Taiwan–US nonproliferation cooperation: the case of North Korea and the influence of affected industries

Abstract

Why does the United States find it challenging to obtain third-party commitment to its nonproliferation policies? Although US pressure is necessary to trigger implementation, I contend that states are less responsive when the affected industries foresee growing gains from targets and display strong leverage on the ruling parties. I tested this argument by conducting a within-case study on US–Taiwanese nonproliferation cooperation concerning North Korea since 1992. On the basis of interviews, official statistics, and Wikileaks documents, this study revealed that because of the machinery industry’s increasing export volume to North Korea and strong political influence, Taiwan delayed United States–requested enforcement actions against the machinery industry’s violators until 2006. By contrast, because of minimal energy trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Taiwan swiftly halted a nuclear waste disposal plan in 1997 and improved financial sanctions in the 21st century. These findings fill the theoretical gap regarding the political costs of sanction enforcement on third-party states and add to the scholarship on nonproliferation commitment. The contemporary policy implication is that Taiwan’s high-tech industries are likely to display stronger opposition to United States–demanded controls over trade in semiconductor goods with China.