Applying the Lessons of South African Nuclear Disarmament to North Korea

2016년 대북제재 이후 북한경제 변화와 신남북협력 방향 (Changes in the North Korean Economy and Guidelines to New Strategies of Inter-Korean Cooperation after UNSCR since 2016)

Last orders in Pyongyang

This article explains that key to understanding North Korean nuclear weapons motivations is the application of the explanatory frameworks of constructivism, liberalism, and realism to different time periods in North Korea: 1964 to 1994 (realism), 1991 to 2007 (liberalism), and 1991, 1994, and 2011 (constructivism). Notably, these periods coincide with the perceived security threat from South Korean-based U.S. nuclear arms until the erosion of Soviet support, the North Korean economic crisis and the value of nuclear weapons as an international-aid bargaining chip, and the expedience of nuclear disarmament. A realist approach toward North Korea from the 1990s to the present would be counterproductive, as the state has hardened itself against its adversaries and simultaneously needs economic and civil aid.

The Complex Relationship between Sanctions and North Korea's Illicit Trade Justin V. Hastings (bio) North Korea's illicit trade and sanctions have a complex relationship.1 In this essay, I argue that while North Korean companies do engage in illicit trade to bypass sanctions, much of such trade is actually the result of the fundamental dysfunction of the Kim regime and how the North Korean economy has evolved in the past several decades. That said, North Korea has been forced by sanctions to adapt the way it does business inside and outside the country. Because much of the illicit trade does not benefit the regime directly, it may actually behoove the international community to encourage some types of illicit trade and to provide an outlet for the regime to make money other than through dealing in weapons and illicit goods. Sanctions and the Illicit Economy North Koreans do indeed engage in illicit trade as a way of bypassing sanctions and sanction-enforcement mechanisms, specifically in buying or selling goods that have been declared off limits by UN Security Council resolutions. But there are two other main reasons that North Koreans engage in illicit economic activities and trade that have little to do with sanctions. First, the North Korean system at its most basic level encourages, and in many cases practically requires, economic activities to be illicit. In the years since the Arduous March killed a significant percentage of the North Korean population and citizens responded by going into business for themselves as a means of survival,2 North Korea, particularly under Kim Jong-un, has developed a modus vivendi whereby the lines between formal [End Page 28] and informal status, state and nonstate trade, and licit and illicit economic activities are blurred. Nearly every economic actor in North Korea is involved directly or indirectly in illicit trade, or more generally the illicit economy. Central state companies defy sanctions to export proscribed goods and import sanctioned items (which have long since ceased to be merely the technology that could be used in weapons programs). Other state companies with trading licenses go abroad (usually to China) to make money via whatever means they can. Private companies masquerade as state-owned companies by paying off state officials to buy and sell both legal and illegal goods, while state officials moonlight as entrepreneurs using their public positions. Private individuals use family members and other connections in China to move consumer goods and food across the border, often outside formal checkpoints or in violation of trade regulations.3 The North Korean economy as a whole functions as what has been called a "food chain," where every level of society and the state must pay rents to their superiors for the right to operate, and Kim Jong-un and his circle serve as the apex predators collecting rents indirectly from everyone below them.4 Because all private enterprise in North Korea is technically illegal, the state benefits from a system in which officials can collect bribes and fees to allow private and hybrid businesses to operate but have the legal leeway to crack down on them at any time. The state does not really care where the income to pay rents up the food chain actually comes from. This leads to a situation where the state (and officials) can indirectly benefit from what are often large-scale, institutionalized illicit economic activities without being directly involved. Drug trafficking, for example, likely has not been directly run by the North Korean government (in the sense of using central state–owned factories for production and ships for trafficking) since the mid-2000s, but the state continues to benefit indirectly from drug-trafficking profits.5 Second, many North Koreans engage in illicit economic activities, particularly trade, as a way of mitigating state-imposed political and [End Page 29] economic risk and moving profits out of the country (such as through smuggling gold into China).6 Because North Korea has few financial institutions or dispute-resolution mechanisms that encourage commerce, and because market actors must cultivate relationships with government officials (through bribes, gifts, and a cut of profits) as a way of getting any business done, regardless of the ostensible...

This study addresses whether North Korea–China trade dilutes the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea and Japan, and if so, to what extent and in what way. The structural adjustment of North Koreas export pattern in size and trade type dilutes the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea in particular. South Koreas economic sanctions significantly boost North Koreas exports to China, and the export increase has been substantial to cover the loss from the sanctions. North Korea has increased exports to the Chinese domestic market (by general trade) and those passing through China (by bonded trade). These findings show that North Korea has mitigated the economic damage of sanctions by employing various techniques for trade diversion. Changes occur because incentives for both North Korean regime and foreign firms are expedient particularly after South Koreas sanctions.

The North Korean Economy By Nicholas Eberstadt. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transactions Publishers, 2007, 329 pp, (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-7658-0360-3As the editor of North Korean Review, I know that there are two American economists with the knowledge and experience required to solve the puzzle of this secretive country's economy and the military implications of its economic policies: Marcus Noland of the Institute for International Economics and Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute. Whether or not readers agree with this book's diagnoses and suggested remedies on North Korean economy, they can surely benefit from considering the clear and energetic presentations in Nicholas Eberstadt's book. In my opinion, anyone who has some interest in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and Korea) should read The North Korean Economy.This book consists of ten chapters. Chapter i, "Reform, Muddling Through, or Collapse," concludes that numerous small attempts by state planners to liberalize the ailing economy have been completely inadequate to pull the economy out of its nosedive. Eberstadt insists that policy makers must be prepared for the possibility that North Korea will continue to strive to amass an ever-growing nuclear arsenal, even as it gives assurances to the contrary.Chapter 2, "Our Own Style of Statistics: Availability and Reliability of Official Quantitative Data," states that in an age of globalization, North Korean statistical authorities stand in virtually complete isolation from all international counterparts. Apparently, there is scant evidence of any improvement in North Korean statistical output over the years since September 1998, when Kim Jung Il formally assumed state power.Chapter 3, "International Trade in Capital Goods, 1970 to 1995," examines the North Korean international trade in "capital goods"; that is to say, machinery, equipment, the manufactured parts used as capital stock in the production process. Eberstadt thinks that the ratio of capital goods to gross domestic capital formation in the North Korean economy during the 1980s and 1990s may have been lowest in the world.Chapter 4, "Interlocking Crisis in Food, Energy, and Transport Equipment: Indications from Mirror Statistics," analyzes North Korea's trends in three sectors of strategic significance to the entire North Korean economy: food, energy, and transport. This chapter states that Pyongyang appears to be pursuing an "aid-based" solution to its food and energy crises, the same one that has been used by the country for half a century.Chapter 5, "Socioeconomic Development in Divided Korea: A Tale of Two Strategies," presents a comparative economic analysis of the two Koreas. Ever since the Korean War, the two rival governments have pursued two different strategies in their economic policies: a highly centralized economic system by North Korea and a government-directed capitalism by South Korea. Some fifty years after the Korean War, South Korea defeated North Korea economically. The only question remaining is whether victory will eventually eradicate North Korea or prompt it to reconstruct itself as a modern state compatible with the economic and strategic realities of Northeast Asia. …

The North Korean nuclear problem has gradually deteriorated in the past two decades and is becoming increasingly serious.1 Over the course of this worsening crisis, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has staged three nuclear tests and continues to develop its diverse medium- and long-range missile capabilities. North Korea now claims to be a nuclear weapons state and has formally announced its byungjin policy, which aims for the simultaneous pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development.2 Pyongyang is clearly determined to develop advanced nuclear capabilities and time is running short for the international community to respond. Despite this, diplomatic initiatives aimed at denuclearizing North Korea have thus far been ineffective. Policymakers have bought the same horse three times by attempting, and ultimately failing, to resolve the problem through the Geneva Agreed Framework (October 1994), the September 19th agreement (September 2005), and the leap day agreement (February 2012). Likewise, the six-party talks aimed at peaceful denuclearization of North Korea-involving Russia, China, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and the United States-have in essence stalled. Considering the rate at which North Korea's nuclear program is advancing, it is urgent that the international community adopt a more effective approach soon.This essay explores why efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have been unsuccessful and attempts to outline a more effective approach. The first section examines Pyongyang's inconsistent justifications for the program, as well as its perspectives and motivations regarding denuclearization. Next, the essay assesses the obstacles hindering the international community's efforts toward the denuclearization of North Korea. Last, this essay argues that the nuclear problem is rooted in the nature of the North Korean regime and considers strategies necessary for resolving the crisis. The essay concludes by recommending a more enduring, holistic, and comprehensive approach focused on strengthening deterrence capabilities and gradually altering North Korea's current trajectory through increased engagement.North Korea's Claims for Nuclearization and Understanding of DenuclearizationNorth Korea's actions over time and inconsistent justifications for its nuclear program indicate an unwillingness to denuclearize. Commencing in the late 1950s, North Korea's nuclear program was ostensibly for research purposes and energy generation. Thus, the DPRK asked for compensation for terminating its program in the 1990s, and a coalition of countries agreed to the provision of light-water reactors and heav y-fuel oil under the 1994 Agreed Framework.3 When North Korea's uranium enrichment program was discovered in 2002, Pyongyang denied the program's existence. However, it later acknowledged the continuation of the program and withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 to pursue its nuclear ambitions (the first and only signatory country to the NPT to do so). At the same time, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Since the summer of 1998, outside observers have witnessed the country's development of medium- and long-range missiles such as the Musudan, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.4 As North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities have evolved, Pyongyang has increasingly argued that its nuclear program is intended to be a deterrent against a potential preemptive attack by the United States.The key to understanding North Korea's changing stance on its nuclear program is comprehending how Pyongyang views the issue of denuclearization: when North Korea speaks of denuclearization, it means for the entire Korean Peninsula. In essence, its actions to this end would be conditional upon the United States no longer providing a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Beyond this, North Korea has demanded a U.S. …

IntroductionThe inauguration of President Obama in January 2009 aroused expectations in Pyongyang that the strained relationship between North Korea and the U.S. would improve under the new U.S. administration, for Obama had indicated during the 2008 presidential campaign his willingness to meet even with leaders of rogue nations, such as Kim Jong-Il of North Korea, if that was what it would take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. However, contrary to North Korea's expectations, the bilateral relationship between the two countries not improved but deteriorated further, especially after North Korea's missile and nuclear tests in the spring of 2009.It is the purpose of this paper to examine U.S.-North Korean relations under the Obama administration from the time of the inauguration on January 20, 2009, to the present with emphasis on an analysis of the factors which have contributed to the deterioration of the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and North Korea. It is a major contention of this paper that, like his predecessors, President Obama is determined to bring about the denuclearization of North Korea and will not relax sanctions against Pyongyang so long as North Korea persists in its ambitious nuclear weapons program.The Obama Administration's Approach to North KoreaDuring the presidential campaign in 2008, Obama said that he would be willing to sit down with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il if it would help persuade the North to give up its nuclear weapons program.1 Apparently, such a statement aroused the expectations on the part of North Koreans that an Obama presidency would provide an opportunity for improved relations. Pyongyang seemed hopeful for an end to what it called the regime change policy of the Bush administration and anticipated better relations with United States.2 In an attempt to establish cordial relations with Washington, North Korea conveyed its wish to send a representative to the Obama inauguration. However, the Obama transition team turned the request down,3 a decision based on the fact that there were no official diplomatic ties between the two countries.Apparently, North Korea was not near the top of the Obama administration's foreign policy priorities. It was also not clear how much time or attention Obama's foreign policy team would pay to North Korea, given urgent problems in such locations as the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.4 Meanwhile, signs of troubles for the Obama administration's North Korea policy began to surface on the eve of the new president's inauguration. According to Selig Harrison, who visited Pyongyang in mid-January 2009, North Koreans had very high hopes for Obama, but they want to confront him from a position of strength. North Korea made it clear that it had no intention of giving up nuclear weapons before normalizing relations with the U.S.5 Moreover, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman declared on the eve of Obama's inauguration that our status as a nuclear weapons state will never flounder as long as the U.S. nuclear threat remains, even a bit. He went on to say that we can live without normalized relations [with the U.S.], but can't live without nuclear deterrence.6 Although President Obama emphasized his intention to depart from President George W. Bush's policy of unilateralism and shift toward multilateral cooperation, it become increasingly clear that, insofar as the U.S. policy toward North Korea is concerned, the bottom line is (in the words of The Daily Yomiuri) continuation rather than change on the nuclear issue.7 Like his predecessors, Obama firmly believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation is vital, not only to the security of the U.S. but to the preservation of the existing international system. In fact, as Joseph Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund points out, Obama has the most detailed, comprehensive, and transformative nuclear policy agenda any candidate ever carried into the White House. …

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, consecutive floods in 1995-1996 and a severe drought in 1997 caused the North Korean economy to shrink, becoming abysmal by the end of the 1990s. North Korea's foreign trade followed the same path as its overall economic trend. The volume of foreign trade declined 60 percent from a peak year of $4.9 billion in 1988 to $2.0 billion in 2000. However, recently the trend has been reversing with an average annual increase of 10 percent since 2000. This paper identifies the four key problems of North Korea's foreign trade: chronic trade deficits, a limited number of trading partners, the increasing role of the inter-Korea trade and Chinese interest in the North Korean market.IntroductionNorth Korea has long been portrayed as an autarkic society governed by an absolute ruling ideology called juche, a concept of autonomy and self-suffeciency that leads to a belief that Korea should be free from any foreign intervention. North Korea's economy prominently applies the ideology of juche under three principles. First, all means of production are owned solely by the state and cooperative organizations. Second, the state formulates unified and detailed plans to guarantee a high rate of production growth and balanced development of the national economy. Third, socialist production relations are based on the foundation of an independent national economy. Under the juche principle, North Korea's foreign trade has amounted to only about i0 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) for years, far below that of most other economies.North Korea has been secluded from the Western world, but the country has recently initiated a policy of internal reform and external engagement. The greatest contribution that Japan, South Korea and the United States could make in order to achieve durable peace and stability on the Korean peninsula would be to normalize economic relations with North Korea and enter into an extensive program of engagement.After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in i989, even optimistic diplomats predicted only seven years at the most before the demise of North Korea (Clifford, 2002). These predictions were partially true for economic collapse, but not for political sustenance. No one knows for sure how many North Koreans died from food shortages in the i990s, because North Korea is a police state that restricts most reporters and relief workers. However, the United Nations' World Food Program estimates that more than one million people have been killed by famine (Fairclough, 2005). Many children went unfed or underfed. Malnutrition has been blamed for the stunted growth of children in North Korea, where seven-year-olds are seven centimeters shorter and weigh i0 kilograms less than children of the same age group in South Korea (Lee, 2002 b). Thirty-seven percent of North Korean children are malnourished as are a third of mothers.North Korea issues no consistent macroeconomic statistics, making it impossible to gain an accurate picture of its economy. However, the Bank of Korea estimates that North Korea lost almost half of its GNP and 70 percent of its foreign trade from i990 to i998 as the country's economy contracted and its trade relations with former communist countries dwindled. North Korean factories are estimated to have operated at no more than 25 percent of capacity in the i990s (Oh and Hassig, 2000). The health care system virtually ceased to operate. Food shortages became the most pressing economic problem.The North Korean economy finally turned around in i999. The Bank of Korea estimates that the North Korean economy grew by 6.2 percent in i999, i.3 percent in 2000, 3.7 percent in 200i, i.2 percent in 2002, i.8 percent in 2003, and 2.2 percent in 2004, after experiencing nine successive years of negative growth. In particular, North Korean grain output recorded gains, and its import volume has expanded rapidly during the last few years. …

Three Difficulties for the North Korean Economy and Inter-Korean Cooperation

No end in sight for North Korea's malnutrition crisis

본 연구는 남한의 2015 개정 음악과 교육과정과 북한의 2013 개정 음악과 교육과정을 비교 분석하여 통일을 대비하여 남북한 음악과 교육과정 통합을 위해 해결해야 할 시사점을 도출함을 목적으로 한다. 남북한 음악과 교육과정 구성, 문서 체제, 항목별 내용(성격, 목표, 내용, 교수․학습 방향, 평가 방향, 교과서 집필 방향)을 비교한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 음악과의 정의와 역할의 진술 내용, 표현과 감상 영역을 주요한 내용 영역으로 설정하고 있는 점은 남북한 음악과 교육과정의 공통점이라고 할 수 있다. 이는 교육과정을 구성하는 기본적인 항목에서 공통점을 가지고 있는 것이기 때문에 지속시켜 나갈 필요가 있다. 둘째, 북한 음악과 교육과정의 ‘음악무용’ 과목 제시, 애국주의와 사상의 강조, 성취기준의 구체적 제시, 교과서 집필 방향의 상세한 제시 등은 남한 교육과정과의 차이점이다. 교육과정과 교과서의 역할에 대한 시각 차이와 사상적 측면은 앞으로 좁혀나가야 할 중요한 쟁점이다. 이러한 남북한 음악과 교육과정에서의 차이를 줄여 나가기 위해서는 총론과 연계한 남북한 음악과 교육과정 연구, 남북한 음악 용어 차이 극복을 위한 기초 연구, 남북한 공통 음악과 교육과정의 개발 및 적합성 검토가 후속 연구로 수행되어야 한다.This study aims to analyze the characteristics of the revised music curriculum of North and South and draw implications associated with curriculum integration between the two countries. This study set out to compare North and South Korean music curriculums in organization, document system, and content by the item(character, goal, content, teaching and learning direction, evaluation direction, and writing direction for textbooks). The comparison results were as follows: First, both the North and South Korean music curriculums set the definitions and roles of the music subject and its expression and appreciation domains as major areas, which suggests that both of them need to continue these basic items since they are common between their curriculums. Secondly, the North Korean music curriculum was different from its South Korean counterpart in offering the Music and Dance”subject, putting an emphasis on patriotism and ideology, providing specific achievement criteria, and setting directions for textbook writing in details. North and South Korea need to narrow a gap in important issues such as different views of roles of curriculums and textbooks and ideological aspects. These differences between North and South Korean music curriculums can be resolved by doing research on North and South Korean music curriculums associated with the general introduction, basic research to overcome differences in musical terms between North and South Korea, and follow-up research on the development of common music curriculums between North and South Korea and the review of their fitness.

IntroductionSince the death of Kim Jong-il in 2012, the international media has speculated whether the new leader, his son Kim Jong-un, will put economic development on his political agenda and open up the North Korean economy for foreign investors. In his new year's speech held in 2013, Kim Jong-un called for far-reaching reforms in the following year including an opening up of the economy to foreign investors and achieving better relations with South Korea.1 While skepticism remains as to whether an economic opening can be achieved in the short term, potential foreign investors need to focus on business opportunities and market attractiveness.While not yet being considered an emerging market by the major indices,2 the popular media ascribe the country basic potential to become an emerging market in the future due to its relatively large domestic market, with its population of 24 million inhabitants and due to its richness in natural resources (e.g., gold, silver, copper, magnesite, coal, uranium and iron ore). If economic reform takes place, Goldman Sachs, for instance, sees enormous growth potential in the North Korean economy.3 The bank's analysis of the North Korean economy assumed the value of domestic mineral resources at 140 times of the 2008 gross domestic product (GDP). However, the country has a relatively young and technologically educated labor force which is available at low labor costs of around USD 160 per month.4A comparatively small but increasing number of international investors have already ventured into business with North Korea. The Cairo-based firm Orascom established the first GSM mobile phone network there in 2008 and contributed to funding the construction of the 105-story Ryugyong Hotel, located in the capital, Pyongyang, that is planned to open in 2013 and which will be managed by the Swiss luxury hotel group Kempinski Hotels.5If North Korea fully opens up its economy to foreign investors, the business opportunities will be plentiful.The Ethical Dilemma SituationDespite potentially lucrative business prospects, international investors are at the same time faced with ethical dilemmas and substantial business risk when intending to invest in North Korea. From a theoretical point of view, ethics in business used to be defined as behavior that is consistent with the principles, norms, and standards of business practice that have been agreed upon by society.6 But what if society is not free to participate in political decision-making processes but is instead oppressed by a dictatorial leadership, as is the case with North Korea (more details will be provided in the further course of the study)? How should foreign investors respond to such an environment? Engage in business activities and risk receiving bad press that may cost them consumers in the firm's home country?7 Theoretically it is assumed that a country which violates human rights, in which legal arbitrariness prevails, in which corruption is high and which lacks predictable rules in business does not attract foreign businesses and remains economically backward.8 Firms usually weight chances, risks and ethical concerns in order to benefit from first mover advantages or to skip a venture in emerging markets.9 As this case will show, levels of tolerance towards ethical issues differ among countries that show an interest in doing business with North Korea.It has to be noted that research on North Korea is inherently difficult. Data availability and data credibility are typical problems. However, as foreign firms are already engaged in sponsoring North Korean athletes and media started reporting about those experiences, a decent base of information is made available in order to discuss ethical dilemma situations in international business. This is of particular value for research aiming at practical relevance and implications for managers.Achievements and International Recognition of North Korean AthletesThe North Korean sports industry is one of the sectors which is attractive to international investors since on the one hand it lacks financial resources, but on the other hand it has achieved international recognition ever since the soccer World Cup in England in 1966 when the North Korean team beat Italy 1-0 and made it to the quarter finals. …

Research Purpose and SummaryThis research is designed to assess the current state of the North Korean economy caused by the July 1 measures in 2002, through interviews with North Korean refugees, whose numbers have recently increased dramatically (see Table 1).* Research target: North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006 and who currently reside in Seoul, Gyeonggi Province, and Busan* Research period and methodology: November to December 2006, survey and in-depth interviews with ten refugees* Numbers: 335 refugees, or 1 7 percent of the total number of North Korean refugees who fled into South Korea in 2006.* We interviewed 21 9 North Koreans who fled from North Korea between 1997 and 1999 and between 2004 and 2006, to ascertain changes in the North Korean economy after the July 1 measures (see Table 2).* Contents of research: profile of North Korean refugees, income and consumption, and market activitiesResearch FindingsA Profile of the North Korean RefugeesOur findings concerning gender are shown in Table 3:* Among the refugees, the proportion of men increased remarkably, from an average of 7 percent during 1997-9 to an average of 44 percent during 2004-6.* The particularly high proportion of women among those refugees who had left North Korea before the July 1 measures results from the fact that women were allowed to retire early and therefore it was easier for them to escape from North Korea.* The number of male refugees has gradually increased since the July 1 measures, because the increased number of men engaged in trade has made it easier for them to move, and female refugees have helped their families and relatives to leave North Korea.Age profiles are shown in Table 4:* Overall, the proportion of those refugees in their twenties is highest, but in recent years the proportions of the youngest age cohort (those aged between ten and nineteen) and of those in their forties have increased, while the proportion of those in their twenties has decreased.* The shares of the youngest age group and of those in their forties among the total number of refugees have increased since the July 1 measures, because those in their forties engaged in trade and they helped their families to move to South Korea.The educational background of the refuges is shown in Table 5:* The percentage of refuges who had not finished high school has decreased, while the proportion of those refugees who had completed high school and college education has increased.The occupations of refugees when they were in North Korea are shown in Table 6:* The proportion of production workers has declined, whereas that of the unemployed has risen.* This is largely attributable to the gradual increase in the early retirement of women engaged in production.Income StructureIncome structure is shown in Table 7:* As shown in the table, there is not much difference in the income structure of those two groups of refugees who had fled North Korea before and after the July 1 measures.* Wage income amounts to less than 10 percent of total income, and trade income accounts for about 90 percent of total income.* Table 7 indicates that it is difficult even for workers with a job to earn enough money to live on their wages alone.Income level is shown in Table 8:* The income level of the refugees after the July 1 measures is substantially higher than that of the earlier group of refugees.* The average monthly income per capita more than tripled, from $6 for the three years from 1997 to 1999 to $20 for three years from 2004 to 2006.Consumption Structure and LevelThe consumption structure is shown in Table 9:* The table shows that food consumption as a percentage of refugees' total expenditure fell after the July 1 measures, while expenditure on clothing increased after the July 1 measures; food accounted for the largest portion of refugees' total expenditure before and after the July 1 measures. …

IntroductionAre the days of hope for North Korea's nuclear denuclearization over once and for all? North Korea's recent disclosure of its uranium enriched program (UEP), in addition to its plutonium-based nuclear arsenal, the possible instability of power succession from North Korea's top leader, Kim Jong Il, to his son Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean leadership's blind reliance on its nuclear program as the ultimate guarantor of its regime survival, all point to a pessimistic assessment that it would be impossible to persuade North Korea to negotiate away its nuclear program for whatever rewards might obtain from the United States and the international community.Admittedly many people hoped for some sort of breakthrough on the nuclear front as the Obama administration took office in January 2009, expressing its willingness to engage North Korea. Although he didn't mention North Korea by name, President Obama pledged in his inaugural address to reach out to isolated regimes. As Democratic presidential candidate, Obama also expressed an active interest in engaging North Korea in a presidential debate in September 2008 when he criticized the Bush administration's lack of diplomatic engagement with North Korea, and supported sustained, direct and aggressive diplomacy to resolve North Korean nuclear issues.2Obama's criticism was clearly directed against the Bush administration's non-engagement policy toward North Korea during its first term. In fact, such an approach was inevitable, given the Bush team's fundamental distrust of the Pyongyang regime that had failed to keep its promises despite a series of previous nuclear pacts with the United States, including the Agreed Framework in 1994. The Bush administration avoided any further nuclear deal with North Korea during its first term, determined not to accept any demands from Pyongyang because doing so might leave them open to comparison with the Clinton Its North Korea policy was even described as the ABC (Anything but Clinton) policy.3However, the Bush team's hawkish stance began to crumble when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in October 2006. Tension was already rising since Washington made a big issue of Pyongyang's secret uranium enrichment program (UEP) in October 2005. North Korea initially acknowledged its presence, but has denied it ever since. Hard pressed by the urgent need to keep North Korea's unfettered nuclear pursuits at bay, chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill hastened to pull off a series of nuclear deals with North Korea, with the full support of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. North Korea froze its plutonium activities and finally submitted its nuclear declaration in 2009, for which it received political benefits from the United States, including being removed from the U.S. terrorism list. However, the previously uneventful nuclear talks stalled when both sides failed to iron out the differences on verification of North Korea's nuclear declaration.It was against this backdrop that many people expected some sort of breakthrough in the stalled nuclear talks when the new Obama administration came in. However, such expectations were shattered by North Korea's unexpected provocations right from the beginning of the Obama administration. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a l ong-range ballistic missile that, it argued, was the satellite Kwangmyongsong-2, intended to be put into orbit through a space launch vehicle, Unha-2. The strong U.S. condemnation, followed by the unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 1874, prompted North Korea to embolden rather than change its behavior. In defiance of the UN resolution, the North conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, which dealt a fatal blow to the Obama administration's efforts for engagement. The second nuclear test unequivocally demonstrated once again Pyongyang's intention of not giving up its nuclear program despite a series of nuclear pacts with the previous Bush administration. …