Wittgensteins vergebliche Suche nach einer Methode der Metaphysik Betrachtungen anlässlich des einhundertjährigen Jubiläums der Erstveröffentlichung des Tractatus

Abstract

As we celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of the first publication of the Tractatus, I take a look back at this foundational work of the analytic philosophical tradition. In particular, I examine Wittgenstein’s conception of metaphysics in this work and explore the question of what Wittgenstein considers to be the correct method of metaphysics. As a careful analysis shows, the Tractatus suggests at least three completely different methods of metaphysics: arguing by transcendental argument, logical analysis of the propositions of our language, and some kind of immediate insight. None of them seems to work within the framework of the book: transcendental arguments are ruled out by the infamous proposition 6.54, according to which there are no meaningful philosophical arguments. Logical analysis is declared to be part of a mere application of logic that falls outside the scope of the Tractatus. And immediate insight looks like a dubious fallback position that cannot be made plausible and does not meet Wittgenstein’s own standards for justification. All in all, the method of metaphysics in the Tractatus remains unclear.