Nonproliferation Policy Research Articles

Reviewing South Africa’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Strategic Trade Controls

Reviewing South Africa’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Strategic Trade Controls

NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUE IN THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF THE USA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ANALYSIS OF BASIC DOCUMENTS

The article is devoted to the study of the evolution of the nuclear policy of the United States of America in the field of non-proliferation in the XXI century. It is noted that the USA, as one of the first nuclear powers, pays considerable attention to this issue in order to maintain the stability of the non-proliferation regime and international security. Based on the methodology of content analysis and qualitative methodology, the principles, priorities, and primary methods of the strategy of the administration of the White House regarding countering nuclear proliferation are determined on the basis of the fundamental documents of the USA, speeches of officials, and researchers. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to study the basic elements of the US nuclear non-proliferation policy and assess how successful this policy is considered to be, in particular, based on the examples of Iran and North Korea. In order to achieve this goal, the study gradually reveals changes in the security environment in the context of the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, and how this affects the policies of the US presidents’ administrations. Through the prism of such documents as the Nuclear Policy Review and the National Security Strategy of the United States, the main threats are defined, and therefore the priorities and concepts that form the general strategy of Washington to counter the proliferation of WMD. The article shows that in the XXI century, among the main threats to both the United States, its allies and partners, as well as the non-proliferation regime in general, attention is significantly focused on the problems associated with the existence and development of nuclear and missile programs of such states as Iran and North Korea. Therefore, the author analyses how official Washington elaborates a strategy towards the nuclear weapons proliferation problem, how the approaches of different administrations to counter these threats are changing, and which methods and approaches were used. In order to understand, how successful the strategy of individual administrations of US presidents was, the assessments of leading researchers and their arguments are studied. The conclusions summarize the results of the conducted research and reveal the author’s vision of the problem.

An Analysis of Constraints on Pyroprocessing Technology Development in ROK Under the US Nonproliferation Policy

An Analysis of Constraints on Pyroprocessing Technology Development in ROK Under the US Nonproliferation Policy

The End of Inhibition? Why US Nonproliferation Policy Is Becoming Less Effective

The End of Inhibition? Why US Nonproliferation Policy Is Becoming Less Effective

U.S. planning test reactor to run on weapons-grade uranium

Use of highly enriched fuel in civilian reactor would contravene decades-old nonproliferation policy.

Taiwan–US nonproliferation cooperation: the case of North Korea and the influence of affected industries

Why does the United States find it challenging to obtain third-party commitment to its nonproliferation policies? Although US pressure is necessary to trigger implementation, I contend that states are less responsive when the affected industries foresee growing gains from targets and display strong leverage on the ruling parties. I tested this argument by conducting a within-case study on US–Taiwanese nonproliferation cooperation concerning North Korea since 1992. On the basis of interviews, official statistics, and Wikileaks documents, this study revealed that because of the machinery industry’s increasing export volume to North Korea and strong political influence, Taiwan delayed United States–requested enforcement actions against the machinery industry’s violators until 2006. By contrast, because of minimal energy trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Taiwan swiftly halted a nuclear waste disposal plan in 1997 and improved financial sanctions in the 21st century. These findings fill the theoretical gap regarding the political costs of sanction enforcement on third-party states and add to the scholarship on nonproliferation commitment. The contemporary policy implication is that Taiwan’s high-tech industries are likely to display stronger opposition to United States–demanded controls over trade in semiconductor goods with China.

Malaysia’s path to the Strategic Trade Act

ABSTRACT In 2010, six years after news broke that the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring was making components for Libya’s nuclear program a short distance from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia adopted comprehensive export controls. Because Malaysia, like many developing and middle-income countries, had little to gain in security terms from such controls and potentially much to lose economically, its decision to introduce them seems puzzling. Drawing on a series of interviews with Malaysian officials and civil society, this article contributes to a growing literature on states’ nonproliferation policies by exploring that puzzle. The article considers the existing literature that purports to explain why states impose export controls and identifies three plausible factors behind Malaysia’s decision to do so: international norms, side payments, and political leadership. The article then details Kuala Lumpur’s development of export controls and assesses the role of each factor. Consistent with recent studies of the international nonproliferation order, the article concludes that Malaysia’s decision to introduce export controls was driven mainly by the promise of political and economic side payments from external actors, especially the United States, and by domestic changes in political leadership.

US nonproliferation policies and Canada's medical-isotope industry: a case study in nuclear ambivalence

ABSTRACT This article analyzes how US nonproliferation policies that sought to curtail US exports of highly enriched uranium (HEU) affected Canada’s medical-isotope industry and, particularly, the Canadian MAPLE (Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment) reactors project. US HEU-export policies established between 1978 and 2012 highlight the “nuclear ambivalence” of the Canadian isotope industry’s flagship product, molybdenum-99 (Mo-99)—a life-saving commodity widely used by US hospitals but also a material whose production process, based on HEU, came to be perceived as a potential threat to US and world security. The ambivalent status of Mo-99 production was reinforced by a state of mutual dependence between the two countries: On the one hand, Canada depended entirely on US HEU exports to maintain its dominant position in the Mo-99 world market and could not turn to other sources of HEU supply. On the other hand, US hospitals relied mainly on Mo-99 of Canadian origin, which limited the US government’s ability to enforce its policy by suspending its HEU exports to Canada. As a result, US and Canadian efforts to convert the Canadian isotope facilities to low-enriched uranium were thwarted by tensions between global security, public health, and commercial stakes, which led ultimately to ending Canada’s Mo-99 production.

European Responses to Ukraine’s nuclear idiosyncrasies: from Kyiv’s independence to Moscow’s aggression (1991-2022) | As respostas europeias às idiossincrasias nucleares ucranianas: da independência de Kiev à agressão de Moscovo (1991-2022)

From Ukraine’s independence in 1991 to Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukrainian territory in 2022, the European Union’s (EU) international involvement in Kyiv’s nuclear status can be characterized from an elusive and marginal common policy in the sphere of nuclear disarmament to an ‘unassuming’ common and coherent non-proliferation policy. During this period, Brussels relied on Washington to take the lead. In this context, my objective is to describe what was and is the role of the EU in Ukraine’s nuclear status. The EU’s involvement (even if marginal) can be analysed into two distinct timeframes. First, I propose to study the role of the EU during the period between the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the complete dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine after the signature of the so-called Budapest Memorandum. Second, I examine the EU efforts to promote non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agenda between two critical junctures: 2014 Russia’s covert invasion of eastern Ukraine and 2022 Moscow’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine territory. In the end, I also scrutinize the effects of these two major events on the current European security and nuclear order.

A Rare Successful Nonproliferation Policy: The JCPOA

AbstractIn July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) addressed the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The United States and the other P5+1 countries (the permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany) agreed to lift the nuclear‐related economic and financial sanctions they had imposed. This article discusses how the US administration successfully formulated a nonproliferation policy to convince Iran to engage in nuclear negotiations in the period before the 2015 agreement and how diplomacy and sanctions were used as integrated tools to achieve the goal of nonproliferation. The article also focuses on the administration's agitating for more sanctions and isolation of Tehran from the international community while employing the two diplomatic methods. In implementing the strategy, it faced major domestic and foreign challenges. Nevertheless, the US nonproliferation strategy toward Iran achieved its primary purpose.

Diplomacy under the nuclear shadow: Kennedy, Nasser, and Dimona

As John Kennedy prepared to enter the White House, the Middle East was on the verge of making a leap into the nuclear age. This article examines a secret and extended dialogue between Nasser and Kennedy on nuclear proliferation that took place under the shadow of the Israeli reactor in Dimona. Through relying on primary sources from the United States and Egypt, it traces the historical origins of the unresolved tensions between both countries on how to address Israel’s nuclear capabilities and the impact of that on their bilateral relations. In doing so, it presents a less familiar side of Nasser’s leadership, his perceptions of regional security and his approach to the nuclear question, both regionally and internationally. It also brings into focus the limits of Kennedy’s non-proliferation policy and proactive diplomacy in the Middle East, particularly in addressing Dimona. To this day, US toleration of Israel’s nuclear regional monopoly has exposed the US to accusations of double standards. The article traces how both Nasser and Kennedy were constrained in dealing with the nuclear question in the region during a key and foundational period of the Middle East’s nuclear history.

A China-US war in space: The after-action report

ABSTRACT In this article, the author analyzes the results of a three-move space war game conducted by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in 2021. The game focused on a possible lead up to a Chinese commercial blockade of Taiwan in the 2027–29 time frame. In the game, China attempts to deter Japan and the United States from coming to Taipei’s aid by threatening and then attacking US and Japanese satellite systems. Results of the game – conducted with the assistance of current and former senior State Department, NASA, intelligence, space industry, and Defense Department officials – suggest that space combat is unlikely to be waged only between dedicated military systems. Instead, many of the ground- and space-based threats the United States and its allies face – including laser satellite trackers, commercial space surveillance systems, space debris-removing satellites, and refueling spacecraft – will have legitimate civilian uses but can be flipped to conduct military missions against critical, targeted satellites. The author provides four “takeaways” from the space war game, one of which involves much closer coordination among the United States and its allies in regard to space security.

US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE THEORY OF EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The US policy towards North Korea is shaped by the nuclear non-proliferation policy and security guarantees provided to Japan and the Republic of Korea. These guarantees have a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are a tool to deter the DPRK from aggression against other countries in the region and, above all, US allies – Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, these guarantees are also an assurance of the latter's abandonment of the policy of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The aim of the article is to analyze the foundations of Washington's policy towards Pyongyang and its influence on relations with allies through the prism of the theory of extended nuclear deterrence. It is stated that the effectiveness of deterrence consists of the conviction of the willingness to react with an adequate response. At the same time, the persuasiveness of extended deterrence is lower, as the protecting state must respond to threats from the ally that is to say outside its own national borders. There is controversy among scholars who reflect on the relevance of extended deterrence during the Cold War and in the modern security environment. It is noted that the emergence of new threats and an increasing number of conflicts, if any, change the nature of extended deterrence, but this does not diminish the importance of the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States for both the NPT and the security of the region. The author analyzes the reasons for the United States' security guarantees for South Korea and Japan. Particular attention is paid to the factor of North Korea's aggressive policy and its progress in the development of the nuclear missile program. With the reduction and withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang's destructive policies have exacerbated the American allies' sense of danger and provoked talks about developing their own nuclear programs. This scenario threatened the NPT regime and international stability, as well as US strategic interests in the region. Therefore, Washington is stepping up cooperation with its allies in the process of resolving the problem of North Korea's nuclear missile program and is officially reaffirming its unwavering security and defense commitments, which should restore trust between the parties and increase the role of extended deterrence in general.

Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation

What explains South Korean public opinion on nuclear weapons development? Despite the US security commitment, most South Koreans consistently support independent nuclear weapons development. To solve this puzzle, we investigate the mechanisms of security threat and security commitment under which individuals develop their opinion on nuclear proliferation. An original survey of 1,988 South Korean adults shows empirically supported correlates of South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation. Public support for proliferation is largely shaped by external security threats: nuclear threats from North Korea and China, but also the latent nuclear superiority of Japan. Public opposition to proliferation is fostered by the perceived credibility of the US security commitment, but not by its perceived effectiveness. The results provide insights into South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation and can inform the design of a nonproliferation policy tailored to South Korea.

An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration's Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

Abstract The Israeli raid in June 1981 against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq has been extensively analyzed by scholars, especially in the context of debate about the efficacy of preemptive strikes against hostile nuclear programs. Yet surprisingly, some important historical questions have been left unanswered: how did the raid affect the Reagan administration’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how was the raid perceived by relevant administration officials? How did the United States design its political strategy of response to the raid, and how did this strategy play out at the International Atomic Energy Agency? What does this episode tell us about Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy priorities? By exploring recently declassified documents from several archives around the world, this article addresses all of these questions and, in the process, debunks revisionist myths relating to the raid.

Editor's Note

Editor's Note

Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age

AbstractThree decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how they should be addressed, primarily, but not solely, in the United States. Recent scholarship has rightly identified a new set of challenges posed by the development of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW). But the full implications of this transformation in policy, technology and thinking for the global nuclear order as a whole have so far been underexplored. To remedy this, we look further ahead to the ways in which current trends, if taken to their logical conclusion, have the capacity to usher in a new nuclear era. We argue that in the years ahead, SNNW will increasingly shape the nuclear order, particularly in relation to questions of stability and risk. In the Third Nuclear Age, nuclear deployments, postures, balances, arms control, non-proliferation policy, and the prospects for disarmament, will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. Consequently, we advocate for an urgent reassessment of the way nuclear order and nuclear risks are conceptualised as we confront the challenges of a Third Nuclear Age.

Reward-based or threat-based deterrence: US policy toward Japan and South Korea in comparative perspective

Despite the striking similarities in strategic environment of Japan and South Korea, US deterrence through nonproliferation policy toward the two allies varied in terms of its measures applied: reward-based deterrence and threat-based deterrence. Using the critical junctures framework, this paper argues that 1) domestic structural circumstances of divided with idealist bias or unified with realist bias in two allies led to different local responses to US policy that signalled the level of credibility of US security guarantee; 2) intermediaries that played a critical role in promoting mutual trust and confidence have influenced the credibility and confidence on intra-alliance level; 3) this credibility and confidence had shaped the direction of the US deterrence strategy of reward-based deterrence for Japan and threat-based deterrence for South Korea.

Correlates of South Korean Public Opinion on Nuclear Proliferation

What explains South Korean public opinion about nuclear weapons development? Despite the US security commitment, a majority of South Koreans consistently support independent nuclear weapons development. To solve this puzzle, we investigate the mechanisms of security threats and security commitment under which individuals develop their opinion on nuclear proliferation. An original survey of 1,988 South Korean adults shows empirically supported correlates of South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation. First, public support for proliferation is largely shaped by external security threats: nuclear weapons threats from North Korea and China, and even superior nuclear latency threats from Japan. Second, public opposition to proliferation is shaped by the perceived credibility of the US security commitment but not by the perceived effectiveness. The results provide important insights for understanding the South Korean public opinion on nuclear proliferation and for designing a nonproliferation policy tailored to South Korea.

Rabia Akhtar: The Blind Eye, U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan From Ford to Clinton

Rabia Akhtar: The Blind Eye, U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan From Ford to Clinton