Metaphysical Concepts Research Articles

Истоки методологических дискуссий 20-30-х годов в советской судебной психиатрии

In a historical review with the aim of analyzing the role of psychiatrists in criminological studies of the 1920–1930s, their views on the problems of insanity, social danger and approaches to the study of the personality of a criminal are considered. The correlation of these ideas with sociological and anthropological trends is traced within the framework of the positive school of criminal law, which denied the metaphysical concept of free will and, accordingly, the categories of guilt and sanity. It is shown, however, that uniting these approaches with the subsequent development of forensic psychiatry was the desire to create its natural science foundation.

A Study of Scale Effects in Discrete Scaled Dynamic Systems

Scaled experimentation is an important experimental approach for the investigation of complex systems. Unfortunately, scaling suffers scale effects, where changes in behaviour with scale can be so significant to undermine any scaled investigation. The state-of-the-art in scaled experimentation remains dimensional analysis, which unfortunately offers no solution to scale effects and consequently scaled experiments although important provide only limited usefulness at the present time.This paper is concerned with a new approach to scaled experimentation founded on the theory of finite similitude applied to discrete mechanical systems. The new theory applies the metaphysical concept of space scaling, where objects, prototypes, systems, experimental apparatus and facilities are scaled by the means of space contraction or expansion. Although space scaling is clearly practically impossible, what is possible is an assessment of the effects of space scaling on the governing physics and a comparison with real experimental behaviours.It is shown in the paper how the new theory accounts for all scale dependencies and unlike dimensional analysis is able to accommodate known scale effects. It provides also alternative scale-invariances that cater for the situation where scale effects are present but unknown. This aspect is the focus here with application of first-order finite similitude to simple mechanical-dynamic systems, an approach that requires two scaled experiments at two distinct scales. It is demonstrated how it is possible by means of two scaled experiments to represent behaviours at the full scaled that hitherto would have been deemed impossible with traditional dimensional analysis.

On the Explanatory Power of Dispositional Realism

The article focuses on the unifying and explanatory power of the selective realism defended by Anjan Chakravartty. Our main aim is twofold. First, we critically analyse the purported synthesis between entity realism and structural realism offered by the author. We give reasons to think that this unification is an inconvenient marriage. In the second step, we deal with certain controversial aspects of the intended unification among three metaphysical concepts: causation, laws of nature and natural kinds. After pointing out that Chakravartty’s conception of laws is a plausible view that a scientific realist might endorse, we contend, on the contrary, that the concept of natural kind is dispensable in the framework of Chakravartty’s realism.

Metafísica em tempos de pandemia: consolo schopenhaueriano para o espanto em face da morte

O ponto central do presente artigo consiste em aplicar o conceito schopenhaueriano de metafísica ao contexto atual da pandemia de covid-19, com o intuito principal de proporcionar um consolo ao indivíduo angustiado com medo da morte.

Begriff (Concept)

The lexeme Begriff marks Goethe’s ongoing reconstruction of the traditional philosophical concept across a variety of disciplinary practices. In its most developed articulations, it also works transcendentally to establish the conditions of possibility for thought and intelligibility on a dynamic plane of verbal experimentation and reinvention that cuts immanently through the world. Unlike the clear and distinct concepts of rationalist metaphysics, which function as fixed universals beyond the reach of the senses, Goethe’s extensive usages and ongoing conceptualizations of Begriff draw on an expressive power within language to generate sequences of cognitive moves and moments of transitional understanding that stand in close relation to each other and can be gathered in graded series to be saved for further observation, description, reflection, and reconfiguration. Through its successive linguistic manifestations, moreover, and in line with Goethe’s heterodox approach to systematic philosophy, Begriff lays out force fields of verbal and philosophical activity and discovery with fluid and permeable borders. In ways comparable to the power of reflective judgment in Kant’s third critique, which dispenses with the categories of the understanding and their determining judgments to work intuitively within the world of living forms (Gestalten), Goethe’s lebendiger Begriff (living concept) proves to be a more encompassing structure of thought and its processes than the conceptual machinery of orthodox metaphysical systems with their regulatory regimes of limit-setting terms. Redeployed as an experimental object of experience, Begriff is, therefore, also anschaulich (visual, accessible to intuition). By offering a dynamic perspective onto the fugitive things of the world—including its thought things—it continually reveals the hidden secrets of its own perpetual becomings.

A first order finite similitude approach to scaled aseismic structures

For many decades the designs of earthquake-resistant (aseismic) structures have been influenced by scaled experiments, underpinned by the theory of dimensional analysis. Although scaled experiments still play an important role, they are recognised to suffer shortcomings, which are particularly severe when scaling ratios are pronounced. The issue is one of scale effects and the inability of dimensional analysis to offer any solution in their presence.This paper is concerned with a new theory for the analysis of aseismic structures that is founded on the metaphysical concept of space scaling, where beams, substructures or buildings etc. are contracted through the mechanism of space contraction. Although space contraction is evidently practically impossible the theory describes the effects of such a process on the underpinning governing mechanics involved. Unlike dimensional analysis the approach which is termed finite similitude embraces scale effects and accounts for them by linking experiments at more than one scale.It is demonstrated in this work how it is possible to reconstruct full-scale behaviour by means of two scaled experiments of a selected beam, column and multi-storey structure when subjected to dynamic loading conditions.

Do We Need a Metaphysics of Morals?

This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.

Wittgensteins vergebliche Suche nach einer Methode der Metaphysik Betrachtungen anlässlich des einhundertjährigen Jubiläums der Erstveröffentlichung des Tractatus

As we celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the first publication of the Tractatus, I take a look back at this foundational work of the analytic philosophical tradition. In particular, I examine Wittgenstein’s conception of metaphysics in this work and explore the question of what Wittgenstein considers to be the correct method of metaphysics. As a careful analysis shows, the Tractatus suggests at least three completely different methods of metaphysics: arguing by transcendental argument, logical analysis of the propositions of our language, and some kind of immediate insight. None of them seems to work within the framework of the book: transcendental arguments are ruled out by the infamous proposition 6.54, according to which there are no meaningful philosophical arguments. Logical analysis is declared to be part of a mere application of logic that falls outside the scope of the Tractatus. And immediate insight looks like a dubious fallback position that cannot be made plausible and does not meet Wittgenstein’s own standards for justification. All in all, the method of metaphysics in the Tractatus remains unclear.

There is no actual problem of other minds

I shall argue that you can substantially refute the most persuasive variety of solipsism by taking its most plausible version seriously, and then showing that it is not rational to hold, once one understands the nature of metaphysical commitments. In the first section, I argue that the only viable form of solipsism involves de dicto self-reference. In the second, I argue that this position involves a claim of contingent identity, for which some actual worlds are those where solipsism is not the case. The basis of the argument is a conception of metaphysics which treats the study of reality as the study of the universal features of actually possible worlds (i.e., realistic necessity).

Disciplinary discourses of globalization in the horizon of lack of meaning: “challenge” and the search for an “response”

The overlapping disciplinary discourses of globalization are built in the perspective of the absence of its concept; the concept presupposes the disclosure of meaning, that is, a philosophical interpretation. The representation of the globalization of the form of modernity actualizes its philosophical understanding and sets the perspective for defining its concept; concepts of the “third era of liberation” I.G. Fichte, “the era of nihilism” F. Nietzsche and M. Heidegger’s “closing period of modern times” are presented as the horizon of the philosophical interpretation of globalization as planetarism, the essential (conceptual) features of which are “destruction of space” as the removal of boundaries and “compression of time” to total modernity, provided by technology as the arche of modernity. In a metaphysical concept, there is a combination of the real and the actual, which for the new time is essentially subjective; the new European subject and the idea of technology are one essence and there is a beginning from which modernity unfolds and is interpreted, which remains for modernity itself both “unnecessary” and “impossible” (M. Heidegger). The article demonstrates the impossibility of the concept of globalization for the dominant view of modernity in the economic paradigm (J. Agamben) and the essential non-reality of Heidegger’s concept of planetarism for modern disciplinarily arranged science. It is concluded that the real challenge is the impossibility of comprehension with the absolute exclusion of the possibility of a response.

Metaphysics Supervenes on Logic: The Role of the Logical Forms in Hegel's "Replacement" of Metaphysics

In this paper, I seek to explain Hegel's view that his "logic" replaces metaphysics. I argue that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism in book III of The Science of Logic is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts discussed in books I and II of the Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction." In addition to illustrating the dependence of metaphysics on logic, the present interpretation provides a new picture of the structure of Hegel's Logic that emphasizes the explanatory priority of its Doctrine of the Concept.

On Peirce’s Earliest Conception of Metaphysics

In this paper, I explore Peirce’s initial conception of metaphysics as developed in his “Treatise on Metaphysics” (1861–2: W 1.57–84). Peirce claimed therein that the idea of metaphysics was three-fold, with its three perspectives consisting of its definition, object, and method. Since Peirce defined metaphysics as the “philosophy of primal truths” (1861: W 1.59), I initially focus on elaborating upon what these “primal truths” are and illustrate that they are analytical propositions resulting from the logical analysis of the general constitution of a mental state (an image) to its elements. Next, I give account of how Peirce’s thoughts regarding the justification of metaphysical propositions resulted in his concluding that in metaphysical knowledge, like in any other, there is an element of faith. Finally, I conclude with remarks regarding Peirce’s notion of reflexivity as it is employed in his metametaphysics.

The Constitution of the Human Person as Discovery and Awakening

Scholars strive, in their treatment of Stein’s work, to express both a phenomenological concept of the human person, characterized by conscious and free spiritual activity, and a metaphysical concept of the person, seen as an individual essence unfolding throughout life. In Stein’s work, the two concepts are not simply juxtaposed, nor is there a shift from one to the other. Stein integrates her phenomenological research into a metaphysical framework. In the present contribution, I endeavor to show that Stein’s interpretation of Husserl’s concept of constitution focuses on the question of whether this constitution is to be understood realistically or idealistically and on the question of the constituting subject. I shall argue that Stein’s interpretation of constitution is closely linked to the lived experience she calls already in her early writings “self-discovery” and “awakening.”

Метафизика бытия информации

In article the metaphysics of being of information is considered and her cat­egorical status. The concept of information plays an especially important role in cognitive disciplines – neurology, cognitive psychology, sociology and arti­ficial intelligence theories altogether forming the scientific basis of new epi­stemology. Information is understood as the objective reality perceived by the subject by means of touch bodies which it fixes and comprehends by means of various semantic pro-positions, logical-mathematical operations and calculations, using it in various communicative practices for achievement of the purposes. On the basis of philosophical traditions of interpretation of cat­egory of life and various interpretations of this abstract concept of modern nat­ural sciences the new understanding of category of life as a basic metaphysical concept of science is offered. The philosophical bases of the theory of creative participation of the person in events of the Universe the famous American physicist-theorist J.A. Wheeler who put forward the thesis “all from Bit” (It from Bit), the information paradigm of the universe developed by the prom­inent modern philosopher L. Floridi. It is demonstrated that the origination and evolution of all objects takes place due to the existence of specific information programs that express the fundamental creativity of the nature. The statement that the category of life in modern interpretation both in natural-science, and in sociocultural aspects expresses life of information, or the information life presented in unity of three spheres of reality – matter, lives and consciousness (reason) is proved.

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism

The article examines the question of whether L. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus had any influence on the formation and development of logical positivism. It is shown that the members of the Vienna Circle were familiar with the Tractatus, but practically did not accept anything from its content. Wittgenstein's reasoning about the world, about facts, about the structure of fact were rejected by them as a bad metaphysics, with which they fought. The denial of causality and the deprivation of the meaning of scientific laws could not be accepted by representatives of logical positivism, whose main task was the logical analysis of the language of science in order to cleanse it of metaphysical concepts and build a unified science on a solid empirical foundation. If the members of the Vienna Circle were even familiar with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, then representatives of the Berlin Group, the Lvov-Warsaw School, the Uppsala School and supporters of logical positivism in other countries hardly heard of it. This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein's Tractatus did not have any impact on the logical positivism.

Metaphysics of a forgotten tradition I. Introduction of the concept of “intrinsic modus of thing” by John Duns Scotus: From the theological explication of “infinity” to the metaphysical problem of “contraction of being”

The article is the first part of a study on the notion of the “intrinsic modus” of thing or reality in the metaphysics of the early Scotist tradition (first quarter of the 14th century). This part of the study analyses the circumstances of the first formulation of the notion of “modus intrinsecus” in the theological writings of John Duns Scotus and identifies two main (and one additional) contexts for Scotus’s explication of this concept, which will be important for the subsequent Scotistic tradition of meta[1]physics. The article then puts forward a hypothesis about a historical shift in the use of this concept based on an analysis of Scotus’s texts. Scotus initially introduces it solely for a theological explanation of the concept of “infinite being”, but later, in connection with his discussion of the reality of the concept of being, uses the concept of intrinsic mode as key to his own solution to the metaphysical problem of the “contraction” of the transcendental concept of being, which he thinks of as a particular “modification”. Finally, the article identifies the main structural elements in Scotus’s discussion of “intrinsic mode” and attempts to present the content of this concept by distinguishing between intrinsic mode and Scotus’s other related metaphysical concepts (quiddity, difference, property).

Politics of Cultural Conversion in Colonialist African Cinema

Politics of Cultural Conversion in Colonialist African Cinema Femi Okiremuete Shaka (bio) Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. Lesley Banks and Paul Robeson in Sanders of the River (dir. Zoltán Korda, 1935, United Kingdom). Image courtesy of the author. For some time now, the cinematic practices of Africa have often been assessed as a unified cinematic practice—one which was essentially colonialist. Historians and critics of African cinema have often overlooked the need to make a distinction between the two divergent cinematic practices, colonial African instructional cinema and colonialist African cinema, which existed side by side during the colonial era. Colonial African instructional cinema was a governmental and non-governmental agency [End Page 61] sponsored cinema that treats the medium essentially as a vehicle for social mobilization and public education. In most of its productions, the medium is used as a vehicle for teaching Africans modern methods of agriculture, medication, banking, taxation, personal hygiene, urban planning and development, youth mobilization, community self-help schemes, etc. The films do not represent Africans as lacking knowledge of these things; rather, they represent them as doing things in the old-fashioned traditional ways. The emphasis therefore is on using the medium as an aid to the process of modernization. On the other hand, colonialist African cinema was/is sponsored essentially by private commercial interests, and it lays claim to Africa through representation of colonialist conventionalized stereotypes of Africans in European culture. Thus the lack of any systematically argued critical criteria or theoretical propositions for qualifying a film as African or otherwise meant that the criticism of African cinema has often been silent, and has neglected several important issues necessary for a proper appraisal of the field. It is not the objective of this study to propose a theoretical framework for the criticism of postcolonial African cinema. By properly distinguishing between the two types of Colonial cinematic practices, and by further comparing both practices with contemporary African cinematic practices, the roots of current practices will not only be formally established, but their distinctive features will also become apparent. In essence, I will try to define the various practices that preceded contemporary African cinema. I have attempted to map out some of the methodological problems plaguing the criticism of African cinema, as well as to provide the critical criteria for distinguishing between the two types of cinematic traditions. I have also examined the historical background of colonialist African cinema and undertaken an analysis of Zoltán Korda's Sanders of the River (1935, United Kingdom) as a case study of cinematic practice. Certain terms require definition. By colonialist African discourse/cinema, I mean both continental and diasporic European representations of Africans that use European metaphysical concepts, its moral values, ethics, and aesthetics, to judge through representation those of Africa as inferior imitations or types of European originals. I will be using the term "colonialist" to qualify and distinguish this mode of discourse in order to avoid generalizations that would otherwise give the wrong impression that all European representations of Africa and Africans are colonialist. Above all, I am using the term "African" to qualify the African experience in colonialist discourse in general. This is the sense in which I will be using terms such as colonialist African discourse, colonialist African literature and colonialist African cinema. [End Page 62] Methodological Problems in the Criticism of Colonialist African Cinema The study of colonialist African cinema, unlike colonialist African literature, upon which the majority of its texts are based, has remained a neglected area in African film scholarship. Studies that have been carried out on the representation of Africans in cinema deal essentially with the images of African Americans in American cinema. Studies such as those carried out by Noble, Mapp, Bogle, Leab, Cripps, Nesteby, etc., deal only tangentially with Africa by virtue of the African origin of African Americans. The only exception in this regard is Richard Maynard's work, Africa on Film, Myth and Reality. However this collection of essays by historians, anthropologists, and journalists pursues arguments that seem to equate representation with reality. Stam and Spence have questioned the validity of such a methodological approach to colonialist filmic studies: these studies...

Компьютерный поворот в философии XXI в. (Размышления над книгой Йоханнеса Ленхарда «Сюрпризы вычислений. Философия компьютерных симуляций»)

In 2019, a new book by Lenhard was published. Lenhard attempts to separate computer simulations from classical mathematical modeling. Structuring in three parts the accumulated over the years research material, Lenhard correctly, with­out undertaking the construction of revolutionary metaphysical concepts, ac­quaints the reader with the new world of the philosophy of computer simula­tions. In the first part, the author reveals the thesis that computer simulations are a completely new, previously unknown, type of mathematical modeling. The second part focuses on the conceptual epistemic transformations of mathe­matical modeling from the perspective of the phenomenon of computer simula­tions. This part also deals with the verification methods that are used in scientific experiments: verification and validation. In the third part, Lenhard, questioning the purely scientific rational way of knowing, tries to grope for the contours of new methods, the specificity of which is due to the use of computer simulations in scientific research practice. In this review, I will analyze the main problems that Lenhard identifies in his book as the most important for understanding the philosophical essence of computer simulations.

Synergetic approach to macroeconomic studies

This paper confirms the principal possibility of using synergetics in macroeconomic studies. It noted that the presence in economic systems of all science typologies requires using subjects of natural and engineering sciences for the study of economic objects as well. Ignoring this fact hinders the development of fundamental economic knowledge and, as consequence, conditions the use of metaphysical concepts in developed models. Since the above interdisciplinarity is inherent in synergetics, its applicability in macroeconomics is considered. On the example of modeling economic systems, it is demonstrated that their essence (nonlinear space-time structure) corresponds to the basic provisions of synergetics. Therefore, its tools are eligible in the tasks of macroeconomic analysis. As an example, this paper proposes the stochastic model of economic cycles explaining their phenomenon as well as providing the quantitative (parametric) description of cycles. Novelty of the model describing the cycles as random oscillations is tied to the probabilistic description of the investment function and the perception of the economic system as a material object with certain inherent properties. According to a proposed model, the income oscillations are induced by both exogenous (investment fluctuations) and endogenous (economic system elasticity) causes. The values of fluctuations of the income function around its longterm trend relate to the value of intensity of investment fluctuations as well as the gain (efficiency) of the economic system. The duration of the cycle is related to the inclusive wealth of the system and its dynamic factor, which characterizes the system’s ability to withstand investment fluctuations as well as to eliminate their consequences. Prospects of practical applications of the considered model were demonstrated on the example of cycle management.

Daly’s critique of intelligibility of the concept of grounding

The great interest in the metaphysical concept of grounding during last decade in contemporary metaphysics had brought to the appearance of those authors who do not share the same enthusiasm as it?s proponents. In this paper, we deal with one such skeptical position defended by Chris Daly). His fundamental objections are based on the idea that the concept of grounding is unintelligible, that is, that the proponents of grounding failed to show that it is intelligible. In the first part of the paper, I will give a broad overview of basic characteristics of the concept of grounding and its theoretical function, while, in the second part, I will consider Daly?s main objections to it and attempt to answer them. In concluding considerations I will sum up my main points and conclude that Daly?s objections are not sufficiently strong to question the intelligibility of the talk of grounding.