Two-Level Silence and Nuclearization of Small Powers: The Logic of Rendering North Korea Nuclear-Armed

Abstract

The North Korean nuclear issue serves as a failure of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sense that Pyongyang has, at present, nearly achieved its program. Why do some states like North Korea succeed in nuclear armament, while others fail? Two-level silence at both intranational and international levels served as a sufficient condition for North Korea to become nuclear-armed. Under a brutal dictatorial regime, the domestic audience complied with their leader s provocative policy while simultaneously serving as an environment of silence at the intranational level. More importantly, the international community and external states, including China, South Korea, and the U.S., remained relatively less assertive to North Korea s nuclear program as opposed to the cases of Iraq and Syria, which led to the creation of a silent structure at the international level. A structure of silence at both levels provided North Korea with a window of opportunity for accelerating and completing its nuclear program. This analysis generates policy and academic implications. Various options, including daring measures, at great risk, should be on the table in order to resolve a nuclear issue. Most importantly, the finding shows that robust military measures and their willingness to implement these measures serve as the most effective and innovative tool to stop a recurring pattern of past mistakes.