Abstract
This article analyzes revolutionary uprisings, such as the Arab spring of 2011. Revolutions occur with an inherent probability dependent on a country’s characteristics. A country’s incumbent leader can decrease this probability by providing benefits to a population, e.g., public goods such as necessities of life, health care, safety, and education. We equate the probability of revolution with Granovetter’s equilibrium proportion of a population that joins a revolution. Decreased benefits provision increases the share of revolutionaries which, in turn, decreases the cost of revolt which helps resolve the free-rider problem implicit in revolting. The article quantifies how the incumbent chooses whether or not to provide benefits, and how many benefits to provide. We account for the unit cost of providing benefits and for the effects of the benefits provided, adjusted for whether the inherent revolution probability is low or high. Combining the modeling approaches, i.e., how revolutions spread and how the incumbent provides benefits, enriches our understanding of which factors affect revolutions and of how populations and their incumbent leaders interact. The model helps to understand the logic of revolutionary uprisings and how they can be curtailed.
Highlights
Background and prior literature Background The Arab spring caused the eventual disposal of a number of autocratic leaders in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
Examples of instigating events are of a street vendor harassed by police and unleashing untapped frustration causing revolution, or any event where an incumbent has to decide whether to react with strategies such as no benefits provision or accommodation, or fraudulent elections generating results stirring the population
The equilibrium proportion is equated with the revolution probability, affected by the inherent revolution probability and the incumbent’s benefits provision
Summary
An inherent revolution probability is considered, dependent on a country’s characteristics This probability is affected, and potentially decreased, by the incumbent leader of a country providing benefits to the population, e.g., public goods such as health care and security. The incumbent leader of the country can decrease the revolution probability by providing benefits to the population, e.g., public goods such as health care, education, and security. The riot spreads as described by Granovetter (1978), and is affected by the inherent revolution probability and the incumbent’s benefits provision. Combining the two modeling approaches provides richer insights into how revolutions spread and how incumbents can govern or ignore their spread Such insight is useful for incumbents, populations, revolutionaries, opponents of revolutionaries, policymakers, and leaders and actors in neighboring countries. Notes We thank two anonymous referees of this journal for useful comments
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