NIMBY Conflict Research Articles

Complexity Review of NIMBY Conflict: Characteristics, Mechanism and Evolution Simulation

In the process of modernization and urbanization, some government projects or facilities with negative externalities have caused the psychology of residents nearby to “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY). That is, adopting strong and resolute, sometimes highly emotional collective opposition or even resistance behavior. This triggered a NIMBY conflict. From the perspective of Complexity, this study re-examines the characteristics and evolution mechanism of NIMBY conflict and draws the following conclusions: (1) NIMBY conflict is a complex system that interacts between multiple subjects and the environment; (2) Adaptability is the driving force for the evolution of NIMBY conflict. Through detectors, regularizers, and effectors, NIMBY subjects can be encouraged to gradually adapt to changes in the external environment and maximize their own interests; (3) In NIMBY conflict, the government conflict response method is more important than the intervention time. Residents’ communication efficiency and connection probability will affect residents’ behavior choices. The lower the residents’ communication efficiency, the less likely it is to form a NIMBY conflict.

Analysis of the Conflicts in the Process of Industrial Building Renovation Based on Grounded Theory: A China Study

With the transformation of industry in China, and industrial production changes from an incremental economy to a stock economy, a massive renovation of industrial buildings and intensification of renovation conflicts coexist. Industrial building renovation conflict seriously affects industrial building renovation. Based on the Grounded Theory, this paper selects Ningbo City as the research area and builds the “interest–situation–conflict” model through investigation and interview, exploring the reasons for conflicts and the influencing factors of industrial building renovation. Situational factors for three types of conflicts, namely, government–residents, government–enterprises, and residents–enterprises, are greatly affected by policies and systems, supervision and feedback, and different standpoints, respectively. Based on the “interest-situation-conflict” model, this paper analyzes the reasons for the conflicts among government, enterprises, and residents and puts forward countermeasures to solve nimby (not in my back yard) conflict, compensation conflict, development conflict, goals conflict, financial conflict, participation conflict, and conflict of interests and rights, so as to promote the renovation of industrial buildings.

Unpacking the black box: An investigation of online crisis communication patterns among stakeholders in the NIMBY conflict

Conflicts caused by NIMBY facilities pose significant threats to urban harmony and sustainability. Ubiquitous online access undoubtedly exacerbates social tensions, and discerning “who is doing what?” is critical for urban managers during crisis communication. However, communication patterns among online stakeholders in NIMBY conflicts have not been comprehensively investigated. Based on Social-Mediated Crisis Communication theory, this research crawls 66,831 Sina blogs to reveal the evolution of online messages and the interaction patterns of diverse stakeholders. Findings show that stakeholders release messages with different emphases and play different roles. Specifically, government functions as the “leader”, who plays a dominant role in online communication; news organizations function as the “bridge”, receiving and spreading information released by governments to other stakeholders with an efficient transmission function; media practitioners function as the “regulator”, mainly posting rumor management messages to clarify misinformation and alleviate social tensions; and citizen agents function as both “receiver” and “promulgator”, who receive information from other stakeholders and also disseminate opinions to other netizens. These findings can advance the existing knowledge body of NIMBY crisis communication and yield valuable inputs for evidence-based policymaking in conflict management in China and beyond. • Social-Mediated Crisis Communication was applied to investigate online NIMBY crisis communication patterns. • The dynamic communication networks among stakeholders were investigated. • The influential actors in different stages of online crisis communication in NIMBY conflict were identified.

Shifts in governance modes and explanatory factors in the NIMBY: Findings from the X waste incineration plant in Shenzhen, China

AbstractWith increasing numbers of environmental conflicts in recent years, Chinese local governments are changing their modes of governance with the aim of addressing these conflicts satisfactorily. Through a case study, we identified shifts in modes of governance from hierarchical to network and from market to hybrid (characterized by a combination of market and hierarchical) in three arenas. Our findings confirm that initiating actors, stakeholder involvement types, rules of interaction, and implementation strategies are useful indicators of shifts in governance modes. Media, protests and policy entrepreneurs in different arenas are important factors in the shift from hierarchical to network governance, while policy entrepreneurs and higher‐level government intervention are crucial factors in the shift from market to a hybrid governance mode. Policy entrepreneurs play an important role in all three arenas. As for theoretical contribution, our research has provided the evidence for non‐hierarchical governance practices in the NIMBY in China. In the future, local governments in China may learn to consider proper governance mode shifts to deal with the NIMBY conflicts in infrastructure planning and construction.

Nip risk in the bud: A system dynamic model to govern NIMBY conflict

“Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) conflict refers to public resistance to the government in delivering and operating NIMBY facilities. Although the antecedents of NIMBY conflicts are widely explored (e.g., negative externalities, public sensitivity, external triggers), there is rare literature systematically exploring their integrated effects on public resistance from the public social psychology perspective that considers the interplaying effects of public risk and emotion perception. Besides, to reflect the nonlinear change of public resistance (i.e., “emergency” and “discontinuity” features of NIMBY conflict), we originally integrate the catastrophe theory into the system dynamic method to establish an SD-Catastrophe model to simulate the evolution process of public resistance behavior. The effect of governmental response on NIMBY conflicts is especially examined in the simulation model, and the catastrophe characteristics of public resistance behavior in NIMBY conflict are verified. The result shows that governmental response contributes to eliminating NIMBY conflicts in four aspects: 1)Different facilities, different urgency; 2) The faster, the better; 3) The higher intensity, the better; and 4) Existing effect lag. Based on the nonlinear change of public resistance, two governance strategies, including the internal strategy (i.e., optimizing public psychological states) and the external strategy (i.e., controlling project external triggers), are formulated to help the government eliminate the risk of NIMBY conflict.

The behavioral strategies of multiple stakeholders in environmental nimby conflicts: An evolutionary game theoretical research

“Chinese-style Nimby” is a thorny issue in China’s current public governance. Generally speaking, there is a game relationship between multiple stakeholders in the environmental NIMBY conflicts. Given this, the study constructs the tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, construction enterprises and the surrounding residents, and uses MATLAB to numerically simulate the evolutionary system. The results show: 1) The effect of government negotiations in resolving environmental conflicts is better than environmental compensation, with the increase in the degree of civil resistance, the probability of the government choosing negotiation strategies will increase; 2) Reducing the cost of negotiations in enterprises, or the taxation index when selecting considering public’s demands, or improving additional benefits of the corporate, which can effectively improve the positivity of enterprises to consider people’s appeals; 3) The higher the compensation and the extra benefits of people’s cooperative participation are, the faster the system will evolute to people’s cooperative participation. Finally, based on the research findings, this paper provides reference and countermeasures for the construction of multiple co-governance mechanisms of environmental NIMBY conflicts.

Exploring rumor combating behavior of social media on NIMBY conflict: Temporal modes, frameworks and strategies

With the development of social media, mass unreliable information is circulated which amplifies the impact on NIMBY conflict, which is caused by public concern about the negative externalities of development projects. Understanding the behavior of rumor combating provides significant insights for crisis management relating to public acceptance of large-scale infrastructure initiatives, construction projects or energy facilities. However, few studies have addressed how rumor combating behavior develops due to the online rumors in such crises. Accordingly, this study aimed to investigate the formation and the effect of rumor combating behavior on NIMBY conflict with the analytical framework by content analysis and curve fitting method based on Situational Crisis Communication Theory. In this framework, the temporal modes and frameworks evolution of the counter-rumors are illustrated, the influences and behaviors tendency of multiple rumor refuters are examined, and the effects of the rumor combating strategies are explored via acceptance analysis. The results show that there are two key diffusion cycles in the progress of rumor combating, and early counter-rumors can pre-emptively protect the users' attitude. The interactive features of the framework between rumors and counter-rumors vary at different stages and an Assessment framework can provide a quick response to combat rumors. In addition, Media practitioners and News organizations act as the bellwether in rumor combating action, while Individuals and Elites are the main forces as the rumor refuters. Refutation and Guide, fact-based rumor combating strategies, show great persuasive impact. These findings will help the government and relevant entities to implement rumor combating strategies to minimize the potential exacerbation of NIMBY conflict.

Nip Risk in the Bud: A System Dynamic Model to Govern Nimby Conflict

Nip Risk in the Bud: A System Dynamic Model to Govern Nimby Conflict

Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholder behavior strategies in ‘Not in My Backyard’ conflicts: Effect of the intervention by environmental Non-Governmental Organizations

Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in ‘Not in My Backyard’ (NIMBY) incidents can effectively restrain the protest behavior of stakeholders. With or without the involvement of environmental NGOs, a tripartite game model among the government, operating enterprises and surrounding residents is built by complying with the evolutionary game theory. Subsequently, the tripartite evolutionary game is simulated by exploiting the system dynamics to investigate the stability of stakeholder interactions, and the effect of different reward and punishment strategies on game processes and equilibrium states with the involvement of environmental NGOs. The simulation results are presented below. First, without the involvement of environmental NGOs, the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary game system is expressed as (0, 0, 0), and it will not be altered for changes in external variables. NIMBY conflicts are inevitable. Second, with the involvement of environmental NGOs, their behavioral decision-making strengthens rewards and punishments more rigorously, which can efficiently decrease the proportion of their protest behaviors, while causing the fluctuation of the evolution curve. Last, to ensure the high stability of the game process, a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism should be introduced to act on the evolutionary game system of the stakeholders. As stressed in the mentioned findings, (1) the evolutionary game modelling and system dynamics simulations show that the intervention of environmental NGOs can effectively avoid NIMBY conflicts. (2) The involvement of environmental NGOs can reduce NIMBY conflict behavior of stakeholders, whereas static rewards and sanctions can cause the stakeholder evolutionary curve to fluctuate. (3) To alleviate the fluctuation, environmental NGOs are required to introduce the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism. To be specific, changes in penalty coefficients can improve the achievement of the desired state. The present study puts foreword specific and illuminating recommendations which can mediate NIMBY conflicts in various nations.

Online rumor propagation of social media on NIMBY conflict: Temporal patterns, frameworks and rumor-mongers

The rapid development of social media has accelerated the online rumor propagation, making social conflicts more intense during the development of NIMBY facilities. The “fake news” issue is not new, as the consequences will be amplified when the fakery spreads on social media as online rumors. However, few studies have been undertaken on the online public opinion, especially the rumor propagation on NIMBYism. This study collects data related to the anti-PX demonstration in Maoming city in 2014 on the Weibo platform. To form the rumor text library, qualitative research method is adopted to encode the collected data. Based on the social amplification of risk framework, three sub-frameworks are proposed in this study and statistical method is used to analyze the topics of rumors. Meanwhile, the textual content analysis and impact factor analysis is employed to examine the semantic features of rumor texts and the key role of rumor-mongers respectively. The results show that there are three main propagation lifecycles of rumors while the topics of rumors vary according to the cycle. Rumors belonging to each framework have diverse trend and the assessment framework is dominant throughout the process. “Individuals” and “Elites” are the main force of rumor spreading, and “Media practitioners” are the opinion leaders. These findings are useful for governments to establish a rumor detection system so that official information can be released and rumors can be refuted without delay. Meanwhile, the cooperation with the opinion leaders in online rumor propagation should be strengthened. In addition, a scientific popularization and timely notification of project progress is recommended prior to the development of NIMBY facility.

Explore the Conflict and Resolution of Pollution NIMBY Facility Construction in the Context of New Media: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

The rapid urbanization process has brought many pollution NIMBY facilities, and the associated pollution NIMBY conflicts have become one of the important factors restricting social stability. With the advent of the media era, new media has become the main channel for the public to recognize risks and master information, which greatly aggravates the social amplification effect of NIMBY conflict risk. In this case, it is of great significance to explore the interest relationship among the local government, the new media, and the local people and their roles in the NIMBY conflict. Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the local government, the new media, and the local people and carries out numerical simulation on the evolutionary model using MATLAB. The results show that the local government adopts a certain degree of regulatory strategy for the new media, the new media adopts the strategy of publicizing facts, and the local people adopts the strategy of nonresistance, which are the stable strategy points of the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders in the NIMBY conflict. The local government’s intervention in rumors to a certain extent is conducive to promoting the new media to publicize facts of the pollution NIMBY facilities and to restrain the local people’s choice of resistance strategies. The local government’s punishment to the new media spreading rumors should be kept above a certain level to restrain the new media spreading rumors. When the local people’s resistance reaches a certain level, the local government’s intervention will break down and the new media will become hyperactive. The results of this paper can provide some enlightenment for the stakeholders in pollution NIMBY conflicts and deepen the understanding of multiple interest conflicts and their resolution. Finally, this study proposes to build information sharing mechanism, information communication mechanism, trust mechanism, network governance mechanism, and public participation mechanism, so as to resolve the construction risk of pollution NIMBY facilities and improve the overall social welfare level.

Research on the tripartite evolutionary game of public participation in the facility location of hazardous materials logistics from the perspective of NIMBY events

Hazardous materials are important raw materials for economic, social and industrial production. With the increasing demand for hazardous materials, there is an increasing demand for facilities in the production, transfer, distribution and storage of hazardous materials in China. In recent years, there are frequent conflicts for the location of hazardous materials logistics at home and abroad. The conflicts not only lead to the delay or even cancellation of these projects, but also seriously endanger the local social and public security. At present, China's economy is in a period of rapid development, the public’s awareness of environmental rights has increased, and it is extremely sensitive to the location of hazardous materials logistics.The public participation in the decision-making stage of the NIMBY project can effectively prevent the NIMBY conflict. In order to improve the situation of public participation in the decision-making stage of NIMBY projects, this paper takes three main stakeholders in the decision-making stage of projects-local government, investors of hazardous materials logistics facilities and the surrounding public as the research objects, and uses evolutionary game theory to explore the influence of different interest demands on the strategic choices of the three parties. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to resolve the risk of social conflicts.

Research on mechanism of rail-transport NIMBY conflict in China based on risk perception

Research on mechanism of rail-transport NIMBY conflict in China based on risk perception

Research on mechanism of rail-transport NIMBY conflict in China based on risk perception

Research on mechanism of rail-transport NIMBY conflict in China based on risk perception

RETRACTED: Psychosocial pathways of collective action participation in NIMBY conflict: A regulated double mediation model

Frequent NIMBY conflicts have seriously affected social stability and urban development. This paper aims to explore the psychosocial path of people participating in the collective action of NIMBY conflict, and to provide theoretical basis for effective governance of NIMBY conflict. By integrating the psychosocial explanatory variables related to collective action, we construct a regulated double mediation Model, which is empirically tested with 566 questionnaires from the NIMBY conflict in gaoling, China. The results show that: group relative deprivation, group emotions and group effectiveness have positive effects on people's NIMBY conflict participation tendency; group effectiveness and group emotions are important mediating variables of group relative deprivation affecting people's NIMBY conflict participation tendency; group identity has a positive adjustment effect on people's group emotions, group effectiveness, and the participation tendency of NIMBY conflict. The research indicates that group relative deprivation is the key precursor of NIMBY conflict, group emotion is the key factor driving the deterioration of NIMBY conflict, and group identity is the key factor catalyzing the occurrence of NIMBY conflict. This study helps to explain the psychological mechanism of people's participation in NIMBY conflict, and has certain implications for the prevention and governance of NIMBY conflict.

Study on Environmental Protection Based on Urban NIMBY Facilities

With the rapid development of industrialization and urbanization in China, environmental problems have become increasingly prominent and citizen’s awareness of environmental protection has been constantly improved, especially for the new neighborhood avoidance projects which may cause significant environmental events. Moreover, it is difficult for citizens to find appropriate ways while safeguarding their personal rights and interests, which leads to NIMBY conflicts. Therefore, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the current situation and problems of NIMBY projects in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei through questionnaire survey, and puts forward the strategies to solve the problems.

Fields of Dreams: An Economic Democracy Framework for Addressing NIMBYism

Local opposition to the development of socially desirable facilities is one of the most important policy challenges in the United States. Despite decades of effort, a policy formula to reduce “Not in My Back Yard” (NIMBY) political opposition is yet to be found. Cash payments, inclusive deliberation, benefits negotiations, and statutory mandates are only a few of the policy and legislative measures that have been attempted at diffusing NIMBY sentiments, mostly to no avail. This Article offers a different approach to NIMBY conflicts. I argue that disempowerment is one of the main drivers of NIMBY sentiments. People oppose certain developments largely because they feel a lack of control over decisionmaking procedures that directly affect their lives. Applying theories of participatory democracy, I develop a property-based framework to mitigate NIMBY sentiments. Ownership, I explain, empowers. It confers the power to determine and control a resource. When a resource is owned by a community, the community possesses the power to set the agenda for the resource. It follows that if communities own, develop, and manage socially desirable facilities, NIMBY sentiments will be attenuated. To test this hypothesis, I explore two recent successful examples of communal ownership — the development model for windfarms and the U.K.’s Community Right to Build reform. Both case studies demonstrate the potential of communal development to mitigate NIMBY sentiments and provide valuable legal and policy lessons for broader implementation of communal models.

Exploration of the Risk Evolution Cues of NIMBY Projects under Urbanization Process

With the increasing urbanization rate in our country, the occurrence of "not in my back yard" (NIMBY) conflict has become intensified, so it is particularly important to analyze the causes of these conflicts.Therefore, to explore the effects of the risk evolution of NIMBY projects on NIMBY conflicts, we have generalized and identified 13 cues (decision reference variables) by summarizing the existing research results. Further, to realize prediction about the influencing factors whereby NIMBY risk evolves into NIMBY conflict, we then constructed a single system design lens model of NIMBY conflict evolution and prediction. Based on the simulation analysis of 75 collected pieces of valid SJT questionnaire data collected by Policy EXC software, through integration and analysis we obtained the following three predictability cues: government departments closing and not sharing NIMBY information, degree of environmental pollution, and impaired quality of life.

Research on the Influence Factors of the Policy Tools in NIMBY Conflict Management—A Study Based on 25 Cases in China

NIMBY conflict is a kind of public crisis incident accompanied by the development of society. This problem stems from the NIMBY syndrome of citizens in the process of constructing NIMBY facilities and the essence of this problem is the uneven distribution of interests. In this paper, the policy tools in the governance process are divided into three categories: government regulation, collaborative governance, and economic incentives and compensation. According to the research on about 20 cases of NIMBY conflict in China, this paper proposes four main influence factors of policy tools for the management of NIMBY conflict: political factors, civic political awareness, market factors and NIMBY facilities.

Public participation impact on environment NIMBY conflict and environmental conflict management: Comparative analysis in Shanghai and Hong Kong

Public participation is vital for conflict management. Although much practice and best experience of environmental conflict and NIMBY conflict management come from the Western countries, the effectiveness of public participation has seldom been examined in China. Comparative studies in Shanghai and Hong Kong were conducted to examine public participation impact on environment NIMBY conflict and environmental conflict management. The results show that involved stakeholders, the degree of participation, participation approach and timing has impact. There is no public participation during the planning/project decision-making stage in both cases. In Mainland China, manipulation and therapy participation, few participation approach and late participation led negative impacts on public acceptance to NIMBY facilities. Based on the findings in the case studies, involving key stakeholders, enhancing the degree of participation, purposely participation approach and timing participation in the project lifecycle process are suggested for environment NIMBY conflict and environmental conflict management.