Incumbent Leaders Research Articles

Judicial recruitment in post-communist context: informal dynamics and façade reforms

ABSTRACT This article focuses on judicial recruitment in post-communist countries and highlights gaps between law and practice which are due to intervening informal dynamics. The case study on Georgia is suitable to explore the power of informality in increasingly formalized systems of decision-making and also in the ones that allocate considerable powers to judges. The article draws inspiration from and contributes to the limited but growing scholarship on informality in judicial governance. It relies on extensive empirical research to discern informal criteria and methods for selecting judges which embody the interests and preferences of the judicial elite and turn elaborate formal rules and procedures into the convenient façade that covers up informal dealings. It signals that recruitment mechanisms, even if structured to eliminate independence-threatening dynamics, can emerge as means of perpetuating the mentality of conformity and help prevent the consolidation of counter-elites willing and able to challenge the dominance of the incumbent leadership.

In the Shadows of Great Men: Leadership Turnovers and Power Dynamics in Autocracies

Political leaders differ considerably in the degree to which they consolidate power, but what gives rise to these variations still remains under-theorized. This article studies how informal political constraints associated with leadership turnovers shape intra-elite power dynamics. We argue that aging leaders’ efforts to manage the succession problem create an important, yet impermanent check on the power of subsequent leaders. To test this argument, we use the massive text corpus of Google Ngram to develop a new quantitative measure of power for a global sample of autocratic regime leaders and elites between 1950 and 2019, and employ a research design that leverages within-leader variations in predecessors’ influence for identification. We show that incumbent leaders' ability to consolidate power becomes more limited when operating in an environment where influential former leaders are present. Further analyses suggest that the presence of former leaders is most effective in reducing incumbents’ ability to unilaterally appoint or remove high-level military and civilian personnel. These findings have implications for our understanding of the dynamics of power-sharing and institutional change in autocracies.

The Strategic Logic of Islamophobic Populism

AbstractIn Europe, the rise of populism is coupled with the rise of Islamophobia, vividly evident with exponential increases in votes for anti-Islam political parties in national elections. These parties portray Islam and Muslims as threats and maintain a position that Islam (as a religion and culture) is a threatening contrast to European values. By analysing Islamophobic discourses of the French National Front, Alternative for Germany and the Dutch Freedom Party, this article argues that Islamophobic populism targets not only Muslims, but also the incumbent leaders. By looking at the current dynamics of public opinion, this article explains how Islamophobic populism functions as an electoral strategy.

Technology, Venture Capital, and SWFs: The Role of the Government in Forging Innovation and Change

SWFs have pursued VC investments for a variety of reasons, that can be summarized in three main motivations: 1) Strong returns from innovative technologies (disrupting incumbents); 2) Asset class diversification; 3) Diversification of local economies and other positive economic spillovers The focus on returns is perhaps most obvious, but also one of the more difficult to achieve. While VC has enjoyed historically high returns, a flood of investors into the space, often driven by a need to overcome low returns in debt assets, risks making the asset class a victim of its own success. While SWFs are eager to invest in venture capital, many SWFs are also recognizing that they must be careful in selecting when and how to invest. The search of stable and durable returns may include hedging against incumbent leaders. When they invest in a unicorn, they also aim to be part of the new economy that will lead the corporate world in the coming decades and back those companies that will amass the industry profits and market share. For example, it is reasonable for a SWF with a strong portfolio exposition to the banking industry to invest also in fintech companies that may disrupt the whole financial sector in the near future. The same logic applies to sectors such as retail, logistics, healthcare, hotel management, or transportation, that are being already disrupted by startups using new technologies, procedures and solutions. SWFs’ interest in VC is not drive solely by returns, however. Venture investing is also part of a broad strategy of diversification. SWFs want to diversify their portfolios to balance and smooth their exposure to different asset-classes. There is a third reason for SWF interest in VC that is specific to government-owned funds such as SWFs: economic development and the logic of learning how to foster innovation ecosystems. When a pension fund invests in tech-based startups it pursues the first two objectives mentioned above: returns and diversification. Yet, in the case of SWFs, implementing a VC investment program may have a third motivation and benefit: the economic spillovers. SWFs can use these new technologies developed in their portfolio companies to foster economic development, enhance change, and diversify their economies beyond natural resources into stronger value-added economic sectors. In this way, getting access to the latest technologies would allow developing economies with established SWFs (recall that most of SWFs are located in developing economies) to leapfrog in terms of economic development. SWFs can help to transfer the most advanced technologies used by innovative startups in their portfolios to the rest of the economy, looking for efficiency gains in traditional and new sectors.

The political economy of aid allocation: Aid and incumbency at the local level in Sub Saharan Africa

Aid allocation within countries is often thought of as a strategic action by the incumbent leaders to further their own goals. Theoretically, however, the effects of aid may be either positive or negative and the empirical evidence is limited. By matching geo-coded data on aid projects to 101 792 respondents in five waves of the Afrobarometer, we investigate the effects of aid on incumbency support using project fixed effects. We estimate the effects for World Bank aid and Chinese aid separately and find positive effects for the former and no robust effect for the latter. For neither project donor do we find effects on turnout and that aid is not targeting areas with previously higher incumbency support. We find little support for the notion that economic voting is driving the result as individuals self-perceived economic conditions are not affected. The positive effects for the World Bank aid projects seem to be mediated by trust in the politicians, whereas we find no effects of Chinese aid on trust.

The Crisis of International Criminal Law in Africa: A Regional Regime in Response?

This article considers the African Union’s (AU) proposal for a regional court for international crimes under the Malabo Protocol 2014 (Protocol). It places that within the AU’s rejection of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for African Heads of States that are not party to the Rome Statute and a more general protection of incumbents. It argues that the enthusiasm for establishing a regional criminal court, which lacks jurisdiction to prosecute incumbents, has not been sustained and African states remain committed to the ICC. It shows that nevertheless the Protocol’s provisions on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, although imperfect, better address the specific character of armed conflicts in Africa than current international law, including the Rome Statute of the ICC. It concludes that the regional court for international crimes is unlikely to be established unless the ICC takes further action against incumbent leaders but that the Protocol’s provisions could be used in the development of a more Africa-centric international law.

Nation-state or nation-family? Nationalism in marginalised African societies

AbstractScholars have long puzzled over strong nationalism in weak African states. Existing theories suggest that (a) incumbent leaders use nationalistic appeals to distract people from state weakness; or (b) citizens use nationalistic claims to exclude rival groups from accessing patronage and public goods. But what explains robust nationalism in places where politicians seldom visit and where the state under-provides resources, as is true across much of Africa? We propose a theory of familial nationalism, arguing that people profess attachment to a nation-family instead of to a nation-state under conditions where the family, and not the state, is the main lifeline. We substantiate it using surveys from the border between Niger and Burkina Faso, where an international court ruling allowed people to choose their citizenship, thus providing a test for nationalism in marginalised communities. We supplement the border data with surveys and focus groups from the capitals of both countries.

Contributions and constraints to continuity in Mexican-American family firms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the contributions of both successors and incumbent leaders to family firm continuity, using insights from the family business succession literature and cultural dimensions theory. Design/methodology/approach In a qualitative study, the succession practices of 19 Mexican-American family firms were examined. Findings The findings are encapsulated by seven propositions and a model of Mexican-American family firm generational contributions and constraints to family business continuity. Originality/value In-depth interviews with immigrant and second generation family firm leaders revealed both traditional family firm succession patterns and atypical succession patterns, including generational inversion and equals across generations.

Presidential Term Limits and the African Union

AbstractA growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the article frames the manipulation of presidential term limits as “undemocratic changes of the constitution”. From this perspective it argues for a more active role for the AU in monitoring and enforcing constitutionalism and respect for democratic standards by member states when they amend their constitution. It concludes with a tentative set of principles to guide processes of constitutional change in Africa.

Mapping successors' expectations: decoding factors responsible for effective succession in Indian family businesses

The purpose of our paper is to better understand the association between leadership succession in family owned businesses and its impact on family owned firm. In order to understand the salient features of succession and performance in Indian Family Businesses a survey on succession planning and management for Family owned businesses was done by Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India to identify expectations concerning successors: 1) from the incumbent leader; 2) from the family. This survey was conducted to determine successor's future plan that are relevant for a family business to consider for planning before actual succession in business. This paper discusses the summary findings on some of the influential variables discovered during the survey. This article is also an attempt to elucidate on the process of succession in Indian family businesses and describe the magnitude of post succession impact on these firms.

The king can do no wrong: On the criminal immunity of leaders

In its recent anti-corruption campaign, China removed the criminal immunity originally enjoyed by its leaders. Absent fundamental changes in the political institution—in which incumbent leaders, instead of citizens at large, select the next leaders—such a partial reform pays off only if (i) it takes place at the “right” time, (ii) it goes easy on corrupt low-rank officials, and (iii) the government is reasonably centralized. Failing any of these, such a partial reform would lead to rampant corruption throughout the government hierarchy—an outcome far worse than retaining leader immunity.

Weathering the Storm: Conditional Effects of Natural Disasters on Retrospective Voting in Gubernatorial Elections—A Replication and Extension

Previous research shows that uncontrollable events like natural disasters hinder incumbent leaders’ chances at re-election, but also suggests that competent responses to such crises can benefit incumbents. Replicating and extending the work of other researchers, I show that disasters are informative events in retrospective voting where leaders have the opportunity to demonstrate competence and be rewarded by voters while incapable leaders face punishment for their failure to respond to such a crisis. Governors see greater electoral rewards for demonstrating competence when disaster damage is high as well as when the political situation is more difficult. In the context of a leader’s decision-making process, this reveals a complex and conditional relationship between voters and the leaders they are evaluating.

What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision

Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explicitly modeling political competition, I show that there is actually no resource curse from remittances. When there are challengers who can threaten to replace the incumbent leader, the best that any challenger can do is to offer not to take advantage of households’ provision of public-good substitutes, which induces the incumbent to try to match the offer. In equilibrium, public good provision is independent of remittances. This result holds even when no challenger can credibly commit to maintaining her offer once she is in power.

THE “RALLY ’ROUND THE FLAG” EFFECT IN TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN–CHINA RELATIONS

AbstractThis study examines the impact of China's growing territorial ambitions on Japanese public opinion. By experimentally manipulating perceived territorial threats from China, we tested two potential mechanisms of increased support for a conservative incumbent leader in Japan. The first is the “rally ’round the flag” model, in which threats universally boost support for the leader through emotion. The second is the “reactive liberal” model, in which support from conservatives remains constant, but threatened liberals move toward supporting the conservative leader. Two survey experiments provided no support for the emotion-based “rally ’round the flag” model, but they lent support for the reactive liberal model in explaining the impact on Japanese public opinion. However, the second experiment indicated that priming with an image of the prime minister that highlights his role as the supreme commander of the national defense forces completely eliminated the gain in approval rates among liberals.

Political Instability and the Failure of Deterrence

We focus on the interaction of an incumbent leader, an elite who can seize power, and a separate country wanting to maintain a peaceful status quo. Both leaders and elites are distinguished between hawks, who benefit from conflict, and doves, who prefer peace. We show that while deterrence is successful when leaders are perfectly secure, it breaks down when leaders are insecure because hawks can escape punishment and doves use the threat of international conflict to quell internal challenges. These deterrence failures have important implications for various foreign policy positions that conceptually rely on the logic of deterrence.

Local governance and the quality of local infrastructure: Evidence from village road projects in rural China

Research has shown that allowing local communities to elect their own leaders increases local infrastructure investment. However, much less is known about the effects of local governance reform on the quality of local infrastructure. This paper examines the effects of governance reform implemented in rural Chinese villages on the quality of village road projects. We conduct surveys in 101 rural villages and collect data related to the implementation of the reform over the last two decades. We also measure the quality of over 550 village road projects completed in these villages. Using fixed effects and instrumental variable estimation methods, we find that the implementation of village governance reform increases the quality of village road projects. We also find evidence supporting the following effect mechanisms: (1) village leaders become younger and more educated, (2) high quality road projects increase incumbent leaders' re-election chances, and (3) village residents participate more actively in the management and monitoring of village road projects.

When Going to War Is Costly: A Comparative Study of Audiences and the Partisan Press

Much of the conventional wisdom about partisan media effects is based on the single case of the United States. Without more comparative research, we know little about whether the findings are generalizable, however, and thus cannot be certain of their causes. But comparative research presents several challenges. This paper takes advantage of the case of the War on Iraq to examine the effects of partisan press coverage on perceptions of leaders and ultimately on voting behavior in two countries, the United States and Britain. We test three competing hypotheses of partisan media effects. We find support for the argument that the reputation of the incumbent party moderates the influence of partisan coverage on perceptions of war but also show that opposition partisan media coverage undermines perceptions of the qualities of incumbent leaders. Media outlets that support the incumbent do not have similar positive effects. We conclude that the war cost a left-wing leader, Blair, more than a right-wing leader, Bush, because of (1) the ambivalence of incumbent-supporting newspapers in Britain, (2) the absence of a parallel to the boost in approval that incumbent-supporting newspapers provided for Bush, and (3) greater damage to perceptions of Blair’s attributes among readers of opposition-supporting newspapers.

Electoral incentives, term limits, and the sustainability of peace

One of the few stylized facts in international relations is that democracies, unlike autocracies, almost never fight each other. Recent empirical findings show that binding term limits invalidate this result: democratic dyads in which at least one country imposes term limits on the executive are as conflict prone as autocratic and mixed dyads. Moreover, in democracies with two-term limits conflicts are more likely during the executive's second term. To rationalize these findings, we model international relations as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma. We show that the fear of losing office makes democratic leaders less willing to start costly conflicts. Crucially, this discipline effect can only be at work if incumbent leaders can run for re-election. Term limits thus make it harder to sustain peaceful relations.

Incumbent policy, benefits provision, and the triggering and spread of revolutionary uprisings

This article analyzes revolutionary uprisings, such as the Arab spring of 2011. Revolutions occur with an inherent probability dependent on a country’s characteristics. A country’s incumbent leader can decrease this probability by providing benefits to a population, e.g., public goods such as necessities of life, health care, safety, and education. We equate the probability of revolution with Granovetter’s equilibrium proportion of a population that joins a revolution. Decreased benefits provision increases the share of revolutionaries which, in turn, decreases the cost of revolt which helps resolve the free-rider problem implicit in revolting. The article quantifies how the incumbent chooses whether or not to provide benefits, and how many benefits to provide. We account for the unit cost of providing benefits and for the effects of the benefits provided, adjusted for whether the inherent revolution probability is low or high. Combining the modeling approaches, i.e., how revolutions spread and how the incumbent provides benefits, enriches our understanding of which factors affect revolutions and of how populations and their incumbent leaders interact. The model helps to understand the logic of revolutionary uprisings and how they can be curtailed.

The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence

Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.