How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea: Containment or Engagement?

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in our interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If unchecked, this program threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asia and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security and prosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economic growth and political stability is security, and the linchpins of security have been our commitment to our defense relationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea's long-standing challenge to security and stability in Northeast Asia acquired more ominous dimension with the emergence of major North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated large nuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence believes that the purpose of the complex is the production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition to small 5 MW(e) reactor in operation since 1985, 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactor are under construction. We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program had generated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and was poised to leap forward in terms of plutonium production. The North Korean program represented an unacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies' interests for number of mutually-reinforcing reasons: * An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversized conventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK as well as greatly increasing the costs of war in Korea. * A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite nuclear arms race in Asia generally. * Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. * North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariah states or terrorists worldwide. * With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, the nuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 and agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRK defueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel. In 1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium from that load of fuel. The DPRK remained out of compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT and then suspended its withdrawal. In June 1994 the DPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier defueling. It declared it would end its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with the ROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. In light of the DPRK's massive conventional capability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into a sea of fire we augmented our defensive capability, and in consultation with the ROK, considered wide range of options for additional force augmentations. …

North Korea is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear programme because of its importance to the political economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) state and the perpetuation of the Kim regime. Two observations give rise to this conclusion: firstly, the development of North Korea's nuclear programme has been a long-term project spanning several decades. At no stage has Pyongyang shown a commitment to its dismantlement. Secondly, denuclearisation negotiations have followed a cyclical pattern in which the North has provoked crises to make new demands and gain leverage in negotiations. By inference, it is clear that the nuclear programme has great intrinsic value to Pyongyang. This paper argues that the nuclear programme has value as a bargaining chip in international diplomacy to extract economic inputs for its moribund economy, in domestic politics as vehicle for bureaucratic interests and as a rallying symbol of the country's hyper-nationalist ideology, as well as its role as a defensive deterrent and important cog in Pyongyang's offensive asymmetric war strategy. For these reasons, the Kim regime is unlikely to seriously entertain nuclear disarmament.

: U.S. options to deal with North Korea's emerging nuclear weapons program include renewed engagement and a new negotiated agreement (as called for by North Korea), economic sanctions, military action, or Cold War-style hostile containment. The United States is trying to form a multilateral coalition to stop the North Korean nuclear program, but the regional states hold differing views on the best options to pursue. China and Russia, at relatively low risk from North Korean nuclear weapons, are promoting a compromise whereby the United States will guarantee the security of the North Korean regime in return for an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Japan, which is directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, prefers a tougher line, possibly including economic sanctions. South Korea is objectively at risk from North Korea, but because most South Koreans believe that the risk is very low, they favor a policy of dialogue and compromise. The positions of all these states may harden if North Korea stages a nuclear weapons test, but until that happens, the United States can expect little support for either economic sanctions or military action in dealing with North Korea.

This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administrations' policies and strategies toward North Korea.The Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea's change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self‐imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration's engagement policy did not lead to North Korea's change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture.With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea's response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK.

Despite harsh statements by some U.S. congressional critics and initial concerns voiced by many South Korean observers, the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) reached in Geneva on October 21, 1994, successfully survived the scrutiny of at least seven congressional hearings through March of 1995. A January 30 editorial in the usually critical Wall Street Journal concluded that despite the generosity shown to an undeserving regime, the deal with the DPRK offers important advantages by capping and promising eventually to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An agreement on June 12 in Kuala Lumpur between the U.S. and the DPRK and a letter from President Clinton to ROK President Kim Young Sam clarified questions about whether the DPRK would accept South Korea's central role in providing light water reactors as specified under the Agreed Framework. The impetus for the success or failure of the agreement now lies in whether the parties involved can agree on the details of implementation. By choosing not to challenge the Geneva Agreed Framework, the Journal and some members of Congress have accepted the prospect that the agreement's implementation may halt and eventually dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The DPRK has agreed not to refuel the 5 MW experimental reactor at Yongbyon and not to reprocess over 8,000 fuel rods removed from the reactor in May 1994, which contain enough plutonium to make up to six nuclear weapons. In addition, the North Koreans have halted the construction of two larger reactors that might have produced enough plu-

IntroductionAlthough North Korea's KCNA news often threatens to launch nuclear strikes, in reality, the North Korean nuclear program has limited offensive capability.1 Just how limited is a matter of dispute between well-informed observers and analysts. South Korea's defense minister, Kim Kwan-j in, for example noted recently that it was possible that North Korea had miniaturized a nuclear warhead as there had been, in his opinion, enough time for them to have succeeded in miniaturization.2 He based his statement on how long it took other states to miniaturize a nuclear warhead, not on an assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capability. Additionally, even if North Korea has miniaturized a nuclear warhead, the DPRK lacks an effective delivery mechanism and therefore has a limited ability to offensively use nuclear weapons.In our own assessment of North Korea's nuclear capability we found that the North is capable of operationally using nuclear weapons, but its options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained. We concluded that the only credible use of the DPRK's nuclear arsenal would be to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war. Aside from this nuclear-use scenario, conventional weapons predominate in realistic evaluations of deterrence and war-fighting in the Korean Peninsula.North Korean Declaratory Nuclear PostureThe stated purpose of the North Korean nuclear program has changed over the last decade.3 North Korean statements that once described the nuclear program as a tool to secure the state against outside aggression now describe it as a stabilizing force in the region.During and after the collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002, KCNA statements described the nuclear program as a substitute for a security guarantee from the United States. If North Korea's security concerns were addressed, they argued, there would be no need for the nuclear program. An October 2002 statement is particularly telling: settlement of all problems with the DPRK, a small country, should be based on removing any threat to its sovereignty and right to existence. There may be negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but the DPRK wants the former, as far as possible.4By 2005 this language had changed. North Korea declared itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons and began to depict its nuclear program as a regional stabilizer which prevented war by countering the U.S. nuclear threat to the region.5 KCNA statements even suggested that North Korea's nuclear program benefited South Korea by raising a nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean Peninsula!6By 2010 North Korea had not only openly threatened to use its nuclear weapons for the first time, saying that those who seek to bring down the system in the DPRK, whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear strikes of the invincible army,7 but also made the first real declaratory statement of its nuclear posture in response to the U.S. nuclear posture review:The mission of the nuclear forces of the DPRK is to deter and repel aggression and attack against the country and the nation until the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the world is realized. The DPRK is invariably maintaining the pol- icy not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or threaten them with nuclear weapons as long as they do not join the act of invading or attacking us in conspiracy with nuclear weapons states.8Although these statements should be taken very seriously, particularly by South Korea and Japan who are implicated in both via their alliance with the United States, we should not assume that North Korea has the operational military capability to back up this declaratory posture and the stated nuclear threats.North Korean Technical Nuclear CapacityWhen it comes to nuclear threats against the United States, South Korea, and Japan, North Korea vastly overstates its ability to strike. …

No More Illusions of Denuclearization Sue Terry (bio) Much has been made of the motivation behind the United States' development of nuclear weapons during World War II and the strategic implications of its unprecedented nuclear status in the war's immediate aftermath and the postwar international order. Less attention has been paid, however, to the specifics of subsequent states' paths toward the possession of nuclear weapons. The only notable exception is North Korea, the newest and most secretive member of the nuclear club, whose journey to that coveted status has been closely chronicled for two decades. Nuclear diplomacy vis-à-vis Pyongyang since the 1990s has been a mainstay of international politics, headlining international news and triggering heated debates in both policy and academic circles. And while few have presumed that diplomacy could entice other nuclear weapons states—Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Israel, and Pakistan—into giving up their weapons, the notion that North Korea's far more powerful neighbors could and should persuade the aid-dependent North Korean leadership to bargain away its nuclear weapons program has persisted. Jonathan Pollack's new book on the history of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons—No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security—should finally put that myth to rest. The author demonstrates with ample historical evidence and rigorous analysis that the North Korean leadership "does not treat nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip, and instead views these weapons as central to its identity and security planning" (p. 207). Most North Korea watchers, except for the most optimistic assessor of U.S. negotiating skills (or the most patronizing assessors of North Korea's), came to adopt this view in the wake of the North's second nuclear test in May 2009. Pollack also makes a strong case that Pyongyang crossed the nuclear Rubicon in 2009 by chronicling the sequence of events following the breakout of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002 and leading up to the May 2009 test. But Pollack does much more than simply draw the conclusion that a nuclear North Korea is here to stay. He presents a comprehensive history of how and why the North Korean leadership secretly pursued nuclear weapons, [End Page 175] going as far back as the germination of Kim Il-sung's nuclear aspirations in the 1940s and 1950s. Chapter 2, dubbed "Nuclear Memories and Nuclear Visions," is especially good in laying out the historical events that alerted Kim Il-sung to the charms of nuclear weapons. Pollack points out that during World War II, when Japan was the colonial master in Korea, "major chemical and industrial facilities linked to Tokyo's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme were located in northern Korea, and Japan was...exploring for uranium and various rare earth metals in the northern half of the peninsula." He goes on to write that "Moscow undertook uranium mining in northern Korea as early as 1946, presumably relying on Korean labour" (p. 44). During the Korean War, faced with intermittent nuclear threats by the United States, Kim Il-sung showed interest in nuclear science: "The DPRK National Academy of Science was established in 1952, with uranium exploration, basic research in nuclear physics and the training of nuclear scientists identified as early priorities." In the postwar recovery period, Kim called for a "ten-year plan for science and technology...for a comprehensive survey of North Korea's natural resources including uranium, and advocated an active programme of research in atomic energy, the training of scientific personnel, and pursuit of nuclear applications to the DPRK's economic development" (p. 48). Of course, statements of interest in nuclear science do not equal the technical ability or the concerted effort to develop nuclear weapons, and the author is careful not to read too much into these early signs of nuclear aspiration. Pollack dates North Korea's serious nuclear development efforts to the mid-1970s—unlike some South Korean experts who see the 1960s or even the 1950s as the genesis of its nuclear program. As Pollack notes, there is no "documentary evidence to substantiate this assertion," just defector testimonials (p. 48). At the same time, Pollack does describe in detail Pyongyang's...

To North Korea's big disappointment, President Bush was re-elected and started his second term on January 20, 2005. On February 10, a few weeks after President Bush's second inauguration, North Korea said it would not attend 6-Party talks aimed at ending its nuclear weapons program unless the United States dropped its “hostile” policy toward the North. Pyongyang also confirmed that it has manufactured an undisclosed number of nuclear weapons to counter this U.S. policy. Considering the conflicting interests between the United States and North Korea, it will be difficult to anticipate how the North Korean nuclear crisis will be resolved. However, the relations between the United States and North Korea seem to remain in a state of tense stagnation rather than falling into a catastrophic phase. North Korea does not expect any concessions from the United States in the 6-Party talks, which only serve as a means of putting pressure on North Korea. North Korea seems convinced that a military option is not likely. North Korea may want to close the door on the United States and concentrate on the stability of its internal affairs. In the meantime, it wants to strengthen its position by extracting more plutonium. The stagnation may continue until the U.S. has enough power to keep the North from continuing to develop its nuclear program, or North Korea has enough leverage to force the United States to make substantial concession to North Korea.

North Korea's alleged admission of a highly enriched uranium program sparked the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, leading to resumption of North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Korea already has four or five nuclear devices. Thus, the North Korean nuclear issue–a serious international issue that is the most important obstacle to the Korean peace process –needs to be resolved as soon as possible peacefully through diplomatic negotiations at the six‐party talks. The Bush administration insisted that the North Korean nuclear crisis be resolved through the six‐party talks, whereas North Korea insisted on bilateral talks with the U.S.The author in this article analyzed the origin and development of the current nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, to evaluate the six‐party talks as an multilateral framework of resolving the nuclear issue from the first round of the six‐party nuclear talks to the third round in detail, and to make policy recommendations for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue at least at the initial phase of North Korean nuclear dismantlement. The six‐party talks process is not yet dead, and will continue.The author maintains that bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea are essential to the resolution of North Korea's nuclear standoff peacefully and diplomatically. Both need to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions through the six‐party talks process. Both U.S. and North Korea's hard‐line policies cannot solve the nuclear issue peacefully. Therefore, both sides need to be flexible about their respective positions with political will to compromise. The U.S. should be prepared for specifying its road map for multilateral security assurances for North Korea. The author also argues that the U.S. should reconsider proposing possible economic or energy incentives in exchange for North Korea's nuclear freeze to dismantle its nuclear programs.

IntroductionI have repeatedly pointed out the adverse impact of numerous U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea's trade. I have written, for instance, that the large trade deficit, unless compensated somehow, is not sustainable.1 Further, since China and were the only two steady importers of North Korean products from 2000 to 2005, if one or both countries turned against North Korea by joining the economic sanctions, it would be difficult for North Korea not to feel the impact. And so it came to be. Japan rapidly tightened its economic relations with North Korea during the past year or two, I wrote in 2007, a total ban of imports from North Korea, over the issues of kidnapping and nuclear weapons, leaving China as the only country that has a key influence on North Korea's trade. Prospects are that North Korea's exports may decline, making North Korea's trade deficit issue even more difficult.2 Even with these premonitions, it was a pleasant surprise to see the way in which North Korea responded to the nuclear talks later in 2007.The objective of this paper is to explore the economic reasons behind North Korea's positive response to the nuclear talks in 2007, by hypothesizing that the North Korean leaders altered their approach partly because of the adverse impact of economic sanctions on North Korea's trade that had reached an unsustainable stage, and partly because of a greater calculation of benefits and costs by the North Korean leaders since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of which began in 1989.Key Economic Sanctions against North KoreaThe economic sanctions that have been imposed against North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 are chronologically explained elsewhere by me.3 Among the many sanctions imposed on North Korea are three that currently have a direct impact on North Korea's trade. One is the U.S. denial of a most-favored nation (MFN) trade status on North Korea's exports, which was imposed on September 1, 1951. Because of the widespread use of the MFN tariffs, these are known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariffs. Without MFN status, tariffs on North Korean exports to the United States can be so high that it would be impossible for North Korea to even consider exporting anything to the United States.Another important sanction was levied when North Korean agents blew up Korean Air 858 on November 29, 1987, when the plane was on its way from Baghdad to Bangkok. The explosion killed 115 passengers and crew members. On January 20, 1988, North Korea was placed on a list of countries that support international terrorism, on the basis of the U.S. Export Administration Act of 1979. The importance of this sanction is that placement on the list made it impossible for North Korea to borrow development funds from international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.4The third key economic sanctions may be termed collectively the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative, announced by President George W. Bush in May 2003, which is designed to interdict weapons of mass destruction shipments to and from countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea.5 Ever since President Bush labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, there had been a gradual tightening of sanctions until 2007. The October 2002 discovery of North Korea's nuclear program, and North Korea's subsequent announcement that it was renewing the program, broke the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and led to a rapid downturn in the relations between North Korea and the United States. The worsening relations were followed by a broad tightening of North Korea's illegal financial transactions. The broad tightening culminated in Banco Delta Asia's termination of business dealings with North Korea as of February 16, 2006. Banco Delta Asia had long been suspected of handling North Korea's illicit activities overseas, such as laundering of counterfeit U. …

Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint StatementThe six-nation to shut down North Korea's nuclear facility was reached on February 13, 2007, largely because President George W. Bush was willing to give U.S. negotiators more flexibility to reach an agreement. Ever since the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in 2002 after the discovery of a secret nuclear program, the Bush administration has insisted that North Korea should not be rewarded for its bad behavior. Furthermore, many U.S. offers have required North Korea to destroy all its nuclear weapons in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible way before substantial rewards are delivered. Pyongyang has insisted that the United States should provide economic assistance and a security guarantee as preconditions before it gradually dismantles its nuclear weapons (Oh and Hassig, 2004, p. 279).This latest pact accepts North Korea's original position-a freeze of its Yongbyon nuclear facility-and requires the United States to move first by unfreezing North Korean bank accounts at Banco Delta Asia. As shown in Table 1, vexing issues such as the dismantlement of the facility and North Korea's stash of weapons-grade plutonium are subject to further negotiations for the next 60 days.Agreements for the next 60 days, from February 13 to mid-April 2007, included shutting down and sealing the Yongbyon nuclear facility, the provision of 50,000 tons of fuel oil, the provision by North Korea of a list of nuclear programs to be covered by the September 19, 2007, statement, and an agreement to hold North Korea-United States bilateral talks and North Korea-Japan bilateral talks on bilateral issues. Five working groups were to be formed to discuss denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; normalization of North Korea-United States relations; normalization of North Korea-Japan relations; economic and energy cooperation, and a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. A sixth round of talks were scheduled for March 19, 2007, at which time the working groups would report on their work and the next steps will be discussed (www.ncno.org, February 15, 2007).Under the agreement, South Korea, Russia, China, and the United States would provide the first part of the aid, 50,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid; for the United States, that would require congressional approval, which is likely to be difficult to get. If North Korea disables the reactor and abandons all nuclear programs, it will eventually receive another 950,000 tons of fuel oil or an equivalent value of economic aid. As a result, some conservative politicians have denounced the accord. For example, John R. Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said, It is a bad deal for two reasons. First, it contradicts the fundamental premises of the policy that President Bush has followed since the beginning of his administration. Second, it makes the Bush administration look very weak at a time when U.S. troops are in Iraq and when the United States needs to look strong in dealing with Iran. According to critics, if there were no Banco Delta Asia, which holds $25 million in North Korean accounts, the new agreement would contain exactly the same things that North Korea sought in its negotiations with the United States during the first nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, which resulted in the now-scrapped Agreed Framework (Kessler, 2007).Reasons for the Denuclearization AgreementAccording to U.S. think tanks and policy analysts, the United States has four options in dealing with a nuclear North Korea (Bray, 2003):1. Give economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program.2. Use a military strike against the North Korean nuclear facilities.3. Let North Korea develop nuclear weapons.4. Starve the North Korean regime of money.We will describe some details of these four options below. First, the United States could hand out economic aid and security assurance if North Korea dismantles its nuclear program. …

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the US failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy-missile diplomacy-to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

: The intent of this project is to propose a different approach to the United State's regional strategy for North Korea. The Korean War ended fifty-one years ago however the U.S. is no closer to resolving this conflict than it was in 1953. The Korean Peninsula remains a dangerous place and a potential flashpoint threatening the stability of Northeast Asia. North Korea maintains large conventional and non-conventional forces as well as ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These capabilities threaten South Korea and Japan. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has the potential to threaten even more of the region and spark an arms race in a very volatile part of the world. The current United States strategy for North Korea is too limited to realize any sort of normalization in relations. A new approach is needed that will produce long-term stability in the region set the conditions for eventual reunification of North and South Korea and end North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions.

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the US failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy—missile diplomacy—to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.