공약신뢰문제와 이란 핵협상

Abstract

This study addresses the Iranian nuclear issue from a commitment problem perspective. With the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA accord by the Trump administration in 2018, the commitment problem, which refers to a dilemma that the state is unable to make credible commitments due to international anarchy construed as the lack of superior authority to enforce commitments, has come to the fore in the new nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran held since April 2021. Using a simple game theoretical model, this study shows that without ameliorating the commitment problem, no agreement would be reached, thus focusing on what initiatives can be and have been offered in the negotiations to address this problem. In particular, although a form of treaty that requires the two-thirds approval from the U.S. Senate must be the most legally-binding and, consequently, most costly form of agreement in that another U.S. withdrawal would inflict serious damage on its reputation, this kind of agreement is unlikely at present because of the Republican opposition in Congress. In response, the Iranians have offered several initiatives, including a ‘creative’ one called an “inherent guarantee,” which allows Iran to fully reverse its course so that it can acquire highly enriched uranium (HEU) again when the U.S. reneges on a new agreement. Whether this kind of initiative can be realized remains to be seen, proposed initiatives in the U.S.-Iran negotiations to address the commitment problem deserve attention because they might affect the North Korean nuclear issue, once a deal is struck between Washington and Tehran.