Abstract
AbstractThree decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again. This paradigm shift is being driven by the growth and spread of non-nuclear technologies with strategic applications and by a shift in thinking about the sources of nuclear threats and how they should be addressed, primarily, but not solely, in the United States. Recent scholarship has rightly identified a new set of challenges posed by the development of strategic non-nuclear weaponry (SNNW). But the full implications of this transformation in policy, technology and thinking for the global nuclear order as a whole have so far been underexplored. To remedy this, we look further ahead to the ways in which current trends, if taken to their logical conclusion, have the capacity to usher in a new nuclear era. We argue that in the years ahead, SNNW will increasingly shape the nuclear order, particularly in relation to questions of stability and risk. In the Third Nuclear Age, nuclear deployments, postures, balances, arms control, non-proliferation policy, and the prospects for disarmament, will all be shaped as much by developments in SNNW capabilities as by nuclear weapons. Consequently, we advocate for an urgent reassessment of the way nuclear order and nuclear risks are conceptualised as we confront the challenges of a Third Nuclear Age.
Highlights
We stand on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age
Three decades after what is widely referred to as the transition from a First to a Second Nuclear Age, the world stands on the cusp of a possible Third Nuclear Age where the way that we conceptualise the central dynamics of the nuclear game will change again
We argue that a Third Nuclear Age will be a product of that which has preceded it: Second Nuclear Age thinking about the benefits of deploying strategic nonnuclear weaponry (SNNW) combined with the return of the kind of major power competition associated with the First Nuclear Age, is likely to make the Third Nuclear Age a highly dangerous one
Summary
We stand on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age. If this new era comes to pass, the main characteristics of the global nuclear order are likely to see considerable challenge.[1]. We should expect the politics of arms control and multilateral cooperation on nuclear issues to play out in new ways When it comes to the timing of the impacts of SNNW deployments, we argue that perceptions of what may be developed or deployed, or worst-case scenarios of how they might be used, are if not more important than the purpose or the capability of the systems deployed today, when it comes to real-world policy impact. The final section unpacks four scenarios for the Third Nuclear Age and outlines what we see as the main dynamics and contours of the future research agenda in nuclear studies
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