Judicial recruitment in post-communist context: informal dynamics and façade reforms

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article focuses on judicial recruitment in post-communist countries and highlights gaps between law and practice which are due to intervening informal dynamics. The case study on Georgia is suitable to explore the power of informality in increasingly formalized systems of decision-making and also in the ones that allocate considerable powers to judges. The article draws inspiration from and contributes to the limited but growing scholarship on informality in judicial governance. It relies on extensive empirical research to discern informal criteria and methods for selecting judges which embody the interests and preferences of the judicial elite and turn elaborate formal rules and procedures into the convenient façade that covers up informal dealings. It signals that recruitment mechanisms, even if structured to eliminate independence-threatening dynamics, can emerge as means of perpetuating the mentality of conformity and help prevent the consolidation of counter-elites willing and able to challenge the dominance of the incumbent leadership.