Faith In Intuition Research Articles

Dispositional beliefs regarding “affect as information” determine the perception of persuasive self-efficacy

In this paper, we approach the relationship between believing that affect informs about the validity of a claim and believing that one persuasive strategy will be more or less efficient in changing one’s own attitude. In one study, participants were asked to select from a set of features of a persuasive context those they perceived to have more persuasive power. Results showed that these selections were clearly clustered in two groups, suggesting that individuals tend to select either more cognitive features or more experiential affective features. Individual measures regarding participants’ need for cognition and faith in intuition did not explain the tendency to select more one type of cluster or another, but this selection was determined by how much people generally believe that affect informs about the validity or goodness of a claim.

Meaning in life and intuition.

Three correlational studies and 2 experiments examined the association between meaning in life (MIL) and reliance on intuitive information processing. In Studies 1-3 (total N = 5,079), Faith in Intuition (FI) scale and MIL were correlated positively, controlling for religiosity, positive mood, self-esteem, basic need satisfaction, and need for cognition. Two experiments manipulated processing style. In Study 4 (N = 614), participants were randomly assigned to complete the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Fredrick, 2005) either immediately before (reflective/low intuitive mindset condition) or immediately after (control condition) rating MIL. Condition did not affect MIL. However, low MIL rated before the CRT predicted superior performance and greater time spent on the task. The association between reflection and MIL was curvilinear, such that MIL was strongly negatively related to CRT performance particularly at low levels of MIL. In Study 5 (N = 804), intuitive or reflective mindsets were induced and FI and MIL were measured. Induced processing style study did not affect MIL. However, those high in MIL were more responsive to the intuitive mindset induction. The relationship between FI and MIL was curvilinear (in this and the correlational studies), with intuitive processing being strongly positively related to MIL particularly at higher levels of MIL. Although often considered in the context of conscious reflection, MIL shares a positive relationship with reliance on gut feelings, and high MIL may facilitate reliance on those feelings. (PsycINFO Database Record

Affect and Cognition in Attitude Formation toward Familiar and Unfamiliar Attitude Objects

At large attitudes are built on earlier experience with the attitude object. If earlier experiences are not available, as is the case for unfamiliar attitude objects such as new technologies, no stored evaluations exist. Yet, people are still somehow able to construct attitudes on the spot. Depending on the familiarity of the attitude object, attitudes may find their basis more in affect or cognition. The current paper investigates differences in reliance on affect or cognition in attitude formation toward familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude objects. In addition, individual differences in reliance on affect (high faith in intuition) or cognition (high need for cognition) are taken into account. In an experimental survey among Dutch consumers (N = 1870), we show that, for unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, people rely more on affect than cognition. For familiar attitude objects where both affective and cognitive evaluations are available, high need for cognition leads to more reliance on cognition, and high faith in intuition leads to more reliance on affect, reflecting the influence of individually preferred thinking style. For people with high need for cognition, cognition has a higher influence on overall attitude for both familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude objects. On the other hand, affect is important for people with high faith in intuition for both familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects and for people with low faith in intuition for unfamiliar attitude objects; this shows that preferred thinking style is less influential for unfamiliar objects. By comparing attitude formation for familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, this research contributes to understanding situations in which affect or cognition is the better predictor of overall attitudes.

Faith in intuition and cognitive reflection

We compare two different measures of impulsive or intuitive behavior, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and a well-established psychological scale known as “Faith in Intuition” (FI), and investigate their relation to common biases in probability judgment. Using data from two laboratory experiments and a series of classroom experiments, the evidence we obtain is mixed. CRT scores and FI correlated in two data sets out of three. Both measures appear to be partially informative for some of the biases, but the effects are not systematic and depend on which exact probability-judgment question is used. Overall, CRT scores explain more variance in probability-judgment biases than FI scores. Further, gender effects interact with FI but not with CRT.

Individual differences in intuitive processing moderate responses to moral transgressions

Despite the widespread recognition that intuitive processing is integral to moral judgment, research has provided minimal support for the role of individual differences in faith in intuition (FI) in moral outcomes. We propose that reliance on intuitive processing is likely to influence moral behavior when people experience internally generated morally-relevant feelings. We conducted two studies to test this proposal, examining whether FI would moderate the effects of moral recall manipulations on morally-relevant outcomes. In Study 1 (N=120), FI moderated the effects of condition such that after imagining telling a lie in an email, people high in FI gave increased valuations of hand cleansing products. In Study 2 (N=197), FI moderated the effects of condition such that after recalling a past personally relevant immoral act, FI predicted less cheating on an unsolvable IQ test. Implications for moral psychology and the importance of theoretically informed methods for studying the role of individual differences in intuitive processing are discussed.

The Role of Positive Affect and Individual Differences in Intuition in the Accuracy of Pattern Recognition

Two studies examined the interaction of individual differences in intuitive processing style and induced positive affect in implicit pattern recognition in undergraduates. In Study 1 ( N = 187), induced mood and intuition interacted to predict accuracy in pattern recognition using an implicit learning paradigm. Participants high in intuition in a positive mood were the most accurate. In Study 2 ( N = 90), induced mood interacted with intuition to predict accurate reports of stimulus-reward contingencies in an operant conditioning paradigm. Intuition predicted accuracy in judgments of reward contingencies in the positive mood condition. This research suggests that individual differences in faith in intuition predict accurate implicit pattern recognition in the presence of positive affect.

Is the cognitive reflection test a measure of both reflection and intuition?

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one of the most widely used tools to assess individual differences in intuitive-analytic cognitive styles. The CRT is of broad interest because each of its items reliably cues a highly available and superficially appropriate but incorrect response, conventionally deemed the "intuitive" response. To do well on the CRT, participants must reflect on and question the intuitive responses. The CRT score typically employed is the sum of correct responses, assumed to indicate greater "reflectiveness" (i.e., CRT-Reflective scoring). Some recent researchers have, however, inverted the rationale of the CRT by summing the number of intuitive incorrect responses, creating a putative measure of intuitiveness (i.e., CRT-Intuitive). We address the feasibility and validity of this strategy by considering the problem of the structural dependency of these measures derived from the CRT and by assessing their respective associations with self-report measures of intuitive-analytic cognitive styles: the Faith in Intuition and Need for Cognition scales. Our results indicated that, to the extent that the dependency problem can be addressed, the CRT-Reflective but not the CRT-Intuitive measure predicts intuitive-analytic cognitive styles. These results provide evidence that the CRT is a valid measure of reflective but not of intuitive thinking.

A new measure of psychological misconceptions: Relations with academic background, critical thinking, and acceptance of paranormal and pseudoscientific claims

Many studies of psychological misconceptions have used tests with methodological and psychometric shortcomings, creating problems for interpreting individual differences related to misconceptions. To address these problems, we developed the Test of Psychological Knowledge and Misconceptions (TOPKAM), administering it to two samples of psychology students. Results from the first study (N=162) supported the TOPKAM's internal consistency and showed that the number correct on the TOPKAM was significantly predicted by measures of paranormal belief, faith in intuition, the ability to distinguish scientific fields and practices from pseudoscientific ones, and SAT scores. Also, scores on a measure of critical thinking dispositions in psychology predicted TOPKAM scores. A second study (N=178) supported the TOPKAM's test–retest reliability at four weeks and showed that TOPKAM scores were significantly predicted by the same critical thinking dispositions measure and also by scores on a test of critical thinking, argument analysis skill.

Relationships Between Support for the Death Penalty and Cognitive Processing

Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) posits that individuals process information rationally (measured by Need for Cognition [NFC]) or experientially (measured by Faith in Intuition [FI]). This study investigated whether information processing traits (NFC and FI) and states (CEST logic problems) are related to general death penalty attitude and sentencing verdict—and whether these relationships differed for students versus community members. FI and NFC were related to sentencing verdicts. An increase in FI was related to a higher likelihood of a death sentence; an increase in NFC was related to a higher likelihood of a life sentence. CEST logic problems were related to sentencing verdicts and general attitudes. However, these relationships were moderated: For community members, but not students, a decrease in rational processing was related to a higher likelihood of a death sentence and support for the death penalty. Results have implications for psychology and the legal system.

Medindo necessidade de cognição e fé na intuição: Tradução e adaptação das duas escalas à população portuguesa

This paper presents a study of the psychometric characteristics of a Portuguese version of two different scales: Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and Faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996). These scales assess the individuals disposition towards both elaborative, analytic mode processing (Need for cognition) and towards non-analytic, intuitive mode of processing (Faith in intuitions). The present data was obtained in three different studies where these measures were collected. As in the original scales these measures are shown to be independent.

Faith in Intuition moderates the effects of positive affect on gender stereotyping

This study examined whether individual differences in Faith in Intuition (FI) moderate the effect of PA on gender stereotyping. Participants (N=89) completed a measure of individual differences in FI and were randomly assigned in a 2 (mood, positive or neutral) × 2 (target sex, male or female) factorial design. After reading a description of a college student, identified as male or female, participants rated the likelihood that target would major in engineering (stereotypically male) and education (stereotypically female). A significant intuition×mood condition×target sex interaction emerged: Within the positive mood condition, FI was associated with stereotyping. Implications for research on mood and cognition as well as Cognitive Experiential Self Theory are discussed.

Dual-Processing Altruism

Altruism refers to an other-benefiting behavior that is costly but bears no direct profit to oneself. At least three different forms can be distinguished: help giving, altruistic punishment, and moral courage. We investigated the differential impact of two thinking modes, intuitive (System 1) and rational (System 2), on these three altruistic behaviors. Situational (state-related) thinking style was manipulated via experimental instructions and generally preferred thinking style (trait-related) was assessed via questionnaires. We found that of the subjectively preferred thinking styles (trait), faith in intuition (System 1) promoted sharing and altruistic punishment, whereas need for cognition (System 2) promoted volunteering in a situation that required moral courage. By contrast, we did not find a significant effect of situational thinking style (state) on any of the altruistic behaviors, although manipulation checks were positive. Results elucidate the affective-motivational underpinnings of different types of altruistic behaviors.

Faith in intuition and behavioral biases

We use a 15-item self-report questionnaire known as “Faith in Intuition” to measure reliance on intuitive decision making, and ask whether the latter correlates with behavioral biases involving a failure of Bayesian updating. In a first experiment, we find that higher report scores are associated with an increased use of the representativeness heuristic (overweighting sample information). We find no evidence of increased conservatism (overweighting prior information). The results of a second experiment show that more intuitive decision makers rely more often on the “reinforcement heuristic” where successful decisions are repeated even if correctly updating prior beliefs indicates otherwise. However, this effect depends on the magnitude of incentives.

The role of faith in intuition, need for cognition and method of attitude formation in implicit–explicit brand attitude relationship strength

We tested the hypothesis that Faith in Intuition (FI) would moderate implicit–explicit attitude relationship strength for attitudes formed via associative processes, but not propositional processes. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that FI moderated I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via evaluative conditioning. High FI people had stronger I–E correlations. Experiment 2 showed that FI did not moderate I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via propositional reasoning. Those low in Need for Cognition (NC), however, showed stronger I–E correlations than those high in NC. The importance of considering trait variables in combination with the method of attitude formation is discussed.

Age and gender differences in preferences for rational and experiential thinking

Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory assumes that reasoning conforms to a parallel dual processing model (comprising rational and experiential systems), through which we make sense of the world. The Rational Experiential Inventory was developed to measure an individual’s preference for rational (need for cognition) and experiential (faith in intuition) thinking, with individual differences proposed to influence the respective dominance of each. While small but consistent gender effects have been found previously, age effects have rarely been reported or investigated across the lifespan. We examine both age and gender differences in Rational Experiential Inventory scores, using combined data from five studies involving adult participants ( n = 520, 61.9% male) with a mean age of 41.45 years ( SD = 11.73, range 20–74 years). Results suggest a convergence of the rational and experiential systems in adulthood, although the timing may be different for women and men. In later adulthood, the relationship appears to diverge again.

Emotional Responses to Televised PSAs and Their Influence on Persuasion: An Investigation of the Moderating Role of Faith in Intuition

This research examines the influence of message recipients' emotional responses to televised PSAs on their attitudes toward the advocated issues. Integrating the affect-as-information paradigm and Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory, this research hypothesizes that message-induced emotions will have a greater influence on persuasion for individuals who have a strong faith in intuition than for those who have a weak faith in intuition. Overall, the main hypothesis was partially supported. There is some indication that faith in intuition moderates the influence of message-induced emotions on persuasion such that people with a stronger faith in intuition tend to rely more on experienced emotions when making judgments. The moderating effects of faith in intuition, however, appear to be confined to specific PSAs and discrete emotions.

Authoritarianism and its relationship with intuitive-experiential cognitive style and heuristic processing

Two studies examined the relationship between authoritarianism, cognitive style and heuristic processing. Focusing on Epstein’s (2003) cognitive-experiential self-theory, Study 1 shows that authoritarianism is related to Epstein’s dimension of faith in intuition, but not need for cognition, even when controlling for individual differences in need for structure. Study 2 confirms that authoritarianism is related to greater heuristic processing. The discussion suggests ways in which individual differences in cognitive style and heuristic processing may account for established effects of authoritarianism.

Characterizing High-frequency Coincidence Detectors

<P>The experience of meaningful coincidence has been reported throughout time and different cultures. Stories involving coincidence appear in movies, song, and literature. Popular attention to coincidence also has been increasing. Meaningful coincidence is defined informally; these experiences range from having dreams come true to running into someone you’ve just thought about. Synchronicity is related to meaningful coincidence, and is defined as an external state (eg, experiences) that matches an internal state (eg, thoughts, feelings).</P> <H4>ABOUT THE AUTHORS</H4><P>Stephanie L. Coleman is a PhD candidate at University of Missouri-Columbia. Bernard D. Beitman, MD, is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, University of Missouri–Columbia. </P><P>Address correspondence to: Bernard D. Beitman, MD, Department of Psychiatry, University of Missouri-Columbia, Three Hospital Drive, Columbia, MO 65201; fax 573-884-5936; or e-mail <A HREF="mailto:beitman@health.missouri.edu">beitman@health.missouri.edu</A>. </P><P>Ms. Coleman and Dr. Beitman have disclosed no relevant financial relationships. </P><P>10.9999/00485713-20090423-01 </P> <H4>EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES</H4><OL> <LI>Describe the statistical and personality variables that influence detection of coincidence.</LI> <LI>State that high frequency coincidence detectors may be self-referential or vital.</LI> <LI>Recognize that characteristics including intense emotion, faith in intuition, search for meaning, and religious commitment predispose people to detect coincidences.</LI></OL>

Faith in intuition is associated with decreased latent inhibition in a sample of high-achieving adolescents.

Decreased latent inhibition (LI), reflecting an inability to screen from awareness stimuli previously experienced as irrelevant, has been associated with psychosis. Recent research has suggested, however, that low LI is associated with increased creative achievement in high-functioning individuals (S. H. Carson, J. B. Peterson, & D. M. Higgins, 2003). This study examined the relationship between LI and individual differences in the tendency to rely on intuition to make decisions. Participants scoring higher on a Faith in Intuition factor consisting of items relating to affect tended to have decreased LI. LI was not related to a rational thinking style or to a factor consisting of items relating to a holistic type of intuition. Furthermore, those high in faith in intuition benefitted more from a preexposure condition in which participants received the relevant stimuli in the first phase of the task than did those scoring medium and low in faith in intuition. An explanation is offered for the link between faith in intuition and LI, building on past theory and research on the biological basis of LI and associations with openness to experience and creativity.

The Impact of Attitude Accessibility and Decision Style on Adolescents' Biased Processing of Health-Related Public Service Announcements

This article examines how cognitive structures and processes that highlight some aspects of messages but inhibit the salience of others affect adolescents' processing of public service announcements (PSAs). The cognitive structures assessed were attitude accessibility and decision styles (need for cognition and faith in intuition). A 2 (gender: male vs. female) × 2 (race: Caucasian vs. African American) × 4 (message type) mixed design with message type as a within-subjects factor was utilized. Three hundred twenty-five teens ( M age = 14.97) were randomly assigned to view one PSA of each type, presented in a random order. Multilevel modeling analyses showed that attitude accessibility and need for cognition interact with attitude to affect adolescents' biased processing while faith in intuition negatively predicts perceived message bias. Race and gender were also significant predictors of perceived message bias. Implications for message design and health communication are discussed.