Abstract
I shall argue that you can substantially refute the most persuasive variety of solipsism by taking its most plausible version seriously, and then showing that it is not rational to hold, once one understands the nature of metaphysical commitments. In the first section, I argue that the only viable form of solipsism involves de dicto self-reference. In the second, I argue that this position involves a claim of contingent identity, for which some actual worlds are those where solipsism is not the case. The basis of the argument is a conception of metaphysics which treats the study of reality as the study of the universal features of actually possible worlds (i.e., realistic necessity).
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