Abstract
This chapter assess the effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy, in particular the role of sanctions policies adopted in the 1970s. It demonstrates via statistical analysis that states dependent on the United States have been significantly less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs, but only after the adoption of credible sanctions policies in 1976. It also examines the universe of US and multilateral nonproliferation sanctions episodes, showing that sanctions against ongoing nuclear weapons programs have tended to succeed only under one of two conditions—when the proliferator depended on the United States and underestimated the risk of sanctions (South Korea, Taiwan), or faced unexpectedly stiff multilateral sanctions (South Africa, Iraq, Iran).
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