In October 1922 the British Government regulated the status of Transjordan under the mandate by agreeing to the following 'Assurance': 'Subject to the approval of the League of Nations, HBM's Government will recognize the existence of an independent Government in TransJordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir Abdullah ibn Husain, provided such government is constitutional and places HBMG in a position to fulfil their international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two governments'. 1 Publication was made conditional on a further period during which the Amir Abdallah was to prove his reliability a point on which the Colonial Office never felt completely reassured. 2 , However, during the following fifteen months there were no particular indications that developments in and about Transjordan were not leading towards the consummation envisaged. The 'Assurance' was broadcast in Amman by the High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, on May 25, 1923 ever since celebrated in Jordan as Independence Day. A memorandum 'on the present situation and future prospects in TransJordan' presented on February 1, 1924 by Sir Gilbert Clayton, chief Secretary of the Palestine Government, to the High Commissioner, was by no means unhopeful in tenor, though it admitted the Amir to be of 'extravagant habits'. 3 By then, however, it was apparent that Abdallah's fortunes, insofar as they depended upon the goodwill of his British mentors, had begun to take a serious turn for the worse. On January 23, 1924 the Duke of Devonshire, Colonial Secretary in the Conservative government of Bonar Law and Baldwin, informed the High Commissioner that HMG had 'noted with some concern the state of affairs in Transjordan' as revealed by recent reports and that, in consequence, any financial assistance to Transjordan would in future 'be voted in Parliament as a grant-in-aid not to Trans-Jordan but to Palestine; and the High Commissioner for Palestine will be made directly responsible for seeing that it is properly applied'. At the same time, the Duke took care to stress that the proposed measures implied 'no change in his [Abdallah's] status or in the relations of HMG towards His Highness. They are merely an administrative readjustment which it is found necessary to make in order to secure the smooth working of the existing system.' 4 Within a short time, however, the atmosphere changed for the worse. Already on February 8, 1924 Clayton, in another, corrective, memorandum, presented new evidence damaging to Abdallah which had just come to his knowledge on