Abstract

North Korea has shown more aggressive nuclear behavior during the Kim Jong Un era as has been evident in the rapid acceleration of its nuclear weapons development and its delivery system diversification, especially in 2016. This study seeks to determine why was there such an urgency in progressing its nuclear capability in the first few years following Kim Jong Un's ascent to power after the death of his father in 2011. It confines its research scope to Pyongyang's external motivations - its political and economic relations with the biggest regime backer, China - to conduct an academic investigation on whether Kim Jong Un's North Korea could still perceive China as a reliable patron. It concludes that the bilateral political and economic relations took a notable and simultaneous downturn, prompting it to focus on internal balancing, exemplifying the core principles of the IR theory of defensive realism.

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