequisite to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and making progress towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. First, minimizing the commitment problem requires bringing in a third party who is capable of securing the implementation of an agreement. Besides bringing in a third party, this paper also proposes two other ways to make reneging costly. The final agreement for a nuclear deal must be a legally binding agreement such as a treaty that requires U.S. domestic legislative approval and finally, North Korea must relinquish any economic aid from the United States to reduce the possibility that a nuclear deal made between them does not cause any U.S. domestic backlash against the deal.