Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia

Abstract

Scholars have long noted that states with significant ethnic cleavages face difficult obsta cles to maintenance of democracy and that these problems are most severe in new democracies.1 As a result, scholars have looked primarily to institutions as a means to help ethnically divided states overcome these obstacles and successfully implant democ racy in face of deep ethnic cleavages.2 Achieving broad representation of different ethnic groups has important implications for stability and quality of democracy, particularly in polities just emerging out of long peri ods of authoritarian rule.3 Legislative representation carries powerful symbolic power for ethnic minorities and often becomes an end in itself even when minorities have little or no chance of participating in governing coalition.4 It is often taken as a matter of faith that proportional representation (PR) increases minority representation while electoral systems with single member districts (SMD) exclude minorities from legislative representation. Lijphart argues that proportional rep resentation, for example, is not only better than single member districts but is superior to all other electoral institutions (for example, alternative vote, reserved seats for minor ity groups, and mixed electoral systems) in promoting minority representation.5 While advocates of proportional representation acknowledge possibility that minorities can gain representation under certain conditions in other electoral systems, it is still viewed as providing crucial advantages. As Lijphart explains, the beauty of PR is that in addi tion to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups-eth nic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups-in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion. Why deviate from full PR at all?6 Despite scholarly consensus in favor of proportional representation, there is sur prisingly little empirical evidence that PR systems provide better representation of ethnic minorities than SMD systems.7 This article offers a model of electoral system effects on minority representation and a set of hypotheses concerning how PR and SMD electoral rules will affect different categories of ethnic minorities under certain conditions. Patterns of minority representation under PR and SMD electoral arrangements are then