Nonproliferation Policy Research Articles

The Making of a ‘Ship-to-Mouth’ Nuclear Power: The Johnson Administration and India’s Nuclear Tilt, 1964–1968

This article explores Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s nonproliferation policy toward India in light of China’s nuclear program. It argues that although the administration prioritized nonproliferation, it was unwilling to undertake the necessary steps to prevent an Indian pro-bomb decision. This was owing to downgrading South Asia as a United States (US) foreign policy priority at the time, and the shared belief within the administration that India will go nuclear anyway in the long run. At a time when the US–Indian diplomatic relations had reached a nadir and India’s regional security environment was highly precarious, Washington’s wait-and-watch policy proved counterproductive to its own nonproliferation goals. New Delhi demonstrated its tacit decision for the bomb with its 1968 refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and gravitated more toward Moscow.

Nuclear Technology and Norm Stewardship: US Nonproliferation Policies Revisited

There is a lively debate in constructivism today regarding the constitutive and regulatory power of international norms. First-generation studies assume that when states support norms they have fully “internalized” normative ideals. However, the scholarship tends to privilege structure over agency and may not account well for changes in state policies that impact normative architectures. This study extends recent work on agentic constructivism and international law to develop a typology of “norm stewardship” and model of norm change. It conducts a plausibility probe of the new stewardship model by comparing case studies of US policies on exports of sensitive uranium enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies. Case evidence suggests that variations in norm internalization and dissonant norm strains impact multilateral initiatives on nonproliferation. This study concludes with a discussion of wider implications of norm stewardship for theories of international cooperation.

Proposal of a plutonium burner system based on HTGR with high proliferation resistance

An innovative plutonium burner concept based on high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) technology, “Clean Burn”, is proposed by Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). That is expected to be as an effective and safe method to consume surplus plutonium accumulated in Japan. A similar concept proposed by General Atomics (GA), Deep Burn, cannot be introduced to Japan because of its adopting highly enriched plutonium, which shall infringe on a Japanese nuclear nonproliferation policy according to Japan–US reprocessing negotiation. The Clean Burn concept can avoid this problem by employing an inert matrix fuel (IMF) and a tightly coupled fuel reprocessing and fabrication plants. Both features make it impossible to extract plutonium alone out of the fabrication process and its outcomes. As a result, the Clean Burn can use surplus plutonium as a fuel without mixing it with uranium matrix. Thus, surplus plutonium alone will be incinerated effectively, while generation of plutonium from the uranium matrix is avoided. High neutronic performance, i.e., achievement of burn-up of about 500 GWd/t and consumption ratio of plutonium-239 reaching to about 95%, is also assessed. Furthermore, reactivity defect caused by the inert matrix is found to be negligible. It is concluded that the Clean Burn concept is a useful option to incinerate plutonium with high proliferation resistance.

European Efforts to Control the Spread of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies

EU efforts to foster agreement on better measures to prevent the misuse of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (ENR) technologies are an easy test for the effectiveness European policies to improve controls over proliferation-sensitive technologies more generally. Three examples of attempts to strengthen ENR controls are examined. EU members and the EU were actively engaged in efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, in the strengthening of guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups for the trade in ENR technologies and in endeavours to develop multilateral approaches for enrichment and reprocessing facilities. Yet, European efforts suffered from the same lack of coherence that characterizes the EU’s non-proliferation policies more generally. Realistically, it will be up to EU member states and particularly those with access to ENR technologies to provide political leadership on nuclear non-proliferation issues such as better ENR controls.

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The EU’s Non-proliferation Strategy Ten Years On

2013 marked the tenth anniversary of the European Union's Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Since 2003 the EU has taken significant strides in institutionalizing cooperation on non-proliferation policy and establishing itself as an actor in the sphere of non-proliferation. The EU is now a prominent player in all the major multilateral frameworks relating to non-proliferation and WMD arms control, as well as a leading provider of financial and technical assistance in support of non-proliferation. The impact of the EU's non-proliferation strategy, however, has been less than might have been hoped. In the main multilateral arms control and non-proliferation frameworks, the EU has come up against basic political obstacles that cannot be easily overcome. In terms of key countries and regions of proliferation concern, the EU lacks the leverage to decisively shape the WMD-related decisions of the states concerned. Nevertheless, the EU's non-proliferation strategy is a sensible one: the Union's Member States share an important interest in constraining WMD proliferation, their ability to advance this objective is increased by acting collectively and there is no readily available alternative strategy. The lessons of the first decade of that strategy, however, are that there are limits to what the EU can achieve in the sphere of non-proliferation and that progress will be incremental rather than dramatic.

An International History of the Brazilian–Argentine Rapprochement

The establishment of political channels that allowed long-standing rivals Brazil and Argentina to pursue co-operation in the nuclear realm is commonly attributed to the work of civilian Presidents José Sarney and Raúl Alfonsín as well as to the re-establishment of democratic regimes in both countries in the 1980s. Nevertheless, archival research, recently declassified documents, and oral-history interviews confirm the hypothesis that these efforts actually date back to the 1960s. The initiative gained momentum in the 1970s with the settlement of the Itaipu-Corpus dispute over common freshwater resources and joint opposition to the United States’ non-proliferation policy. This article addresses the process which led to the establishment of stable forms of co-operation between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear realm. It explores four different strategies adopted by each country in order to obtain access to nuclear technology and exert regional leadership: alignment with the United States (thereby relinquishing nuclear autonomy); establishment of strategic partnerships with alternative Western powers; development of indigenous technology through secret programmes; and bilateral co-operation at the regional level. The international context, domestic factors, and personal attitudes are taken into account with the aim of providing a comprehensive analysis of co-operation and trust-building processes in a non-Western setting.

Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy

Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, power-projection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this article uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this article have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy.

Opening Address at the Symposium on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

This symposium is an education initiative organised by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in association with the School of History, University College Cork, and the embassy of Japan in Ireland. It is very important to promote greater awareness of Ireland’s disarmament and non-proliferation policies, and a greater understanding of why we pursue them. This initiative offers us an opportunity to look not just at the historical perspectives of Ireland’s disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, but to look forward to our future objectives. Ireland has always attached a very high priority to promoting the international disarmament agenda. We were admitted to the United Nations in 1955 and, like many emerging small nations, Ireland has put a premium on a strong international rule of law based around the United Nations system. From the outset we committed ourselves to the goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to promoting disarmament and arms control more generally. These remain key foreign policy priorities for Ireland. Our early efforts on nuclear disarmament were motivated by the humanitarian imperative for removing these weapons entirely from global arsenals. We are extremely privileged to have the opportunity to hear Ms Setsuko Thurlow’s personal testimony of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on the fateful morning of 6 August 1945. Her powerful testimony provides us with a unique perspective on the humanitarian impact of a nuclear weapon detonation and on what this actually means in terms of human suffering. The origins of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are closely associated with Ireland’s efforts within the United Nations in the late 1950s, and successive Irish governments have been very conscious of that legacy. In October 1958 the

The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions

AbstractBuilding on the rationalist literature on sanctions, this article argues that economic and political sanctions are a successful tool of nonproliferation policy, but that selection effects have rendered this success largely hidden. Since the late 1970s—when the United States made the threat of sanctions credible through congressional legislation and began regularly employing sanctions against proliferating states—sanctions have been ineffective in halting ongoing nuclear weapons programs, but they have succeeded in deterring states from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place and have thus contributed to a decline in the rate of nuclear pursuit. The logic of the argument is simple: rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, so long as the threat is credible. Vulnerability is a function of a state's level of economic and security dependence on the United States—states with greater dependence have more to lose from US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US-sponsored norms. The end result of this selection effect is that since the late 1970s, only insulated, inward-looking regimes have pursued nuclear weapons and become the target of imposed sanctions, thus rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation sanctions low. I find support for the argument based on statistical analysis of a global sample of countries from 1950 to 2000, an original data set of US nonproliferation sanctions episodes, and qualitative analysis of the South Korean and Taiwanese nuclear weapons programs.

The Chinese Nuclear Test and 'Atoms for Peace' as a Measure for Preventing Nuclear Armament of Japan : the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the United States and the Introduction of Light Water Reactors into Japan, 1964-1968

The Chinese Nuclear Test and 'Atoms for Peace' as a Measure for Preventing Nuclear Armament of Japan : the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the United States and the Introduction of Light Water Reactors into Japan, 1964-1968

Nuclear Posture, Nonproliferation Policy, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

What is the relationship between nuclear postures and nonproliferation policies and the spread of nuclear weapons? At first blush, this might appear to be an obvious question. After all, states go to great lengths—extending nuclear security guarantees to nonnuclear weapon states, forward-deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of allies, sizing their own nuclear arsenals with the proliferation decisions of other states in mind, supporting international institutions in conducting inspections of nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states, restricting the availability of sensitive nuclear technology, applying and enforcing sanctions against would-be proliferators, conducting military strikes against nuclear facilities, and promoting nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, among many other steps—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It would be strange to imagine that states pursue such actions unless they can expect a policy payoff in terms of peace or security. Yet, there is little systematic evidence to suggest that nuclear postures and policies have a meaningful impact on the spread of nuclear weapons. Correctly understanding the effects of nuclear posture and policy on both horizontal proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons to new states) and vertical proliferation (increases in the size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals within existing nuclear states) is a subject of extreme real-world importance. United

Nonproliferation Policy of the Clinton Administration toward India: Shifting of Nuclear Goalposts?

This article examines the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the Clinton administration (1993–2001) toward India. It is argued that initially President Clinton was focused on a “capping, rollback, and eliminate” approach toward Indian nuclearization. But, after India conducted nuclear tests in 1998, there was a discernible change in Clinton's policy toward India, which has largely gone unrecognized. The Clinton administration considerably shifted the nuclear goalposts—from the cap, rollback, and eliminate Indian nuclear weapons—to merely the exercise of nuclear restraint by India. This, in turn, implied a tacit acceptance of the nuclear weapons possessed by India. The Clinton administration cleared the languishing nuclear debris and created space for the next administration to reset the anomalous nuclear relationship with India.

The New Face of EU Security Policies? Analysing the Normative Patterns of EU Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern Mediterranean

In recent years, the European Union has substantially intensified its non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean. Although the analysis of these policies shows that the Union comes close to what the literature suggests is an ideal type normative power, this interpretation in itself is at odds with other security policies in the southern Mediterranean and with non-proliferation policies outside the region, most notably in Iran. Therefore, this article examines the causes and implications of this inconsistency, and argues that it can be problematic to characterize the EU as a normative power in a geographically and thematically limited issue area.

Mutual Interference between Universality and Individuality in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: U.S–India Deal as a Turning Point

Mutual Interference between Universality and Individuality in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: U.S–India Deal as a Turning Point

British nuclear non-proliferation policies towards Iran and the Middle East

The article argues that British non-proliferation policies towards the Middle East have had limited success because they are circumscribed by dependence on alliances and constrained by other factors such as Britain's historical legacy, its status as a nuclear weapons state and, especially through the European Union's engagement with the region, the communication of self-interest rather than credible pursuit of the declared objective of regional security-building. Despite promoting and implementing its own disarmament policies, Britain has been unable to overcome mistrust and perceptions of hypocrisy in the region in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. This is particularly evident in the dispute with Iran, which is examined in detail with the assistance of Adler's ‘double-damned dilemma’ model. The analysis argues that the Western coercive approach has facilitated the stalemate with Iran, because it has encouraged Iran's provocations and allowed it to respond with a strategy of denial. The analysis suggests that Britain and its allies adopt a defusing strategy which does not reduce the dispute to a proliferation problem, but treats Iran's behaviour as a quest for recognition. Britain has little influence on Iran, but might build on its relationship with Turkey to develop this approach in conjunction with its allies.

BRAZIL AND MEXICO IN THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

Latin American countries have historically followed different paths and logics toward the nonproliferation regime. Some states have unconditionally advocated for global and nonproliferation efforts, while others have vehemently opposed such measures or remained ambivalent toward the regime itself. By historically comparing two of Latin America's most influential countries—Brazil and Mexico—this study identifies the underlying domestic conditions and external influences that explain their differences in behavior and policy toward the nonproliferation regime. Because little is known about the reasons why different Latin American countries adopt these different approaches, the purpose of this article is to resolve this problem, primarily by focusing on the ways in which evolving civil-military relations and US influence have shaped nonproliferation policy preferences in Latin America. It concludes with a discussion of how these historical cases might shed light on current nonproliferation policies in Latin America.

Les Allemands et le nucléaire : histoire d’un double défi. Seconde partie : De la contestation à la «sortie» du nucléaire

The Federal Republic of Germany launched a civilian nuclear programme in the mid 1950’s but her ambitions were by no means restricted to civilian applications: Chancellor Adenauer was hoping to develop a military programme in order to raise the status of his country by joining the very restricted club of nuclear powers. But due to the opposition expressed by the Allied forces, Germany then concentrated on the development of an ambitious civilian programme which would still have to face two major challenges: The restricted availability of uranium due to the non-proliferation policy of the great nuclear powers. Indeed, although Germany had abandoned any intention of developing a military programme, her civilian programme suffered from those international restrictions. Adding to this difficulty, a second challenge also arose from the outset: the protest against both military and civilian applications of nuclear energy within German society, which would finally lead to the end of the nuclear programme.

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY CROSSROADS:

On October 1, 2008, Congress enacted a proposal that originated with President George W. Bush in 2005 to approve an unprecedented nuclear trade pact with India by removing a central pillar of US nonproliferation policy. Despite the numerous political challenges confronting the Bush administration, the initiative won strong bipartisan support, including votes from Democratic Senators Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama. The four-year struggle to pass the controversial US-India nuclear trade agreement offers an exceptionally valuable case study. It demonstrates a classic tradeoff between the pursuit of broad multilateral goals such as nuclear nonproliferation and advancement of a specific bilateral relationship. It reveals enduring fault lines in executive branch relations with Congress. It vividly portrays challenges confronting proponents of a strong nonproliferation regime. This article is based on an analysis of the negotiating record and congressional deliberations, including interviews with key participants. It assesses the lessons learned and focuses on three principal questions: how did the agreement seek to advance US national security interests?; what were the essential elements of the prolonged state-of-the-art lobbying campaign to win approval from skeptics in Congress?; and what are the agreement's actual benefits—and costs—to future US nonproliferation efforts?

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world—especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention—coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.