Abstract
The rapid urbanization process has brought many pollution NIMBY facilities, and the associated pollution NIMBY conflicts have become one of the important factors restricting social stability. With the advent of the media era, new media has become the main channel for the public to recognize risks and master information, which greatly aggravates the social amplification effect of NIMBY conflict risk. In this case, it is of great significance to explore the interest relationship among the local government, the new media, and the local people and their roles in the NIMBY conflict. Based on the stakeholder theory, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of the local government, the new media, and the local people and carries out numerical simulation on the evolutionary model using MATLAB. The results show that the local government adopts a certain degree of regulatory strategy for the new media, the new media adopts the strategy of publicizing facts, and the local people adopts the strategy of nonresistance, which are the stable strategy points of the evolutionary game among the three stakeholders in the NIMBY conflict. The local government’s intervention in rumors to a certain extent is conducive to promoting the new media to publicize facts of the pollution NIMBY facilities and to restrain the local people’s choice of resistance strategies. The local government’s punishment to the new media spreading rumors should be kept above a certain level to restrain the new media spreading rumors. When the local people’s resistance reaches a certain level, the local government’s intervention will break down and the new media will become hyperactive. The results of this paper can provide some enlightenment for the stakeholders in pollution NIMBY conflicts and deepen the understanding of multiple interest conflicts and their resolution. Finally, this study proposes to build information sharing mechanism, information communication mechanism, trust mechanism, network governance mechanism, and public participation mechanism, so as to resolve the construction risk of pollution NIMBY facilities and improve the overall social welfare level.
Highlights
Academic Editor: Paolo Bellavista e rapid urbanization process has brought many pollution NIMBY facilities, and the associated pollution NIMBY conflicts have become one of the important factors restricting social stability
In the literature on stakeholders in NIMBY conflict, the main objects of concern are local governments, construction enterprises, and local people. is paper argues that pollution NIMBY facilities, as public facilities with the nature of pollution, are public products provided by local governments for social development
This paper finds that the uneven distribution of interests and risks is the logical basis of pollution NIMBY conflict. erefore, it plays a key role in the governance of NIMBY conflict to clarify the interest relationship between the subjects of NIMBY conflict and realize the balance of interests of all parties. e evolutionary game model has been proved to be a promising tool for analyzing the interaction of stakeholders behind the construction of pollution NIMBY facilities
Summary
In the pollution NIMBY conflicts, the government, NIMBY enterprises (project developers), the public, nongovernmental organizations (such as environmental NGOs), media, experts, and other subjects are the key stakeholders and participants, and their interactive relationship is complex [42, 43]. Kang and Du [56] expanded the research boundary and built an evolutionary game model to explore the interest relationship between the government, NIMBY facility construction enterprises, and the surrounding resident. Most of the existing studies focus on the government or the public, while ignoring the impact of new media on the construction of pollution NIMBY facilities and the evolution of NIMBY conflict. Based on the above research, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of local government, new media, and local people to analyze the impact of different evolutionary behaviors of different stakeholders on NIMBY conflict. By systematically summarizing the behavior evolution and influence of stakeholders in pollution NIMBY conflict, it provides means to eliminate conflict for the construction of NIMBY facilities in the new media environment
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