Research on the tripartite evolutionary game of public participation in the facility location of hazardous materials logistics from the perspective of NIMBY events

Abstract

Hazardous materials are important raw materials for economic, social and industrial production. With the increasing demand for hazardous materials, there is an increasing demand for facilities in the production, transfer, distribution and storage of hazardous materials in China. In recent years, there are frequent conflicts for the location of hazardous materials logistics at home and abroad. The conflicts not only lead to the delay or even cancellation of these projects, but also seriously endanger the local social and public security. At present, China's economy is in a period of rapid development, the public’s awareness of environmental rights has increased, and it is extremely sensitive to the location of hazardous materials logistics.The public participation in the decision-making stage of the NIMBY project can effectively prevent the NIMBY conflict. In order to improve the situation of public participation in the decision-making stage of NIMBY projects, this paper takes three main stakeholders in the decision-making stage of projects-local government, investors of hazardous materials logistics facilities and the surrounding public as the research objects, and uses evolutionary game theory to explore the influence of different interest demands on the strategic choices of the three parties. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to resolve the risk of social conflicts.