Transferable Vote Research Articles

Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How?

Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a third and chanceless candidate in a 2-candidate race, and the possibility to win a 3-candidate election through different kinds of strategic voting. Here the focus is on the strategy in single-winner elections, where the win is obtained by ranking a main competitor artificially low. Condorcet methods are compared with the major alternatives (Borda Count, Approval Voting, Instant Runoff Voting). Various Condorcet methods are studied, and one method is proposed that minimizes the number of noncyclic profiles where burying is possible.

Condorcet efficiency with adaptive parties in a spatial model

Several recent articles analyze the decision rules that politicians use to adjust their policy strategies in response to past election results and to rival candidates/parties’ strategies. Findings presented in these articles shed light on the expediency of using alternative voting systems from the viewpoint of their potential to produce an election winner preferable in a particular sense or according to a particular criterion. We consider one such criterion, the Condorcet criterion, which evaluates the ability of the candidates to defeat all others in a series of pair-wise votes. We assume that voters choose the candidate (party) based on the candidates’ announced policies, and we report results of a computer simulation of adaptive politicians competing in a multi-dimensional issue space. Our simulation findings suggest that voting systems’ Condorcet efficiencies vary significantly with the decision rules that the competing politicians employ to adjust their policy strategies. Our findings also suggest that, consistent with conclusions reported in earlier research by Merrill, voting systems’ Condorcet efficiencies depend on the degree of spatial dispersion between the parties or candidates contesting the election.

A taxonomy of runoff methods

We look at ways of classifying runoff methods in terms of characteristics such as number of rounds, rules used to determine which candidates advance to the next round, and rules which determine the final winner. We also compare runoffs and so-called instant runoffs such as the alternative vote.

Supplementary vote; analysis, applications, and alternatives

The Supplementary Vote (SV) was invented as a compromise between the two-round runoff system and the alternative vote. This paper shows that in many ways it is not. Under SV voters rank order a limited number of candidates. If one candidate is supported by over 50% of the voters he/she is declared the winner. Otherwise, all but the top two candidates are eliminated from the contest. Then, all second preferences of voters are taken into account. The candidate winning most first and second votes is declared the winner. SV violates fundamental criteria used to evaluate electoral systems and is difficult for voters. The paper discusses an alternative to SV which avoids at least some of its most apparent flaws.

Note Onset Detection via Nonnegative Factorization of Magnitude Spectrum

A novel approach for onset detection of musical notes from audio signals is presented. In contrast to most commonly used conventional approaches, the proposed method features new detection functions constructed from the linear temporal bases that are obtained from the decomposition of musical spectra using nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF). Three forms of detection function, namely, first-order difference function, psychoacoustically motivated relative difference function, and constant-balanced relative difference function, are considered. As the approach works directly on input data, no prior knowledge or statistical information is therefore required. Practical issues, including the choice of the factorization rank and detection robustness to instruments, are also examined experimentally. Due to the scalability issue with the generated nonnegative matrix, the proposed method is only applied to relatively short, single instrument (or voice) recordings. Numerical examples are provided to show the good performance of the proposed method, including comparisons between the three detection functions.

Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia

Scholars have long noted that states with significant ethnic cleavages face difficult obsta cles to maintenance of democracy and that these problems are most severe in new democracies.1 As a result, scholars have looked primarily to institutions as a means to help ethnically divided states overcome these obstacles and successfully implant democ racy in face of deep ethnic cleavages.2 Achieving broad representation of different ethnic groups has important implications for stability and quality of democracy, particularly in polities just emerging out of long peri ods of authoritarian rule.3 Legislative representation carries powerful symbolic power for ethnic minorities and often becomes an end in itself even when minorities have little or no chance of participating in governing coalition.4 It is often taken as a matter of faith that proportional representation (PR) increases minority representation while electoral systems with single member districts (SMD) exclude minorities from legislative representation. Lijphart argues that proportional rep resentation, for example, is not only better than single member districts but is superior to all other electoral institutions (for example, alternative vote, reserved seats for minor ity groups, and mixed electoral systems) in promoting minority representation.5 While advocates of proportional representation acknowledge possibility that minorities can gain representation under certain conditions in other electoral systems, it is still viewed as providing crucial advantages. As Lijphart explains, the beauty of PR is that in addi tion to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups-eth nic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups-in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion. Why deviate from full PR at all?6 Despite scholarly consensus in favor of proportional representation, there is sur prisingly little empirical evidence that PR systems provide better representation of ethnic minorities than SMD systems.7 This article offers a model of electoral system effects on minority representation and a set of hypotheses concerning how PR and SMD electoral rules will affect different categories of ethnic minorities under certain conditions. Patterns of minority representation under PR and SMD electoral arrangements are then

Where have all the parties gone? Fraenkel and Grofman on the alternative vote – yet again

The alternative vote (AV) is a preferential electoral system that tends to reward political moderation and compromise. Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a, 2006b) have repeatedly attempted to show that AV is not conducive to interethnic moderation in severely divided societies. In this response to their latest attempt, I point out that neither political party coordination of the vote nor strategic voting plays any part in their analysis. In contrast, I explain how moderate parties of one ethnic group are able to induce their supporters to cast ballots for moderate parties supported by voters of another ethnic group. I also explain why the incentives for parties to arrange interethnic vote transfers are much greater under AV than they are under systems such as the single transferable vote, which is in use in Northern Ireland, and I show that Fraenkel and Grofman”s interpretations of AV’s operation in Australia, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Papua-New Guinea are contrary to the evidence.

The merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz

In Professor Horowitz’s rejoinders (2004, 2006) to Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a), he mischaracterizes our formal results, retreats from previous claims about the conditions for the alternative vote electoral system to generate centripetal outcomes, renders explicit his dubious assumptions about voter behavior in divided societies, and greatly exaggerates the global evidence in support of pro-moderation outcomes under the alternative vote. Here we respond to Horowitz's (2004), criticism in this journal of the formal model of Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) and to the broader defense in Horowitz (2006) of majoritarian vote pooling arrangements as means of mitigating ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies.

Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections

After six sets of European Parliament elections, do voters primarily use these elections to punish their national governments or to express their views on European issues? We answer this question by looking at all European elections (1979–2004) in all 25 EU states. We find that almost 40% of the volatility in party vote-shares in European elections compared to national elections is explained by the transfer of votes from large and governing parties to small and opposition parties. Nevertheless, anti-EU parties and green parties on average do better in European elections than in national elections. But these “European effects” are minor, and the position a party takes on Europe is largely irrelevant to its performance. Hence, despite the growing powers of the European Parliament, neither positions on matters regarding European integration, nor on matters regarding “normal” left-right policy, have much of an effect on electoral outcomes.

Decision Difficulty and Illusion of Transparency in Japanese University Students

People tend to believe that their inner thoughts are readily apparent to others. This study was conducted to examine effects, related to the difficulty of making decisions of personal preference, on the illusion of transparency, that is, the tendency people have to regard their own preference as more apparent to others when they have made their decision easily as opposed to situations in which they felt their decision to be difficult. In three studies in which the customary "transparency" experimental paradigm was used, university students were asked to rank choices of wedding dresses (Studies 1 and 3) or Korean movie stars (Study 2). Analysis suggested that the less difficulty participants felt in making their judgments (the first and last preference vs mid-ranking preference), the more they expected judgments to be transparent, especially when they had the clear intent to convey their thoughts to others. However, observers discerned first preferences no better than mid-ranking preferences. How inner subjective information contributes to the illusion of transparency is also discussed.

The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting

Problems of multicandidate races in U.S. presidential elections motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not previously been recognized that the first four presidential elections (1788–1800) were conducted using a variant of approval voting. That experiment ended disastrously in 1800 with the infamous Electoral College tie between Jefferson and Burr. The tie, this paper shows, resulted less from miscalculation than from a strategic tension built into approval voting, which forces two leaders appealing to the same voters to play a game of Chicken. Because the Burr Dilemma poses a significant difficulty for approval voting, this paper urges that researchers give more attention to “instant runoff” reform options, especially the alternative vote and the Coombs rule.

How Does Separability Affect The Desirability Of Referendum Election Outcomes?

Recent research has shown that in referendum elections, the presence of interdependence within voter preferences can lead to election outcomes that are undesirable and even paradoxical. However, most of the examples leading to these undesirable outcomes involve contrived voting situations that would be unlikely to occur in actual elections. In this paper, we use computer simulations to investigate the desirability of referendum election outcomes. We show that highly undesirable election outcomes occur not only in contrived examples, but also in randomly generated elections. Our data suggest that the presence of interdependent preferences significantly increases the likelihood of such undesirable outcomes, and that certain alternative voting methods, such as sequential voting and setwise aggregation, hold the potential to produce outcomes that more accurately reflect the will of the electorate.

A decision model for junction improvement schemes

The selection of appropriate junction improvement schemes is somewhat complex, as most decisions involve multiple objectives, and several decision-makers are subject to stakeholders' review. Usually a subjective engineering judgement process is adopted for selecting new road alignment designs, and so the need arose for a generic decision model to be developed to support engineers and decision-makers in selecting the optimal design solution. This contribution uses multiple-criteria decision-making based on the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) as a means of adopting a formalised and systematic decision framework. The paper also discusses issues relating to inconsistency analyses and model validation. The practical value of the decision framework presented is that it allows the decision-maker to rank choices in the order of their effectiveness in meeting conflicting objectives or priorities.

Strategy Takes a Holiday

The alternative vote (AV) is an electoral system that tends to produce centripetal effects. It therefore has some potential to foster interethnic compromise and coalition in severely divided societies. Fraenkel and Grofman's attempt to show that AV will not “necessarily” and “uniformly” produce moderate results refutes a proposition that has not been advanced and does so on the basis of assumptions contrary to those specified by proponents of AV's generally moderating propensities. Fraenkel and Grofman's examination of two elections under AV in Fiji is based on perverse interpretations of the data and embodies a serious underestimate of the extent to which strategic behavior can support interethnic moderation.

Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies?

Using insights from social choice theory, particularly Black's concept of single-peaked preferences and Downs's median-voter model, the authors previously investigated the theoretical impact of the alternative vote system (AV) on the success of moderate parties in an ethnically bipolar society. Focusing on the simplest case, that with one moderate and one extremist ethnic party associated with each of the two ethnic groups, they found that for AV to necessarily yield outcomes that favor moderate parties there must be majority support for moderation and voter preferences that are single peaked with respect to the ethnic-conflict-defined dimension. Here, the authors test these assumptions with data from the 1999 and 2001 elections in Fiji, an ethnically bipolar society. They show that Fiji's objective of ameliorating ethnic divisions by the adoption of AV was not successful. In elections in 1999 and 2001, moderate parties would have fared better under a proportional representation system.

The Failure of the Alternative Vote as a Tool for Ethnic Moderation in Fiji

In Donald Horowitz's rejoinder to Fraenkel and Grofman, he retreats from his previous claims about the desirability of alternative vote (AV), mischaracterizes our formal results, and nowhere addresses the extreme disproportionality of electoral outcomes in Fiji except to incorrectly dismiss this as due largely to malapportionment. Although he refuses to recognize the role AV played in the build-up to the overthrow of the Indian-led government in May 2000, Horowitz does acknowledge that the system he so strongly urged on Fiji's reformers failed to achieve its intended objectives at the elections of August 2001.

Electing women to Parliament: Fiji and the alternative vote electoral system

In many places in the world, women struggle to be heard and, when it comes to having a voice in the highest authority in the land, the difficulties in some countries can be almost insurmountable. Women in Fiji are confronting the problem of women’s representation in Parliament. With only a small number of women (7.04 percent) in the House of Representatives, what changes could the citizens of Fiji make to remedy this lack of female representation? One answer that could be considered is for Fijian lawmakers to make amendments to the alternative vote electoral system, a variation on preferential voting. The alternative vote falls into the same simple plurality category as first-past-the-post, a system notoriously unfriendly to women candidates.

Everything That Can be Counted Does Not Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System

This article investigates how the choice of a voting system impacts the right to vote. It presents the first comprehensive summary of the usage of alternative voting systems in the United States and also the first comprehensive summary of the caselaw on voting systems. Two aspects of the right to vote are considered: the right to an equally effective vote and the right to a reliable electoral outcome. The right to an equally effective of vote is considered as a generalization and unification of disparate but related rights. The only voting system that clearly violates this right is at-large voting. Commentators have previously criticized the discriminatory effects of at-large voting, but not in the last twenty years. This article takes a fresh look at the legal viability of at-large voting in light of the Supreme Court's more recent jurisprudence. The right to a reliable electoral outcome is a heretofore undefined but eminently reasonable right. If nothing else, the outcome of an election must be meaningful in some sense. From a survey of the Supreme Court's election law jurisprudence, notably the Anderson balancing test, a middle-level review or reasonableness test is proposed to regulate the right to a reliable outcome. This article then applies this right to several voting systems, shows when they would violate this right, and suggests possible remedies.

Another Consideration in Minority Vote Dilution Remedies: Rent-Seeking

In some areas of the United States, racial and ethnic minorities have been effectively excluded from the democratic process by a variety of means, including electoral laws. In some instances, the Courts have sought to remedy this problem by imposing alternative voting methods, such as cumulative voting. I examine several voting methods with regard to their sensitivity to rent-seeking. Methods which are less sensitive to rent-seeking are preferred because they involve less social waste, and are less likely to be co-opted by special interest groups. I find that proportional representation methods, rather than semi-proportional ones, such as cumulative voting, are relatively insensitive to rent-seeking efforts, and thus preferable. I also suggest that an even less sensitive method, the proportional lottery, may be appropriate for use within deliberative bodies, where proportional representation is inapplicable and minority vote dilution otherwise remains an intractable problem.

Bringing the election to the voters with instant runoff voting

Bringing the election to the voters with instant runoff voting