Abstract

AbstractA growing number of states have modified constitutionally determined presidential term limits or adopted a flexible interpretation of relevant constitutional provisions to allow incumbent leaders additional terms in the highest office. This article investigates African Union (AU) responses to attempts to overturn or weaken term limits on executive power, one of the most tenacious constitutional trends in Africa. Inspired by the AU's well-established discourse on “unconstitutional changes of government” under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, the article frames the manipulation of presidential term limits as “undemocratic changes of the constitution”. From this perspective it argues for a more active role for the AU in monitoring and enforcing constitutionalism and respect for democratic standards by member states when they amend their constitution. It concludes with a tentative set of principles to guide processes of constitutional change in Africa.

Highlights

  • Africa has become a key landscape for presidential tenure reform over the past 20 years, with more than 50 attempted or successful changes to presidential term limits in African Union (AU) member states

  • The discrepancy between the legality and legitimacy of some regimes has led the AU to recognize the pressing need to evaluate the legitimacy of regimes against its broader agenda of democratization and constitutionalism

  • This is the background against which the AU, through the Peace and Security Council (PSC), called for the development of guidelines for constitutional amendment.[101]

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Africa has become a key landscape for presidential tenure reform over the past 20 years, with more than 50 attempted or successful changes to presidential term limits (to introduce or tighten them, or to remove or relax them) in African Union (AU) member states. This article suggests that the debate on term limits should be situated in the AU’s approach to constitutionalism and the rule of law, including its agreed role in promoting and protecting these norms It argues that the AU already has a normative framework in place that commits its members to constitutionalism and the rule of law, and that this provides the basis for developing a more robust monitoring mechanism for scrutinizing and assessing the way in which presidential term limits are imposed, altered or removed. After the Cold War, a broad consensus emerged in favour of democratization and consolidation of democratic institutions[11] and, gradually, constitutional mechanisms that seek to tackle the problems of excessive executive power were adopted These mechanisms included strengthened legislatures,[12] decentralization[13] and protection of judicial independence.[14] Limits on the duration and number of terms a president may hold office is one of these mechanisms. 12 JD Barkan “Legislatures on the rise?” (2008) 19/2 Journal of Democracy 124; R Mattes and S Mozaffar “Legislatures and democratic development in Africa” (2016) 59/3 African Studies Review 201

13 N Steytler “Domesticating the leviathan
32 Y Roznai “Unconstitutional constitutional amendments
Findings
CONCLUSION
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